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Abstract
A “moral dilemma” is a situation in which there is more than one obligatory course
of action, but to act on one choice means to not act upon the others. Moral dilemma arises
when an action, or inaction, results in “wrongness” because other morally correct
obligations are rendered unattainable. Sometimes prolonged exposure to moral dilemma
leads to a phenomenon known as “moral distress.” Moral distress is a negative feeling or
state that is experienced when a person makes moral judgments about a situation in which he
or she is involved, but, due to one or more constraints, does not act upon those judgments.
This inability to resolve conflicting moral judgments may be caused by a conflict of duty.
The United States Military acknowledges situations of moral dilemma when soldiers
experience difficulty in determining a correct course of action because of “right versus
right” conflict in duty or in values. This happens, for example, when physicians who join
the military assume a dual role – that of physician and military officer. The military
physician must sometimes act without being provided a satisfactory professional conceptual
model of a moral working-self for adjudicating potential conflicts in duties.
A comparison of professional duties and ethics of the medical and military
professions, a critique of methods of conflict resolution, and a review of issues of conflict
may provide insights into instances of perceived moral dilemma. After examining these
topics, I propose a moral topology of decision-making that allows military physicians the
conceptual space to preserve professional and personal integrity while upholding
professional standards of competence and ethical behavior embraced by both professions.
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Chapter 1: Moral Dilemmas of Military Physicians
I don’t know a soul who doesn’t maintain two separate lists of doctrines—the
ones that they believe that they believe; and the ones that they actually try to
live by.
Orson Scott Card
Ender’s Game
Light and matter are both single entities, and the apparent duality arises in the
limitations of our language.
Werner Heisenberg

“A moral dilemma is a situation in which an agent S morally ought to do A and
morally ought to do B but cannot do both, either because B is just not-doing-A or because
some contingent feature of the world prevents doing both.” 1 Moral dilemma most
frequently arises when principles, values, or duties come into conflict. Prolonged exposure
to moral dilemma sometimes results in a phenomenon known as “moral distress.” Moral
distress is a negative feeling or state that is experienced when a person makes moral
judgments about a situation in which he or she is involved, but cannot act upon those
judgments because of constraints. Constraints may be internal, such as those of conflicting
values, or external, such as institutional policy or procedure that interferes with professional
responsibility.
Soldiers in the United States military experience moral dilemma in what the Army
calls “right versus right” conflicts. These conflicts are typically described as existing due to
conflicts in duty or in values. 2 Examples of this include conflict between loyalties to squad
members versus loyalty to “The Big Army” or respect to a foreigner versus loyalty to

1
2

Christopher W. Gowans, Moral Dilemmas. New York: Oxford University Press, 1987. 3.
Personal conversation with LTC Joe Doty, 10 March 09. The seven Army Values are loyalty, duty, respect,
selfless service, honor, integrity, and personal courage.
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soldiers in a leader’s care. 3 This dissertation investigates moral dilemma as it applies to the
military physician who finds a conflict arising from his professional duty as a physician and
his professional duty as a military officer.
Physicians who join the military assume a dual role; that of physician and military
officer. Research into moral dilemma experienced by military physicians reveals that
military physicians must sometimes act without possessing a professional mental model, or
moral working-self, for adjudicating potential conflicts of duties in their new dual
profession. In some cases, this leads to moral distress. In other cases this leads to
inefficiency and harms to patients, institutions, and the profession. Common themes of
conflict are saving lives versus taking lives, personal responsibility versus following orders,
serving individual clients versus serving the public, serving to foster health versus serving to
foster national security, or serving an individual versus serving a group.
Chapter One is an introduction to typical reactions to the problem of moral dilemma.
From these reactions, representative cases of perceived conflict in professional duties as
experienced by military physicians are presented. The chapter concludes with a brief
introduction of various attempts that have been used to resolve this conflict between the
professional duties of a physician and a military officer, and my thesis which will provide
additional conflict resolution protocols for “Train the Trainer” or “Educate the Educator”
instruction.

3

Examples are from Army Center of Excellence for the Professional Military Ethic field research, office
communications, and stories collected about events currently happening in the Army.
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§1: Moral Dilemma: Reactions and Phenomenology
Two broad philosophical frameworks provide the theoretical underpinning and
framework for common reactions to moral dilemmas. 4 One group, rationalism, holds that
moral practice is primarily a form of human rationality. Rationalism emphasizes
mathematical reasoning, or a mathematical paradigm, as the highest form of human
rationality. Based upon the mathematical process of reasoning, good reasoning must include
a system or order, commensurability and hierarchy, abstraction, concepts, and principles.
Also based upon this mathematical paradigm, moral theory seeks to discover single,
universal principles. Action-guiding judgments must follow from these principles.
Rationalism tends to be skeptical of experience. Reform of moral theory must come from
“without,” such as from naturalistic “hard” sciences, mathematics, and logical systems of
reasoning.
The other group, experientialism, holds that moral practice is primarily a function of
experience, particularly experiences and relationships rooted within social contexts.
Reasoning is not limited to rigorous models of Platonic mathematics, but, rather, takes a
non-Platonic view of mathematics where discovery of natural occurrences are combined
with the creation of order, concepts, and principles. Although single, universal principles
are not excluded, the nature of cognitive framing, limits of knowledge, and the creative and
novel understanding of situations all contribute to the possibility of a multiplicity and
incommensurability of values and principles. Experientialism holds a greater concern for
the phenomenology of what it feels like to live a moral life. This group will use the
naturalistic “hard” sciences, mathematics, and reason to help define the range of morality.
4

Christopher Gowans, “Moral Theory, Moral Dilemmas, and Moral Responsibilities.” N.R.
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Experientialism also looks to history, biography, and literature to inform moral theory and
what it means to lead a good life.
Rationalism and experientialism agree that “Moral dilemmas are standardly defined
as situations in which an agent morally ought to (and can) do one thing, and morally ought
to (and can) do another, but cannot do both.” 5 Rationalism and experientialism disagree,
however, on whether or not concern is warranted with respect to the possibility or
experience of moral dilemma.
Rationalists tend to minimize concern with moral dilemma. They believe that moral
dilemma may not be consistent with their overall focus on reason and rationality. Some
rationalists dismiss moral dilemma by attempting to show how perceptions of moral
dilemma are misguided. Other rationalists may dismiss moral dilemma because they do not
consider moral dilemma to be an issue. When rationalists reason against moral dilemma
they usually consider one of three approaches. First, they claim that moral dilemma
conflicts with standard deontic logic. Second, they claim that a person experiencing moral
dilemma is cognitively defective. Third, they take a perspective, possibly a Kantian or
utilitarian perspective, and claim that ultimate principles cannot conflict, thus the problem
must be in using secondary principles or a misapplication of the ultimate principles.
Experientialism explicitly denies the soundness of the first and third approach
rationalism uses to reject moral dilemma. In the former case, experientialism questions the
worth of standard deontic logic and of forcing a moral system to subscribe to deontic logic.
In the latter case, experientialism claims that due to the multiplicity of values, the creation of

5

Ibid. 202.
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order, concepts, and values and the nature of human cognition and self-organizational
schemas, moral dilemmas are both a real and legitimately experienced phenomena.
That leaves the rationalism claim that a person experiencing moral dilemma is
cognitively defective. Although experientialist may acknowledge that perceptions of moral
dilemma may be due to a cognitive deficiency, they claim that cognitive deficiency only
explains some cases of perceived moral dilemma—not all cases. Some moral dilemmas
may be conceptually reframed such that there are a minimum or no conflicts in what a moral
agent ought to do. Alternatively, some agents may be able to utilize moral imagination to
create novel moral solutions not previously considered. Resolving moral dilemma may
involve training, education, and development of people to recognize true instances of moral
dilemma and to creatively resolve moral dilemma.
Resolving moral dilemmas may also involve utilizing non-moral factors, such as
regulating parameters, which will help in adjudicating how to act in the face of a true moral
dilemma. However, experientialism may have to acknowledge that sometimes no solution
exists for solving moral dilemma. Moreover, it may be undesirable to resolve all moral
dilemmas. In some cases, such as with Nazi physicians involved with racial purity programs
or with the medical personnel involved with the Tuskegee experiments, experiencing moral
dilemma, and being aware of the moral dilemma confronting them might have prevented
immoral and unethical actions. 6
As will be seen in the following chapters, proponents of claims that the professional
duties of a physician must conflict with the professional duties of military officers are often
rationalists. Their solutions often involve claiming that no dilemma exists because (1) a
6

See Appendix 3 and Appendix 4 for details of Nazi Medicine.
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hierarchy of duties must exist and, therefore, one set of duties must take priority over the
other; or (2) individuals who perceive moral dilemma or experience moral distress are
simply cognitively defective, hence, they should be morally developed to recognize that one
set of duties overrides the other.

6

§2: Moral Dilemma and the Military Physician
How do professional identity, mental models, organizational schemas, self-schemas,
and scripts contribute to moral dilemma? 7
Professional identity, mental models, organizational schemas, and self-schemas are
parts of the memory that are accessed, either automatically or through conscious choice.
Accessing these parts of memory often activates scripts, or semi-automatic responses, which
may be prompted by a combination of environmental cues and internal processes. Scripts
are dynamic, may evolve over time, may overlap, and some scripts may come to dominate a
personality. Consider the following example.
When Lance walks into a classroom early in the morning he assumes the role of a
teacher. As students ask him questions related to his science class, he can very quickly
access scripts that prompt him to answer. When Lance first started teaching he may have
had to consciously search his memory to activate the appropriate scripts, but over time they
have become so ingrained in his identity that they are almost automatic.
Later that night, when Lance enters his research lab, he assumes the role of an
experimental research scientist. As an experimental research scientist he may access various
scripts, some that were used as a teacher, but others used as a researcher. Because Lance
thinks of himself more as a teacher than a researcher, he has to exert more effort to access
some parts of his memory to activate his “researcher” scripts.
When Lance leaves the lab, he is attacked in the parking lot. Lance is a martial
artist. Long before teaching and research he had begun to self-identify himself as such.
7

For a detailed account of identity, self, and schemas, see Hannah and Avolio, “Transforming Follower Moral
Capacity: Toward A Holistic Developmental Model.” Primers on moral psychology and professionalism
are found Appendix 2 and Appendix 6 of this dissertation.
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Because of his long training, and ingrained self-identity, Lance is able to automatically react
according to various scripts to neutralize the threat.
Lance is a unique individual with unique memories. Environmental cues and
conscious thought access different mental models, organizational schemas, and self-schemas
– Lance as teacher, Lance as researcher, and Lance as martial artist. These, in turn, activate
scripts that translate into actions. Now consider this for the military physician.
Physicians and military officers often have different professional mental models. 8 It
is possible to identify the core professional mental models and scripts associated with each
profession. 9 When reduced to core professional identities, physicians often represent
socially sanctioned healers. Through medical school, ethics training, professional journals,
conferences, and on-the-job training, physicians are often presented with the professional
ideal to “maintain and restore human health.”
Soldiers, when reduced to their core professional identity, represent socially
sanctioned killers. Through basic training, officer schools, ranger schools, sniper schools,
“warrior training,” and marksmanship drills, soldiers are often presented with the
professional ideal to “kill men and take ground…and not to question it…follow orders.” 10

8

Concepts developed from personal conversations with Don Snider (Visiting Professor with Strategic Studies
Institute’s Research and Analysis Department, permanent U. S. Military Academy professor, former Army
officer, former Director for Defense Policy with the National Security Council in the White House). (4
Feb. 09) Dr. Snider related James H. Toner’s observation that military training seeks to create a core
identity of soldiers based on two ideals for the modern “Warrior:” (1) to kill and prepare to kill, and (2) to
die and prepare to die. Officers, however, are given the identity: (1) to kill and prepare to kill, (2) to die
and prepare to die, (3) be leaders of character and (4) be a servant to the nation. Dr. Toner is a Professor
Emeritus of International Relations and Military Ethics at the U.S. Air War College in Alabama.
9
This is detailed in the next chapter.
10
LTC Jeff Julum, Director of Education Army Center of Excellence for the Professional Military Ethic,
helped me understand the enculturation of the military ethos into officers and soldiers. The quote is from
Fred Downs, course notes. At a speech at West Point, Downs said to cadets “Your job is to kill the enemy
and take ground.” Grossman’s book, On Killing, expresses a similar account of soldiers as killers.
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The social sanction of professions includes an ideal that professionals have
permission, possibly even obligations in some cases, to perform their roles to benefit their
clients and society. Through training, education, and development, most physicians and
soldiers begin to inculcate some professional values into their moral working-self.
Physicians and soldiers have different scripts that initiate action. Various scripts and
professional mental models are, to varying extent, subsumed into their personal identity and
moral working-self.
What does this mean when the two professions are combined into one—that of the
military physician? Military physicians are still healers, but they are exposed to a culture
and climate of war. At least three areas of external socialization begin to blur the lines
between physician and officer – officer schools, marksmanship training, and persistent
exposure to both the history and the mythology of war and war-stories. The culture and
climate of the military fosters an expectation that all uniformed members of the military
should live and perform as a soldier. For the military physician, this expectation provides
pressure to subsume his professional medical identity into the identity of an officer-soldier.
The military physician often retains moral schemas of a healer that are,
fundamentally, in conflict with the moral schemas of a soldier. As environmental cues and
internal processing presents the military physician with conflicting mental models and
scripts, a military physician may find himself in a situation that might lead to moral dilemma
or moral distress.
Professional literature presents the following examples of perceived conflict of duty
for medical personnel in the military. These cases are influential in suggesting the need to

9

analyze the ethical and moral conflicts that may occur when a physician becomes a military
officer.

Medical Participation: Should physicians participate in war?
During the Vietnam War, many people, including individuals in the medical
profession, questioned the involvement of the United States in what they perceived as an
unjust war. Liberman, Gold and Sidel document that over 300 U.S. medical students signed
the following pledge in protest of the Vietnam War:
In the name of freedom the U.S. is waging an unjustified war in Viet Nam
and it is causing incalculable suffering. It is the goal of the medical
profession to prevent and relieve human suffering. My effort to pursue this
goal is meaningless in the context of the war. Therefore, I refuse to serve in
the Armed Forces in Viet Nam; and so that I may exercise my profession
with conscience and dignity, I intend to seek means to serve my country
which are compatible with the preservation and enrichment of life. 11
The medical students were concerned that given the historical dictum “first, do no
harm,” that military physicians could not maintain the ethical and moral values of their
profession if they participated in an unjust war.

Medical Interrogation: Physicians Involved with Torture
Bloche and Marks presents this hypothetical case based on reports given by
physicians involved with interrogations that employed methods that they considered to be
torture:
A physician newly deployed to ‘Irakistan’ must decide whether to post
physician assistants and medics behind a one-way mirror during
interrogations. A military police commander tells the doctor that ‘the way
this worked with the unit here before you was: We’d capture a guy; the
11

R. Liberman, W Gold, and V. Sidel, V. W. “Medical Ethics and the Military,” The New Physician 17:299309, 1968.
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medic would screen him and ensure he was fit for interrogation. If he had
questions he’d check with the supervising doctor. The medic would get his
screening signed by the doc. After that, the medic would watch over the
interrogation from behind the glass. 12
Even though the physician may not be conducting the interrogations, is he not only
enabling the use of torture, but also violating his responsibility to a patient in his care when
he treats a prisoner being subjected to questionable interrogation techniques? Of concern to
the military physician, is whether his moral responsibility is to the prisoner-patient or to the
military.
Medical Research: Participating in Weapons Development 13
Part of warfare is the continuing development of new or refined weapons to
neutralize enemy targets. As Victor W. Sidel maintains, in modern warfare, the
development of weapons requires medical knowledge. For example, as a military develops
“green bombs” it often must consult physicians to determine the effects of the bombs on
human targets. Moreover, for defensive purposes physicians are needed to evaluate
treatment plans.
In general, as weapons systems gain in sophistication, medical knowledge is also
needed to test their effects on biological targets. Such weapons programs include
biochemical agents, nuclear weapons, sonic or light-based systems. In many cases,
physician involvement may be an integral part of weapons development, testing, and

12

M. Gregg Bloche and Jonathan H. Marks, “When Doctors Go to War,” New England Journal of
Medicine (352)(1) (2006): 4.
13
This case is adapted from information in Victor W. Sidel’s “The Roles and Ethics of Health Professionals in
War.” A “Green Bomb” is an environmentally friendly explosive. They are safer to handle and not as
sensitive to sparks as conventional explosives.
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evaluation. Of concern to military physicians, is whether or not ethical obligation to “first,
do no harm” implies that physicians should refuse to participate in weapons development.

Medicine on the Battlefield: Battlefield Euthanasia
As reported by Captain Steven W. Swann, during World War II the following
situation occurred:
In the spring of 1944…elements of the 111th Indian Infantry Brigade were
engaged with Japanese forces in Burma. After 17 days of constant
fighting, the British units retired following their defeat. The infantry
carried their wounded with them as they marched. Early in the retreat,
Lieutenant Colonel John Masters, the Brigade Commander, was faced
with 29 wounded deemed to be terminal by the unit’s doctor. These
wounded suffered from extensive head wounds and multiple amputations,
and one soldier in particular had lost the lower half of his body. The unit
surgeon reported that these 29 had no chance to survive, but another 30
could be saved if they could be carried by those litter bearers carrying the
severely wounded. Lieutenant Colonel Masters decided to save the 30 that
had a chance of survival, and at his and his surgeon’s mutual reluctance,
had the severely wounded soldiers killed by gunfire from his own troops
so as not to allow them to fall into the hands of the Japanese. 14

Many medical professionals must make difficult triage decisions that result in death
for some patients. Some medical professionals on the battlefield consider it their duty to
help mortally wounded soldiers die peacefully, providing pain relief if possible. Of concern
to military physicians is whether or not, and to what extent, triage duties include
participation in battlefield euthanasia. Should military necessity require a military physician
to abandon his patients? In what circumstances, if any, should a military physician stand
aside while wounded soldiers are killed by gunfire?

14

Captain Steven W. Swann, Medical Corps USA, “Euthanasia on the Battlefield,” Military Medicine n.r.
(1987): 547.
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Experimental Medicine: Informed Consent 15
Randerson and Rockefeller document that experimental medicine has been used on
British and U.S. troops without obtaining informed consent from individual soldiers. The
following case, adapted from their findings, details the type of situation in which a military
physician may find himself during a normal course of his duties.
A physician stationed at Ramstein Air Base is sometimes responsible for the
administration of experimental care for novel biological and chemical agents. Recently the
physician has become involved in two experimental trials.
Trial 1: Pharm-X, an upcoming pharmaceuticals company has been working on a
clotting agent for use in emergency surgery. Internal studies performed by the company are
optimistic. Phase-1 and phase-2 clinical trials indicate that this new clotting agent will be a
success. However, unexpected financial concerns prematurely halted the studies. The
pharmaceutical company arranged with the military to supply the experimental clotting
agent to the military, if the military would in turn continue the testing. The physician is to
oversee the administration of the new experimental clotting agent to soldiers in need of
medical aid. He will provide the agent to combat medics so that they will unknowingly be
using the experimental agent on uniformed soldiers, instead of the currently approved agent,
in the field.

15

This case is adapted from stories related to medical experimentation in the military. A drug, NovoSeven,
was licensed in 1999 to treat hemophiliacs. England’s Ministry of Defense authorized its use in battlefield
trauma cases. For full story see James Randerson’s article, “Experimental drug given to British troops in
Iraq and Afghanistan” available on guardian.co.uk. The article was published in The Guardian on
September 16, 2006. See also John Rockefeller’s testimony before the U.S. Senate “Is Military Research
Hazardous to Veterans’ Health? Lessons Spanning Half a Century.” A Staff Report Prepared for the
Committee on Veterans’ Affairs. United States Senate December 8, 1994. 103d Congress, 2d Session –
Committee Print – S.Prt. 103-97.
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Trial 2: Biochemical warfare has long been known to represent a danger not only to
civilian populations but to soldiers in the field. As new insidious biochemical weapons are
developed, it is necessary to protect people, especially those in danger of exposure.
Preventive measures, such as vaccines, are an important part of defense. Although
there is an approved vaccination for subcutaneous anthrax, that vaccine has not been
approved for inhalation anthrax that soldiers are likely to encounter in combat. Despite this,
the physician is ordered to oversee that the new anthrax “vaccination” is given to all
soldiers. This is to be administered without obtaining informed consent. The vaccination
will be given as part of routine medical procedure.
As a physician it is normally considered unethical to administer trial medication to
patients without the patient’s informed consent. At issue is whether soldiers have given
their fully informed consent to receive treatments, even experimental treatments, when they
joined the military. If so, has this generalized consent relieved a military physician from the
professional responsibility of providing and obtaining individual informed consent from
each patient? Does a military physician who is following orders need to provide individual
patients with the opportunity to refuse treatments?
Medical Education: Training Soldiers in Medicine 16
Howard Levy, a dermatologist drafted into the U.S. Army Medical Department
during the Vietnam War, was ordered to train Special Forces medical aidmen in
dermatological skills. According to Levy’s knowledge, this training was to serve two
military functions. First, aidmen would use their medical training to care for the sick and
16

Information in this case is from Victor W. Sidel’s “The Roles and Ethics of Health Professionals in War”
and Elinor Langer’s “The Court-Martial of Captain Levy: Medical Ethics v. Military Law.”
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wounded of their unit. Second, aidmen would use their medical training as social-political
tools in combat. In the latter case aidmen could (1) refuse or withdraw medical treatment in
an attempt to coerce individuals, (2) use medicine as a bribe to gain information, power, or
command status, and (3) use medical techniques and medicine as interrogative devices.
Aidmen could abandon patients as needed to further military goals.
Levy maintained that such use of medical training was in conflict with and directly
violated his medical professional code of ethics. In particular such training violated the
noncombatant role of medical personnel, destroyed medical neutrality, and potentially
caused harm to individuals. According to the U.S. Army, Levy was bound by the Uniform
Code of Military Justice to willfully obey lawful orders.
Do military physicians have an obligation to place their interpretation of medical
ethics above their military orders? Is a military physician’s primary ethical duty to his
medical code of ethics or, as an officer in the military, is his primary duty to his military
code of ethics?

Battlefield Medicine: Care for a Civilian
Paul J. Schnearts explored the problematic situations developing in modern warfare
as medical personnel find themselves in situations where they must choose how to use
limited resources of personnel and materials when caring for non-military personnel:
As a reservist with a U.S. Army Forward Surgical Team, activated as part of
the Global War on Terror, I fully considered the many ethical conflicts I
might face. There would likely be young men who died as a result of
resource limitations. The apparent conflicting duties of a physician/soldier
needed to be contemplated and justified. The Geneva Convention, which sets
forth that a physician must care for both U.S. soldiers and enemy combatants
using standard medical triage and practice, had to be adhered to….I had not,
15

however, considered the impact societal differences would have on my
perceptions of what constitutes the ethical practice of medicine….A 3-yearold boy presented to our forward surgical team 22 days after a forced
emersion scald burn. The wound, which covered approximately 25% of his
little body, had a pattern consistent with abuse. As anticipated, without any
medical care, he had developed advanced burn wound sepsis with
progression to systemic shock. Upon arrival, he was toxic and in the act of
dying.
Despite this, with aggressive treatment, normal physiologic
parameters were restored relatively quickly. After initial stabilization, there
would be the need for continued fluid resuscitation, metabolic stabilization,
antibiotics, excision of the wound, nutrition, and, eventually, skin grafting.
This was an overall straightforward therapeutic plan. However, although our
unit is well equipped for initial stabilization and our collective knowledge
base was more than adequate to care for this child, we did not have the
necessary facilities to continue his therapy. A combat support hospital just 2
hours away could easily provide the needed resources. 17
The boy had a good chance of medical recovery, and was medically eligible for
treatment. But if the hospital had only limited supplies, supplies which may be needed to
perform their primary mission of combat support, what should the military physicians have
done to uphold their medical duties as physicians and to uphold their military duties as
officers?

17

Paul J. Schenarts, “Thee-year-old Boy with Burn Wound Sepsis: A Challenge to the Ethics of a Responsible
Surgeon.” Current Surgery 2004. n.r.
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§3: Thesis
In the above cases, the military physicians experienced moral dilemma when the
mental models and scripts they developed by participation in two separate professions
appeared to come into conflict. Given the core professional identities that they are trying to
combine – the physician as healer attempting to maintain his core identity while becoming a
military officer who is (1) trained to kill and be prepared to kill, (2) trained to die and
prepared to die, (3) a leader of character, and (4) a servant of the nation – it is
understandable that some military physicians feel a profound sense of discord when trying to
act in their dual professional role as military physician. 18
Are there true moral dilemmas in the examples presented? Assuming there are, what
solutions are typically found in the literature on dilemmas as experienced by military
physicians?
The literature on conflicting military physician duties offers two main solutions that
will collectively be referred to in this dissertation as the “either-or solution” or as “either-or
solutions.” These solutions follow rationalism in that proponents for either-or solutions
claim that no conflict exists because either physicians’ duties override officers’ duties or
vice versa. Historically we find that either-or solutions make for convenient and mostly
unambiguous policy implementation that can provide satisfactory conflict resolution in some
situations. Yet, as I will argue, the either-or solutions can leave moral dilemma, to some
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James Toner argues that every soldier shares a core professional identity to kill, to train to kill, to die, and to
train to die. James H. Toner, True Faith and Allegiance: The Burden of Military Ethics. 22-23. Toner
further quotes Boston University president, John Silber, “A person not prepared to use his skill, knowledge,
techniques, and all the weapons at his disposal for the purpose of killing on behalf of the United States of
America when ordered to do so has no business in the military.” Ibid.
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extent, unresolved or unsatisfactorily resolved for some individuals when a conflict of duty
is perceived.
The unresolved or unsatisfactory resolution of moral conflict is a result of three
closely related problems with the either-or solution. First, at a theoretical level, the either-or
solution tends to ignore, or minimize, the subtle yet significant fact that physicians’ codes of
ethics and military officers’ codes of ethics appear to be in conflict due to a difference in
background beliefs and professional functions of the two professions. 19 That is, inadequate
consideration is given to the professional identity or the moral working-self of the military
physician who must combine both professional roles. Scripts continue to come into conflict
because the core identity of a physician comes into conflict with the core identity of the
military officer. This may heighten the chance of, or perpetuate the experience of, moral
dilemma.
The second problem occurs at the clinical level. At this level are the external factors
that influence moral dilemma. The either-or solutions often do not provide adequate
consideration for the culture or ethical climate that persists surrounding the practice of
military medicine. As with the first problem, the culture or ethical climate of the working
environment of the military physician contributes to a confusion of professional identity.
Scripts may come into conflict due to conflict in professional core identities. This will
possibly contribute to the chance of, or experience of, moral dilemma. This dissertation
presents an exploration into either-or solutions and my conceptual framework of a moral
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Note that this is not a problem limited to physicians serving in the military. Public health officials must also
consider the possibility of the conflicting nature of rival professional duties when dealing with
communicable disease. For example, public health officials may have to consider the quarantine of
individual H1N1 (Swine Flu) patients against their swishes in order to protect the general public.
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topology for military physician decision-making which will provide additional
understanding and conflict resolution tools for individuals interested in moral dilemma.
A third problem occurs on a pragmatic level. There is a tendency among the some
proponents of the either-or solutions to advocate that military codes of ethics should always
be followed or that medical codes of ethics should always be followed in cases of conflict of
duty. During time of war, the military proponents may have a compelling argument that
military obligations and the necessity to protect the state may justify overriding a
physician’s medical duty to an individual. But, as indicated in Chapter Five, during times of
peace, military necessity may not require a physician to choose his military duties over his
medical duties. Likewise, the medical proponents may have a compelling argument that
medical obligation to the individual patient should be of overriding concern during times of
peace. In Chapter Five it is proposed that during times of war there is an obligation to the
military and to the necessity to provide security for the state that may require a physician to
follow his military duty. Extreme proponents of either of the either-or solutions tend to
view duty in absolute terms that propose that a military physician should always give higher
priority to either his military duties or his medical duties.
Chapter Two explores the conflict in professional codes, duties, and moral
identity of physicians and officers. Understanding these views is essential to understanding
why either-or solutions are embraced and why they do not always satisfactorily resolve
moral dilemma for military physicians. It is by understanding the possibility of conflicting
codes of ethics and by acknowledging the perspective of physician as healer and soldier as
killer that either-or solutions are to some extent defensible.
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Arguments for either-or solutions are presented in Chapter Three. It presents the
major themes and arguments of proponents on either side of the issue. Chapter Four
presents challenges to and limitations of the either-or solutions. That chapter shows how,
even though the either-or solutions are consistent with the rationalist approach of resolving
moral dilemma, either-or solutions may be unsatisfactory and leave the experience of moral
dilemma unresolved for some individuals. It then introduces the beginning of a new,
alternate way of understanding the professional role, identity, and relationship of the
military physician.
Chapter Five presents a new approach to minimizing moral dilemma as experienced
by some military physicians. Although it embraces the experientialism position of handling
moral dilemma, it will also present a moral topology of decision-making for the military
physician that should be acceptable to rationalism. The rationalist elements include reconceptualizing the relationship between a military physician and his clients making use of
parameters that can be used to regulate the rights and duties of military physicians and their
clients. This presents a type of hierarchical ordering system that allows the military
physician to analyze situations on a case-by-case basis so that he can make a professional
judgment as to how to uphold his professional duties. The experientialism elements include
understanding a new professional identity, or moral working-self, for the military physician.
With proper training, education, and character development – as well as institutional support
– this will help develop, modify, and inculcate new scripts for the moral working-self of the
military physician.

20

The newly developed moral topology presented in this dissertation will allow
philosophers and clinical ethicists to help some military physicians navigate instances of
moral dilemma. The moral topology allows trainers, educators, and developers to assist
military physicians with the development of the conceptual space needed to preserve
professional and personal integrity while upholding professional standards of competence
and ethical behavior.
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Chapter Two: Perceived Conflict

Happiness and moral duty are inseparably connected.
George Washington
Military medicine is a well conceived, well advised, and well established device,
system, or mechanism, the mission of which is to provide the Armed Services with a
quality or brand of medical coverage that is not only essential to the proper and
efficient function of the military but is moreover essential to the best interests of the
individual and of the national welfare.
Rear Admiral Lamont Pugh, USN
Surgeon General of the Navy, 1952

Chapter One introduces us to the concept that moral dilemma and moral distress are
experienced by physicians in the military because of a conflict in duty. Classic cases
illustrating moral dilemma were presented to introduce some of the issues prevalent in the
literature that demonstrate the perceived conflict of duty between the professional norms of
the medical professional and the military professional. To evaluate the legitimacy of this
conflict, it must be understood how these norms are developed and how the norms are
reinforced in the two professions.
Research into conflict of duty often lacks a theoretical understanding of the ethical
codes and codes of conduct that define the moral standards of a profession. This lack of
understanding may lead to a simplified view of the professional norms, roles, and
commitments that lead to a perception of a conflict of duties. To avoid mischaracterizing
the medical profession of the military profession, and to allow for a true understanding of
the power of the psychological forces surrounding the professional identities of medical and
military professionals, this chapter examines the theoretical and ethical foundations of the
norms of these two professions. The chapter seeks to provide an understanding of what
22

drives the perception that moral dilemma, as a result of conflict between medical duties and
military duties, is unavoidable within some aspects of military medicine.
This conflict of duty arises from a perception of differing professional norms that
hold the belief that physicians are responsible for healing and saving lives, while soldiers are
responsible for providing for the security of the state which may involve taking of life. If
the different conceptualizations of the medical profession and the military profession are
correct, it becomes understandable why some military physicians report experiences of dual
role conflict when it is not clear which set of professional duties should be followed. When
the assumptions of differing professional identities are accepted, either explicitly or
implicitly, it becomes understandable how, after identifying possible areas of conflict,
typical solutions more often than not attempt to adjudicate the conflicting duties by
advocating the primacy of one set of professional duties over the other, either on a global
scale or within a discussion of specific issues. Either-or-solutions initially appear
compelling when the proponents are allowed to assume that the professional duties of a
physician are, necessarily, in conflict with those of a soldier. The next chapter will explore
the either-or solutions in detail. This chapter examines the conceptualizations of the two
professions held by members of the professions and by society.
Sections One and Two of this chapter will present the theoretical underpinnings of
how the roles of physicians and military officers and the codes of ethics used by physicians
or military officers lead to the conclusion that the professions must come into conflict,
especially when united into that of the military physician. This may explain how outsiders
to the professions (and to some extent those inside the professions) come to the conclusion
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that the roles and ethics of physicians and military officers must conflict. This conflict leads
to the necessity of developing a method of resolving moral dilemma or adjudicating how to
professionally manage moral dilemma.
By understanding specific aspects of the professions that come into conflict, we can
better understand why some military physicians perceive and experience moral dilemma,
while others remain oblivious that there may be a conflict in duties. The degree that
conflicting aspects of each profession become part of an individual’s self-identities, and the
degree that environmental or cognitive prompts activate conflicting scripts, will regulate or
explain to what degree some military physicians may experience moral dilemma. For
example, individuals who whole-heartedly accept the military persona are less likely to
experience a conflict when asked to perform duties that benefit their military more than their
individual patients. Conversely, individuals who maintain a high degree of identity to their
physician training are more likely to experience a conflict when tasked to focus on mission
objectives when doing so will cause harm to their patients. Individuals who try to embrace
both identities may experience moral dilemma when environmental or cognitive processes
activate conflicting scripts either simultaneously or close enough in time that, at some point,
they are consciously aware of a moral dilemma developing if choosing one set of duties
necessitate not choosing the other.
This would explain why, from a rationalist perspective, only one set of duties should
apply in any give case. This is what could lead to either-or solutions. As a method of
inculcating this approach, it is possible that some rationalists would suggest that a military
physician experiencing moral dilemma should simply suppress or repress one or the other
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professional identities in an attempt to eliminate the conflict. To understand the specific
aspects of professional identity that may come into conflict for the military physician, the
next sections investigate the roles, codes of ethics, and hidden curricula that contribute to the
possibility of conflicting values and conflicting professional identities.
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§1: Different Roles
Why might people conclude that the central commitments of an officer are different
from those of a physician? Although the claim is well summed up by exposing the kernels
of their professional identities – physicians heal and soldiers kill – there is a complex
network of ideals that supports and encourages the view that these two professions must
come into conflict. In addition to the development of the central ethical commitments of
each profession, this network includes the development of mental models of the proper role
of the physician and the military officer. Training, education, and development within these
professions will, to some extent, imprint the respective ethos onto professionals in that
particular field.
The modern medical institution is composed of professionals and non-professionals
– physicians, nurses, assistants, pharmacists, therapists, researchers, and dieticians – whose
primary role is to provide the services and tools necessary to promote the health interests of
individual patients. Against the role of caring for an individual is a general, and probably
unavoidable, conflict between client-based service and public-based service.
The conflict between client-based service and public-based service can arise under
several different situations. Conflict can develop in at least three scenarios: when a
physician’s patient needs resources needed by other patients, when a physician’s patient
engages in behavior that endangers innocent third parties, or when a physician assumes the
role of both personal doctor and public health care coordinator.
Most professions have to prioritize among the needs of individual clients and
between the needs of clients and the needs of society at large. Although prioritization can be
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problematic, it is often of less concern when a profession can establish norms that define
whether or not the professional is primarily responsible for personal or public service. An
epidemiologist would serve in, prima facie, a public service field while a neurosurgeon
would serve in, prima facie, a personal service field.
Traditionally, the primary agent of the medical institution is the physician who cares
for individual patients. As the primary providers of health care services, physicians are
charged with providing an important service to the public through the medical treatment of
individuals. Physicians, like all professionals, are obligated to follow a code of conduct or
some instrument of self-control, such as The Hippocratic Oath, The American Medical
Association Code of Ethics, The World Medical Association’s Declaration of Geneva
Physician’s Oath, or various internationally accepted codes. How does this compare with
the ethos of the military officer?
The modern military institution is a government-controlled and -operated network of
professionals and non-professionals – officers, enlisted soldiers, civilian contractors,
educators, volunteers, and in some countries, draftees – whose primary role is to provide a
variety of tools and services that serve the security interests of a country. More so than
other professions, the military often has its role defined by an outside authority – the
government it serves. For example, the U.S. Military bases its actions on needs defined by
the duly elected or appointed representatives of the U.S. Government with great weight
given to the policies of the President, as Commander-in-Chief, and to the Secretary of
Defense. In general the government determines the national security interests and the
military determines how to uphold the nation’s interests as defined and prioritized by the
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government. The military can advise the government about various security interests and
methods of obtaining the defined goals, but the government usually determines what
constitutes security interests or how to prioritize various security interests.
The focus of this dissertation is the potential conflict that can develop when service
oriented toward an individual comes into conflict with service oriented toward a group, such
as a military unit or a nation. For medical personnel this can be expressed as a conflict in a
service oriented toward health versus service oriented toward national security. To
understand the potential for conflict better, consider the professional soldier who best
represents the military at a professional level equal to a physician – the military officer.
Military officers specialize in “the management of violence” with the responsibilities
of “(1) [the] organizing, equipping, and training of [his military force], (2) the planning of
its activities, and (3) the direction of its operation in and out of combat.” 20 This is markedly
different from the responsibilities of non-officers who “are specialist[s] in the application of
violence not the management of violence.” 21 Yet officers and soldiers share a core identity.
For example, in the U.S. Army, “Every soldier…is an infantryman…every soldier is a
‘trained killer.’” 22 Every soldier, and by extension, military officer, also shares a core
professional identity (1) to kill, (2) to train to kill, (3) to die, and (4) to prepare to die. 23
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Samuel P. Huntington, The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations,
(Cambridge, Massachusetts: The Balknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1957), 11.
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Huntington, The Soldier and the State, 17.
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James H. Toner, True Faith and Allegiance: The Burden of Military Ethics. 22-23. Toner further quotes
Boston University president, John Silber, “A person not prepared to use his skill, knowledge, techniques,
and all the weapons at his disposal for the purpose of killing on behalf of the United States of America
when ordered to do so has no business in the military.” Ibid.
23
Ibid. 23. Due to this core identity, unless a distinction is warranted I will use military officer rather with
soldier because it seems to be this particular focus that leads to the perception of conflict for the military
physician.

28

As providers of security services, officers are charged with providing an important
and essential service to the public. To achieve their mission goals, officers must ideally
focus less on self-serving interests and more on orientation towards community interests,
specifically the interests of the country the military serves. That is to say, they should not be
purely self-serving. Officers, like other professionals, are expected to follow a code of
conduct and exercise some measure of self-control as set forth in various codes of conduct
such as The Officer’s Commission and Oath, The Code of Conduct, The Laws of War, The
Soldier’s Creed, or various international laws.
Given this understanding of the role of the military officer, and the understanding
previously given regarding the role of the physician, what does this suggest about the role of
the military physician?
When military and medical roles are hybridized into a physician who is a military
officer, there might appear to be a non-controversial role – providing for the security of the
state and healing those clients under the professional’s care. In reality, attempts to combine
medical roles with military roles sometimes result in situations in which it is impossible to
satisfy the duties required of one or the other profession. The different roles and duties of
physicians and military officers create the potential for moral dilemma, because in choosing
to act on one set of duties, it is claimed, the other set of duties must be abandoned or
compromised. When one abandons or compromises one’s duty, one is not fulfilling one’s
professional code of ethics and an individual’s self-identity may become confused or
conflicted.
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§2: Codes of Ethics and the Hidden Curricula
Like all professionals, physicians and military officers are obligated to follow a code
of conduct or some instrument of self-control. Although codes of ethics can be legally
binding, or even required under certain circumstances, they are ultimately a prima facie
indication of an individual and a society subscribing to a prescribed set of moral duties.
This can be at the individual level, when an individual “professes” or publically takes an
oath to follow a code. It may also be at a social level where a society provides legal
sanctions for a profession to engage in certain activities provided members agree to be
bound to some level of ethical conduct—conduct usually sanctioned or publicized through
professional codes of ethics.
Codes of ethics and professional oaths perform several functions. Oaths provide a
declaration of belief, a structure of judging merit or demerit, and an instantiation of selfbinding duties or conduct. They also provide a framework for a professional mental model
or mental schema of a professional. In light of this, what do physicians’ codes of ethics
communicate about the ideals of physicians; and what do physicians’ codes of ethics reveal
about the mental schema or self-identity that may develop within a physician?
Consider several common codes subscribed to by the medical profession: The
Hippocratic Oath, The American Medical Association Code of Ethics Preamble, and the
World Medical Association’s Declaration of Physician Responsibility.
A translation of the original form, The Oath of Hippocrates states:
I SWEAR by Apollo the physician, and Aesculapius, and Health, and Allheal, and all the gods and goddesses, that, according to my ability and
judgment, I will keep this Oath and this stipulation - to reckon him who
taught me this Art equally dear to me as my parents, to share my substance
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with him, and relieve his necessities if required; to look upon his offspring in
the same footing as my own brothers, and to teach them this art, if they shall
wish to learn it, without fee or stipulation; and that by precept, lecture, and
every other mode of instruction, I will impart a knowledge of the Art to my
own sons, and those of my teachers, and to disciples bound by a stipulation
and oath according to the law of medicine, but to none others. I will follow
that system of regimen which, according to my ability and judgment, I
consider for the benefit of my patients, and abstain from whatever is
deleterious and mischievous. I will give no deadly medicine to any one if
asked, nor suggest any such counsel; and in like manner I will not give to a
woman a pessary to produce abortion. With purity and with holiness I will
pass my life and practice my Art. I will not cut persons laboring under the
stone, but will leave this to be done by men who are practitioners of this
work. Into whatever houses I enter, I will go into them for the benefit of the
sick, and will abstain from every voluntary act of mischief and corruption;
and, further from the seduction of females or males, of freemen and slaves.
Whatever, in connection with my professional practice or not, in connection
with it, I see or hear, in the life of men, which ought not to be spoken of
abroad, I will not divulge, as reckoning that all such should be kept secret.
While I continue to keep this Oath unviolated, may it be granted to me to
enjoy life and the practice of the art, respected by all men, in all times! But
should I trespass and violate this Oath, may the reverse be my lot! 24

Problems could arise for modern physicians trying to use this version of the medical
oath. To resolve these problems, updated versions of the Hippocratic Oath change various
aspects of the oath, e.g., eliminating pagan references, allowing for surgery, and promoting
the idea to protect and help patients. In addition to modified versions of the Hippocratic
Oath, other physician codes have become common.
Physicians who join the American Medical Association (AMA) are expected to
follow the AMA’s code of ethics. The basics of the AMA’s code can be found in The
American Medical Association Code of Ethics Preamble:
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Hippocrates, “The Oath,” translated by Francis Adams,
http://etext.library.adelaide.edu.au/mirror/classics.mit.edu/Hippocrates/hippooath.html
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The medical profession has long subscribed to a body of ethical statements
developed primarily for the benefit of the patient. As a member of this
profession, a physician must recognize responsibility to patients first and
foremost, as well as to society, to other health professionals, and to self. The
following Principles adopted by the American Medical Association are not
laws, but standards of conduct which define the essentials of honorable
behavior for the physician.
A physician shall be dedicated to providing competent medical care, with
compassion and respect for human dignity and rights.
A physician shall uphold the standards of professionalism, be honest in all
professional interactions, and strive to report physicians deficient in character
or competence, or engaging in fraud or deception, to appropriate entities.
A physician shall respect the law and also recognize a responsibility to seek
changes in those requirements which are contrary to the best interests of the
patient.
A physician shall respect the rights of patients, colleagues, and other health
professionals, and shall safeguard patient confidences and privacy within the
constraints of the law.
A physician shall continue to study, apply, and advance scientific knowledge,
maintain a commitment to medical education, make relevant information
available to patients, colleagues, and the public, obtain consultation, and use
the talents of other health professionals when indicated.
A physician shall, in the provision of appropriate patient care, except in
emergencies, be free to choose whom to serve, with whom to associate, and
the environment in which to provide medical care.
A physician shall recognize a responsibility to participate in activities
contributing to the improvement of the community and the betterment of
public health.
A physician shall, while caring for a patient, regard responsibility to the
patient as paramount.
A physician shall support access to medical care for all people. 25
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American Medical Association, “AMA Principles of Medical Ethics (2001),”
http://www.cirp.org/library/statements/ama/

32

As a final example of what kind of conduct is expected from physicians, consider
The World Medical Association Declaration of Geneva (1948) Physician’s Oath:
At the time of being admitted as a member of the medical profession: I
solemnly pledge myself to consecrate my life to the service of humanity; I
will give to my teachers the respect and gratitude which is their due; I will
practice my profession with conscience and dignity; the health of my patient
will be my first consideration; I will maintain by all the means in my power,
the honor and the noble traditions of the medical profession; my colleagues
will be my brothers; I will not permit considerations of religion, nationality,
race, party politics or social standing to intervene between my duty and my
patient; I will maintain the utmost respect for human life from the time of
conception, even under threat, I will not use my medical knowledge contrary
to the laws of humanity; I make these promises solemnly, freely and upon my
honor. 26

How do these codes compare to the codes followed by military officers?
Some scholars claim that unlike physicians or lawyers, “Military professionals have
never had a formal code of professional ethics akin to the Hippocratic Oath or the American
Bar Association’s Code of Professional Responsibilities.” 27 These scholars imply that
within military tradition there is not a common code of conduct whereby officers can trace
their ethical origins. While military officers may not have a single historical statement, such
as the Hippocratic Oath, upon which the ethical origins of the military code of conduct are
based, modern efforts are underway to nonetheless codify a common professional military
ethic. Until a common professional military ethic is established, contemporary officers’
codes of ethics are derived from both formal documents and informal elements.
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Declaration of Geneva (1948). Adopted by the General Assembly of World Medical Association at Geneva
Switzerland, September 1948.
27
James H. McGrath and Gustaf E. Anderson III, “Recent Work on the American Professional Military Ethic:
An Introduction and Survey,” American Philosophy Quarterly 30, no. 3 (July 1993): 190.
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Within the United States, the formal documents include: The Officer’s Commission
and Oath, The Constitution of the United States of America, The Laws of War (composed of
the Constitution, treaties, and the army’s ‘law of the land’), Federal law (U.S. Code and
Uniform Code of Military Justice), The Code of Conduct (a non-punitive ethical guide), The
Soldier’s Creed, Service Regulations, Officer Guide, Training Documents, and Handbooks.
Excerpts from these documents will help in understanding the ideal “professional
atmosphere,” or culture and climate, surrounding the military officer.
The Enlistment Oath and Officer’s Commission and Oath:

I, _____, do solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will support and defend the
Constitution of the United States against all enemies, foreign and domestic;
that I will bear true faith and allegiance to the same; and that I will obey the
orders of the President of the United States and the orders of the officers
appointed over me, according to regulations and the Uniform Code of
Military Justice. So help me God. 28
I, _____ (SSAN), having been appointed an officer in the Army of the United
States, as indicated above in the grade of _____ do solemnly swear (or
affirm) that I will support and defend the Constitution of the United States
against all enemies, foreign or domestic, that I will bear true faith and
allegiance to the same; that I take this obligation freely, without any mental
reservations or purpose of evasion; and that I will well and faithfully
discharge the duties of the office upon which I am about to enter. So help me
God. 29
The first oath establishes that a person agrees to enter into the public service of the
United States and to obey the legal orders of those in authority. It specifically references the
authority of the President of the United States, other officers of higher rank, and military
regulations and law. Depending upon a complex arrangement of orders and laws, authority
28

Title 10, US Code; Act of 5 May 1960 replacing the wording first adopted in 1789, with amendment
effective 5 October 1962. This is the oath taken upon enlistment in the US Army.
29
DA Form 71, 1 August 1959, for officers. This is the oath taken upon accepting a commission as an officer
in the US Army.
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might also be granted to international law or foreign officials. The second oath establishes
that the person is voluntarily entering into a professional status with all the rights,
responsibilities, and duties as established within the military structure. Once again, the same
authority structures apply.
To find more specific guidelines of conduct we can examine excerpts from the
formal code referenced in the enlistment oath, The Uniform Code of Military Justice:
Any commissioned officer of the armed forces who, after tender of his
resignation and before notice of its acceptance, quits his post or proper duties
without leave and with intent to remain away therefrom permanently is guilty
of desertion. Any person found guilty of desertion or attempt to desert shall
be punished, if the offense is committed in time of war, by death or such
other punishment as a court-martial may direct, but if the desertion or attempt
to desert occurs at any other time, by such punishment, other than death, as a
court-martial may direct. 30
Any commissioned officer who uses contemptuous words against the
President, the Vice President, Congress, the Secretary of Defense, the
Secretary of a military department, the Secretary of Homeland Security, or
the Governor or legislature of any State, Territory, Commonwealth, or
possession in which he is on duty or present shall be punished as a courtmartial may direct. 31
Any person subject to this chapter who – (1) violates or fails to obey any
lawful general order or regulation; (2) having knowledge of any other lawful
order issued by a member of the armed forces, which it is his duty to obey,
fails to obey the order; or (3) is derelict in the performance of his duties; shall
be punished as a court-martial may direct. 32
30

United States Code, Title 10, Subtitle A, Part ii, Chapter 47, Subchapter 10, Section 885, Art. 85, Desertion.
I have not discovered any similar “death penalty” for civilian physicians who abandon their duties, although
there are liability issues, e.g., for negligence in some cases.
31
United States Code, Title 10, Subtitle A, Part ii, Chapter 47, Subchapter 10, Section 888, Art. 88, Contempt
towards officials. As with desertion, I have not discovered similar speech sanctions to which physicians are
bound. However, it is not uncommon to find clauses in employment contracts that regulate against
inflammatory remarks directed towards the institution of service.
32
United States Code, Title 10, Subtitle A, Part ii, Chapter 47, Subchapter 10, Section 892, Art. 92, Failure to
obey order or regulation. I have witnessed this, although not at the level of a court-martial. The soldier
tried to leave a meeting to “cool off” as tempers were flaring. An officer ordered him to stay, but he
continued to walk out. Although he was not court-martialed, I was made to understand that the soldier
could be given an “Article-15,” punishment which would result in the soldier having to quit the Army. It
could possibly have led to a court-martial and a dishonorable discharge. Unless negligence is a factor, it is
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Any person subject to this chapter who is guilty of cruelty toward, or
oppression or maltreatment of, any person subject to his orders shall be
punished as a court-martial may direct. 33
Any member of the armed forces who before or in the presence of the enemy
– (1) runs away; (2) shamefully abandons, surrenders, or delivers up any
command, unit, place, or military property which it is his duty to defend; (3)
through disobedience, neglect, or intentional misconduct endangers the safety
of any such command, unit, place, or military property; (4) casts away his
arms or ammunition; (5) is guilty of cowardly conduct; (6) quits his place of
duty to plunder or pillage; (7) causes false alarms in any command, unit, or
place under control of the armed forces; (8) willfully fails to do his utmost to
encounter, engage, capture, or destroy any enemy troops, combatants,
vessels, aircraft, or any other thing, which it is his duty so to encounter,
engage, capture, or destroy; or (9) does not afford all practicable relief and
assistance to any troops, combatants, vessels, or aircraft of the armed forces
belonging to the United States or their allies when engaged in battle; shall be
punished by death or such other punishment as a court-martial may direct. 34
Any person subject to this chapter who, without justification or excuse,
unlawfully kills a human being, when he – (1) has a premeditated design to
kill; (2) intends to kill or inflict great bodily harm; (3) is engaged in an act
which is inherently dangerous to another and evinces a wanton disregard of
human life; or (4) is engaged in the perpetration or attempted perpetration of
burglary, sodomy, rape, robbery, or aggravated arson; is guilty of murder,
and shall suffer such punishment as a court-martial may direct, except that if
found guilty under clause (1) or (4), he shall suffer death or imprisonment for
life as a court-martial may direct. 35

doubtful a physician would be punished for similar activity – certainly not for leaving an administrative
meeting.
33
United States Code, Title 10, Subtitle A, Part ii, Chapter 47, Subchapter 10, Section 893, Art. 93, Cruelty
and maltreatment. Of the listed codes here, this one most closely appears applicable to physician conduct,
although it would seem to fall under negligence.
34
United States Code, Title 10, Subtitle A, Part ii, Chapter 47, Subchapter 10, Section 899, Art. 99,
Misbehavior before the enemy. Physicians, not in the military, are not under such restrictions. In fact,
civilian physicians frequently do violate many of these conditions with respect to confronting enemy
troops.
35
United States Code, Title 10, Subtitle A, Part ii, Chapter 47, Subchapter 10, Section 918, Art. 118, Murder.
Except in special circumstances, physicians may not legally participate in the killing of another human
being.
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Any commissioned officer, cadet, or midshipman who is convicted of
conduct unbecoming an officer and a gentleman shall be punished as a courtmartial may direct. 36

These excerpts provide insight into differences between professional expectations of
military officers as compared to professional expectations of physicians. They highlight the
voluntary nature of serving as an officer, the legalization of morally appropriate actions
(attitudes of speech, conduct in public, and treatment of others), inappropriateness of
unlawfully killing human beings, and the explicit warnings that violating certain rules of
military conduct may result in death. Overall, the articles provide legal sanctions for
activity, especially in the case of Article 133, conduct unbecoming an officer and a
gentleman, which contains elements often thought to exist solely under moral purview.
Though it may not have the clearly defined legal force as The Uniform Code of
Military Justice, The Military Code of Conduct is an example of another kind of document
guiding the conduct of military personnel:
I am an American, fighting in the forces which guard my country and our
way of life. I am prepared to give my life in their defense. I will never
surrender of my own free will. If in command, I will never surrender the
members of my command while they still have the means to resist. If I am
captured I will continue to resist by all means available. I will make every
effort to escape and to aid others to escape. I will accept neither parole nor
special favors from the enemy. If I become a prisoner of war, I will keep
faith with my fellow prisoners. I will give no information or take part in any
action which might be harmful to my comrades. If I am senior, I will take
command. If not, I will obey the lawful orders of those appointed over me
and will back them up in every way. When questioned, should I become a
36

United States Code, Title 10, Subtitle A, Part ii, Chapter 47, Subchapter 10, Section 933, Art. 133, Conduct
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misleading statements, failure to pay dept, public drunkenness, associating with a prostitute, failure to
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have clauses so interpretable. Employment contracts may also contain such clauses for physicians.

37

prisoner of war, I am required to give name, rank, service number, and date
of birth. I will evade answering further questions to the utmost of my ability.
I will make no oral or written statements disloyal to my country and its allies
or harmful to their cause. I will never forget that I am an American, fighting
for freedom, responsible for my actions, and dedicated to the principles
which made my country free. I will trust in my God and in the United States
of America. 37

Army leaders are encouraged to promulgate The Soldier’s Creed as both the
“Warrior Ethos” and the essence of professionalism exhibited by all soldiers:
I am an American Soldier.
I am a Warrior and a member of a team. I serve the people of the United
States and live the Army Values.
I will always place the mission first.
I will never accept defeat.
I will never quit.
I will never leave a fallen comrade.
I am disciplined, physically and mentally tough, trained and proficient in my
Warrior tasks and drills.
I will always maintain my arms, my equipment, and myself.
I am an expert and I am a professional.
I stand ready to deploy, engage, and destroy the enemies of the United States
in close combat.
I am a guardian of freedom and the American way of life.
I am an American Soldier. 38
There can be no doubt that a key element in professional development is formal
education, both in gaining knowledge of the technical aspects of a profession and in gaining
an understanding of the moral expectations of the professionals within a given field. In the
education of physicians, instructors acknowledge that “When teaching students our core
values, we must consider the real world in which they will work and relax. The concept of

37 These are the main points extracted from Army Pamphlet 360-512. This Code of Conduct is somewhat
controversial in that the code is itself challenged as causing psychological, and sometimes physical, harm to
prisoners of war.
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Army Field Manual 6-22, “Army Leadership: Competent, Confident, and Agile,” Headquarters, Department
of the Army, Washington, DC, Oct 2006, 4-10.
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‘teaching’ must include…conversations held in the hallway, jokes told in the cafeteria, and
stories exchanged about a ‘great case’ on our way to the parking lot.” 39 This type of
teaching, the informal element, has also been a standard within military training.
The application of the hidden curriculum is often not contained within formal
education. In the military the hidden curriculum includes the informal elements of the
officers’ code of ethics. The informal elements of the officers’ code of ethics are attitudes,
expectations, and experiences which officers are expected to perceive and incorporate into
their own lives. These elements include developing military virtues of courage, loyalty,
obedience, selflessness, truthfulness, candor, discipline, technical competence, and integrity.
They also include the discussion of problems experienced within the military life of less
than free and informed consent, moral aspects of the legal plea of respondeat superior, and
combat obedience. The informal elements also include discussions of duties when orders
are conflicting, i.e., discussions include the nature of permissible versus obligatory duties
with respect to obedience and disobedience when there is a conflict of orders.
The informal education of physicians and soldiers is important because interpretation of
and internalization of aspects of codes of ethics, and appropriate role behavior, are
strengthened or weakened through informal elements of training, education, and
development.
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§3: Conflicting Values, Conflicting Identities
Given this background of the roles of physicians and military officers, as well as the
professional codes of ethics that help shape their professional identities, it is possible to
extract some of the underlying professional values or differences that appear to come into
conflict between physicians and soldiers.
Physicians are typically concerned with individuals in need of health care. Central
values held by physicians include: care and compassion towards those individuals in their
charge, respect for human dignity and rights, concern for moral law, working towards the
best interests of their patients, safeguarding patient confidentiality, advancing medical
knowledge, and in some cases contributing to community development and public health.
Priority is often placed on individual patient care except in the most extreme circumstances,
e.g., when a patient directly presents a potential harm to an innocent third party.
Military officers are typically concerned with group interests related to mission goals
in service of an entire country. Although they will have to deal with individuals, their focus
is on the good of the group. Central values of military officers include: service, obedience,
and self-sacrifice for the greater good of their country. Other values include courage,
loyalty, obedience, selflessness, truthfulness, candor, discipline, technical competence, and
integrity.
A possible professional conflict is experienced by some military physicians through
internalizing, in different conceptual schemas, the mental models of two separate
professions. A medical professional should prioritize responsibilities towards individual
patient care, while the military professional should prioritize professional responsibilities
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towards the common good and focus on overall group welfare. When accessing different
schema, or when given the time to reflect upon different schema or their associated scripting
patterns, this may develop into an experience of moral dilemma. Three examples emphasize
this dichotomy.
When dealing with clients, physicians ought to give full, honest, and open disclosure
towards their patients regarding their condition and options of treatment plans. There does
not appear to be present in the physicians’ codes, provisions for giving incomplete or
dishonest disclosure towards their patients. Military officers and military leaders in general,
are often charged with being honest. Yet, they claim that there are instances where military
necessity requires them to be restrictive or misleading towards those they represent or
command in order to successfully maintain mission goals.
For example, a squad leader was told by his platoon leader that he (the squad leader)
should lie to a fellow squad member so that the squad member would not be distracted
during an upcoming mission. 40 A military physician may be conflicted in whether to
maintain confidentiality of her patients when ordered by her commanding officer to report
why patients are seeking her services. Likewise, when the Department of Defense orders
military physicians to participate in “man-break” tests by misleading a soldier into
participating in experimental hallucinatory drug research or bio-chemical tests, the military
physician may feel professional conflict 41
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Personal communication, Army Center of Excellence for the Professional Military Ethic interview at Ft.
Hood, 18 Nov 09. The fear is that the soldier’s problems could become a distraction or dangerous and
might directly contribute to the harm of other squad members.
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December 8, 1994.
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A second type of example shows the possible dichotomy in professional values.
While both physicians and military officers may desire to preserve the confidentiality and
privacy of patients and soldiers, concerns for group welfare can override this desire. In the
case of physicians, dangers to the public, such as communicable diseases or threatened
injury to others, can be grounds to override patient confidentiality and privacy.
Even in these cases, physicians should not exploit patient weaknesses. However, at
times, military officers may have grounds to override and exploit confidentiality and privacy
for mission goals. For example, Judge Advocate General officers can offer immunity to
material witnesses for testimony in criminal investigations. Yet, it is acceptable for them to
act like civilian “defense lawyers” to obtain a confession “confidentially and privately” then
report the criminal activity to others. 42 Military intelligence officers may attempt to exploit
character weaknesses in soldiers to test them for security risks. This may include using
information that would normally be considered private or confidential such as patient
records of psychological counseling sessions.
As a third example of the possible dichotomy of values, consider that both
physicians and military officers are legally protected from accidentally causing death when
they are following professional standards of competency. These same professional
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An example related in an interview of a Military Police soldier (MP). In a private conversation a
Commanding Officer is talking to a Private about how the Private is doing. The Commanding Officer
learns that the Private is feeling depressed and lonely. He has no girlfriend, no children, and the only thing
he has is a fierce loyalty to the U.S. Time passes. The Commanding Officer is planning a mission where
someone is needed as “bait,” possibly being sent to die, so that others can accomplish the mission.
Knowing that the Private is fiercely loyal to the U.S., and has no family to mourn if he dies, the
Commanding Officer tells the Private that he has a critical mission for the Private. He needs the Private to
infiltrate an enemy base and steal some documents. Although he lets the Private “volunteer” for the
mission, the Commanding Officer does not tell the Private that military intelligence expects the Private will
be killed in the attempt. Moreover, the Commanding Officer does not tell the Private that he is being used
as a distraction for another more important mission. 19 March 09.
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standards of competency also regulate the purposeful involvement in death. While military
officers may be required to make decisions that result in the loss of life in the performance
of their duties, physicians are rarely granted legal sanction to end life.
In general, physician codes of ethics and institutional training focus on protecting
and caring for individual patients. Officer codes of ethics and training focus on protecting
and obeying for the perceived good of the state. For physicians there is a strong
socialization component of adopting a professional identity of healer; while for the military
officer there is a strong socialization component of adopting the professional identity of
someone who kills and prepares to kill.
From these examples, and a survey of the roles, codes of ethics, and informal
elements of professional development, it is possible to draw some generalized conclusions
comparing physicians with military officers.
From a physician’s perspective there may exist obligations derived from their role as
a physician, codes of ethics, and professional norms. These obligations include duties of
nonmalfeasance and beneficence, allowing for patient autonomy, respecting confidentiality,
maintaining truthfulness, and providing compassionate care. From a different perspective,
military officers also have obligations derived from their role as soldiers, codes of ethics,
and professional norms. These include duties of self-sacrifice, protecting noncombatants,
serving military goals, and obeying lawful and moral orders. As we have seen, each set of
professional ideals includes different professional duties.
The military physician is, in a sense, a dual professional. He is a professional in his
role as a physician and a professional in his role as an officer. Yet, acting in the capacity of
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either profession requires accessing different self-schemas or activating different scripts.
Hopefully this includes activating normatively appropriate scripts. Taken individually, each
professional moral schema may represent a single, unified moral working professional
identity. Yet, taken together, it is possible that the professional moral schemas may come
into conflict under certain circumstances.
The degree that conflicting aspects of the medical profession and the military
profession become part of an individual’s self-identities, and the degree that environmental
or cognitive prompts activate conflicting scripts, will regulate or explain to what degree
some military physicians may experience moral dilemma. For example, individuals who
whole-heartedly accept the military persona are less likely to experience a conflict when
asked to perform duties that benefit their military more than their individual patients.
Conversely, individuals who maintain a high degree of identity to their physician
training are more likely to experience a conflict when tasked to focus on mission objectives
when doing so will cause harm to their patients. Individuals who try to embrace both
identities may experience moral dilemma when environmental or cognitive processes
activate conflicting scripts either simultaneously or close enough in time that, at some point,
they are consciously aware of a moral dilemma developing if choosing one set of duties
necessitate not choosing the other.
When these core identities come into conflict, the military physician confronts the
possibility of, and experience of, moral dilemma. The next chapter investigates the either-or
approach to resolving moral dilemma.
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Chapter Three: The “Either-Or” Solution
To save the country is paramount to all other considerations.
General Order No. 100, Art. 5.
The physician’s highest calling, his only calling, is to make sick people
healthy—to heal, as it is termed.
Samuel Hahnemann

Assuming that physician duties can come into direct conflict with officer duties,
what conflict resolutions are available? Following a rationalist tradition, the two most
common responses are: (1) officer duties should override physician duties, or (2) physician
duties should override officer duties. Two additional hypotheses of conflict resolution
between officer duties and physician duties seek to resolve any conflict by suggesting that:
(3) officer duties and physician duties are related much like Ross characterized prima facie
deontological duties, that is, in any given dilemma an individual weighs the duties based on
the situation and carries out the ones given higher priority. Finally, it is not uncommon to
see appeals made that: (4) as a member of the moral community there are non-professional
duties above and beyond professional ones; thus non-professional duties may regulate the
dilemma. 43
In my interviews with military and medical personnel, and implied in much of the
professional literature relating to military physicians, I find that often either (1) or (2) is
taken as obviously true, with the opposing position taken as obviously false. Less often both
(1) and (2) are taken as obviously false, in which case people choose either (3) or (4).
However, upon scrutiny we find that in this latter case there is often still an underlying bias
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rationalism and experientialism positions.
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favoring solution (1) or (2). This chapter provides a literature review of proponents for (1)
and (2). Section One will provide accounts from proponents of the view that military officer
duties should outweigh physician duties. Section Two will provide accounts from
proponents of the view that physician duties should outweigh military officer duties. The
next chapter, Chapter Four, presents an analysis and evaluation of this literature.
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§1: The Needs of the Many & Military Necessity
There are two basic approaches utilized by those defending the either-or solution that
military officer duties should outweigh physician duties; what I will call the general and the
specific approaches. General approaches do not specifically deal with physicians or other
medical personnel in the military; they deal with general duties that everyone or anyone may
have in a military context when military needs conflict with their own interests, duties, or
liberties. The general approaches establish the foundation upon which the specific
approaches are based. Specific approaches specifically target physicians or medical
personnel in their arguments. They emphasize duties that physicians may have in a military
context when military needs conflict with their professional interests, duties, or liberties.
Proponents of the either-or solution that military duties outweigh physician duties
base their arguments on the assumption that a state’s collective interests override an
individual’s interests. Thus, individuals are sometimes required to sacrifice some personal
liberties or interests in order to ensure the survival of the state. The military is a necessary
component of the state providing for the security and defense of state interests. Civilian and
military duties are derivatives from serving the state.
Sometimes duties require individuals to serve in some capacity of service to the
state, e.g., taxpayer, juror, or military conscript. Serving the state can require giving up or
limiting certain individual rights to benefit the group such as when politicians are forced to
give up expectations of privacy and soldiers are restricted in their freedom of speech.
Through trial and error, the state and military have adopted what is essentially a ruleutilitarian approach to duty within the military – duties are derived from group benefit over
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time. Consequently, it is assumed, military duties override medical duties because in the
long-run the benefits of following this plan outweigh the harms of either not following the
plan or outweigh any short-term harms caused by the plan.
There are several more assumptions necessary for these approaches to work
appropriately. It is critical that the military faithfully discharge its responsibility pursuant to
national interests. This, in turn, depends on professional soldiers faithfully discharging their
individual duties. Historically we know that not all militaries or individuals in the military
have faithfully discharged their duties. States, aware of the potential for abuse, usually try
to enact laws or procedures to protect themselves from militaries or soldiers who do not
faithfully discharge their responsibilities. For example, in the United States, the military is
nominally under the civilian government’s control and the military is required, expected,
and obligated to follow the laws and policies of the United States. Failure to comply with
executive and legislative mandates, laws, and regulations and/or policies is often met with
harsh penalties.
Despite these precautions, there are failures in the system. Individuals can act in
dishonorable, unscrupulous, or immoral ways. Failures can also occur when the civilian
government: (1) does not give the military clear goals and mission objectives, (2) does not
give clear guidance in the handling of enemy combatants, noncombatants, and terrorists, (3)
fails to provide the military with just cause in their operations, or (4) fails to act ethically or
morally. Included in these failures are concerns about the confusion generated by the use of
privatized military firms in hostile regions, concerns with the confusion caused by changing
the rules of engagement, and concerns about the confusion generated by changing policy
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concerning conformity to international law. Yet, proponents of advocating the general
approach of the primacy of military duties can always return to a common, rule-utilitarian
defense: yes, there are occasional problems that arise in the system, yet over time following
this approach results in a better society.
Given these background assumptions, how do the general and specific approaches
differ? The first approach is a generalized defense that military duties, in the service of
state interests, should have priority over non-military duties or over an individual’s interests.
For example, some countries mandate military service in such a way that individual citizens
of that country must serve at the expense of their personal interests – modern Israel’s
mandatory military service, pre-1973 U.S. military drafts, or Romania’s mandatory military
service. When serving in the military individuals are expected to act to benefit the larger
group, even at the expense of their own interests. This means that they are expected, if
required, to participate in dangerous missions, risk their lives, or otherwise sacrifice
individual liberties for the overall good. From the generalized defense, proponents for the
priority of military duties can infer that military physicians must likewise give up certain
rights related to their medical obligations while assuming certain duties to the state because
state interests override their personal and professional liberties and duties.
The second approach is much more specific, or direct, by claiming that when
military officer duties conflict with physician duties, the military duties have priority over
physician duties. 44 This approach draws on much of the foundation of the general approach,
especially the idea that state interests override an individual’s interests. However, this
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approach goes farther and claims that although military physicians may hold ideals contrary
to what military duty requires of them, as military personnel they are still required to serve
the military interests of the state. As members of the military, military physicians continue
to perform the tasks of their medical professions by caring for the health of individuals, but
in instances where their professional ethics conflict with their military duty, military duty
assumes priority.
In particular, it is claimed that military physicians, like all soldiers, are expected to
follow legal orders, even when those orders conflict with personal beliefs or physician
norms of conduct. Military physicians may be expected to participate in weapons
development, interrogations, and experiments on non-informed soldiers. Military physicians
may be expected to help maintain the fighting strength of the military even if it means
sacrificing the health or welfare of an individual patient.
In this section, I examine four authors who maintain that the state’s interests override
an individual’s interests. I have chosen these authors because their views often reflect those
of the military personnel I have interviewed. These authors provide insights as to why the
claim that military duties override physician duties is not entirely unwarranted. In general,
these authors propose that state interests should override individual interests. According to
these authors, when military duties serve the state’s interests, military physicians will find
that their physician duties may become subordinate to their military duties. Huntington and
London are used to illustrate the general defense, while Colbach and Gross are used to
illustrate the specific defense.
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§1.1: Huntington
Huntington is a strong advocate for strengthening military security and weakening
individual liberalism. 45 In his work The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of
Civil-Military Relations, Huntington writes about developing a theoretical framework for
civil-military relations and for developing “officership” as a profession. Although
Huntington mentions physicians in the military, their role is not his focus. However,
selective passages from his larger work apply to military physicians. This section will
indicate how his general approach to civil-military relations and of “officership” as a
profession leads to the claim that, during instances of professional conflicts, military duties
should override physician duties.
The argument extractable from Huntington is that in order for individuals to flourish
they need protection from outside forces; protection that only a state can provide. The
overriding concern for a nation must be military security. Military security depends upon
two key elements: a military actively working for the interests of the state and the actions of
professional soldiers. Professional soldiers cannot be effective in their duties unless they
obey orders and act for the collective interests of the military and the nation they serve.
This type of argument contends that although physicians lack command authority in
the military, they are nonetheless members of the military organization. As members of the
military organization, physicians are obligated to act for the interests of the military and,
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“Liberalism” is the term Huntington often uses to refer to a political theory that places great weight on
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Military Academy), are required to study Huntington’s works. His thoughts continue to have a large impact
on officer development.
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hence, for the interests of the nation. As soldiers, physicians cannot be effective in their
duties unless they obey orders. Given that physicians are supposed to act for the collective
interests of the military, and they are supposed to obey orders, during times of conflicting
duties it is necessary for a military physician’s military duties to override his medical duties.
Consider some details surrounding Huntington’s analysis of “officership” as
professionalism and his theoretical framework for civil-military relations. According to
Huntington, professionals work in a social context such that “the professional man can no
longer practice if he refuses to accept his social responsibility.” 46 As professionals,
individuals must accept social responsibility and work, in some sense, toward the social
good. In the case of military officers, they accept the social responsibility of providing for
the security of the state. Historically, this responsibility translated into specializing in the
management of violence: “The duties of the officer include: (1) the organization,
equipping, and training of [the military] force; (2) the planning of its activities; and (3) the
direction of its operation in and out of combat.” 47
Serving the state through the management of violence engenders several values:
cooperation, organization, and discipline. 48 According to Huntington, these values
downplay the importance of the individual such that for a military man to carry out his duty
it is necessary that he “emphasizes the importance of the group as against the individual.” 49
Huntington takes a strong stance for the importance of the group and claims, “Success in
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any [military] activity requires the subordination of the will of the individual to the will of
the group.” 50 It appears that this subordination of the will is not a minor, or weak,
subordination. Rather, Huntington seems to suggest that in many cases the individual
should, essentially, lose himself into the group. We can see this in Huntington’s treatment
of soldiers who are following orders.
The military profession exists to serve the state….the profession has to be
organized into a hierarchy of obedience. For the profession to perform its
function, each level within it must be able to command the instantaneous and
loyal obedience of subordinate levels. Without these relationships military
professionalism is impossible. Consequently, loyalty and obedience are the
highest military virtues. 51
Perhaps remembering the events from the Nuremberg Trials, Huntington qualifies
this by adding a “legal” description for when it is appropriate to follow orders. “When the
military man receives a legal order from an authorized superior, he does not argue, he does
not hesitate, he does not substitute his own views; he obeys instantly.” 52 Then Huntington
seems to relapse into a pre-Nuremburg mentality by abrogating personal responsibility from
those who follow orders as he says, “He is judged not by the policies he implements, but
rather by the promptness and efficiency with which he carries them out. His goal is to
perfect an instrument of obedience; the uses to which that instrument is put are beyond his
responsibility. His highest virtue is instrumental not ultimate.” 53 However, Huntington
acknowledges that there may be limits to following orders.
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Huntington considers two separate tensions when dealing with the limits of obeying
orders. “The first concerns the relation between military obedience and professional
competence, the moral and intellectual virtues of the officer. The second concerns the
conflict between the military value of obedience and nonmilitary values.” 54 In military
operations, a person may disobey only if (1) following orders results in military disaster or
(2) mission success can only be achieved by disobeying the orders.
This creates a possible confusion as this apparently goes against Huntington’s
previous claim that soldiers do not argue, hesitate, or substitute their own views when given
an order. Huntington states that soldiers are supposed to obey instantly. He then claims that
in non-operational issues, professional competence must be the criteria. The professional
must ask, “Does disobeying promote more good to the profession than disrupting the chain
of command?” Though Huntington’s statement still gives priority to the military, the
conclusions are somewhat confusing, as this claim seems at odds with Huntington’s
previous claims that professionals must act for the good of military security or national
interests, not for the good of their professional or personal values.
An additional confusion may arise as we try to understand how Huntington deals
with conflicts between military obedience and personal morality. He simultaneously claims
that officers must follow the orders given to them when the giver of the order has legal
authority to give it, yet:
The soldier cannot surrender….his right to make ultimate moral judgments.
He cannot deny himself as a moral individual….As a soldier he owes
obedience; as a man, he owed disobedience. Except in the most extreme
instances it is reasonable to expect that he will adhere to the professional
ethic and obey. Only rarely will the military man be justified in following the
54
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dictates of private conscience against the dual demand of military obedience
and state welfare. 55
Huntington’s view could be interpreted as coming very close to expressing a “caseby-case” approach to solving moral dilemma. Will this allow physicians enough conceptual
space to allow their physician duties to take priority over military duties? Although this may
seem initially plausible, it is nonetheless inconsistent with Huntington’s overall thesis.
Consider Huntington’s claim that professionals must have some type of social
responsibility. As an example of this, he says, “a physician ceases to be a physician if he
uses his skills for antisocial purposes.” 56 Nevertheless, this is where the controversy arises.
What is considered antisocial purposes when it comes to physicians serving in the military?
Huntington’s position implies that as long as physicians are working for the purposes of the
military, and as long as the military is effectively working for the interests of the state, then
physicians are engaged in legitimate social purposes.
Part of Huntington’s position must be that the soldier does not judge what the
interests of the state are. However, notice that it may not be clear. Is detaining people
indefinitely without charges (Guantanamo) in the interests of the U.S. or not? It may make
us appear to be more secure, but the cost of this practice may be excessively high to our
moral standing and the added security may be temporary. Even if we restrict the scope of
“national interest” to military security, it is not clear whether this practice makes us more
secure (isolating would-be terrorists) or more vulnerable to terrorist attack (being more
widely viewed as worthy of such an attack). The national interest here is clearly debatable.
Similar concerns may arise for abusive interrogation techniques in Iraq.
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Huntington does not appear to allow for such instances where what the military is
assigned to accomplish may be perceived by many to not promote the best interests of the
state. Moreover, he seems to hold to the view that to effectively work for the military,
physicians will have to act as though military duties override physician duties when they
come into conflict.
This may not be obvious when first considering what Huntington says of physicians
in the military. Recall that officers are responsible for the management of violence. Given
this characterization, and given that physicians in the military are officers, yet do not
specialize in violence management, Huntington notes that “Individuals, such as
doctors….are normally distinguished by special titles and insignia and are excluded from
position of military command. They belong to the officer corps in its capacity as an
administrative organization of the state, not in its capacity as a professional body.” 57 Thus,
although they are officers, physicians in the military are not fully in the chain of command.
They receive and give orders within the administrative duties of medical services. During
combat situations, they can receive orders from enlisted personnel if no officers are present,
but they cannot give orders to soldiers concerning combat operations.
Another point, which makes the duties of physicians in the military obscure, is
Huntington’s observation that, “While the primary responsibility of the physician is to his
patient, the lawyer to his client, the principle responsibility of the military officer is to the
state.” 58 An officer is loyal to an institution, not a person. Yet a physician should be loyal
to his patients, not just to an institution. Although it may sound as though Huntington would
57
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allow physician duties to override military duties, it may be more accurate to conclude that
he would favor the opposite.
Huntington does not address directly the conflicting role of a professional physician
assuming the duties of a professional soldier. Rather, he is dealing with a theoretical
account of a military officer as a professional and the relationship between civil and military
affairs. Although Huntington mentions physicians in various capacities, when trying to
reconcile his account of physicians with his account of professional soldiers we do not reach
a clear understanding of their respective duties.
Huntington’s writings are used extensively in the training, development, and
education of officers. His views help define current military culture and ethical climate,
particularly the culture and mores of the military officer. This military culture has a
profound impact on physicians as they assume the dual role of the military physician that
combines the medical profession with the military profession. According to Huntington, as
soldiers, physicians are expected to follow orders. Moreover, as officers “The officer
submerges his own personal interests and desires to what is necessary for the good of the
service.” 59 Repeatedly Huntington places emphasis on the following two assertions: “The
military security of the state comes first. Moral aims and ideological ends should not be
pursued at the expense of security.” 60 Moreover, “The military profession serves the ends of
the state.” 61 Huntington indicates that physicians serving in the military should be
concerned, primarily, with fostering the security of the state, even at the expense of
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physician related duties, personal interests, and desires relating to patient care and
responsibility.

§1.2: London
Perry London’s general framework offers a slightly different account of the proper
resolution of conflicting duties experienced by the military physician. Rather than
mandating that officer duties should always outweigh physician duties, London’s position is
that physicians should not be criticized for following military duties. At the very least, a
doctor should be excused for following his military duty. London argues for this in his
analysis of the following case:
Fear of Flying: A twenty-six-year-old staff sergeant AC-47 gunner with
seven months’ active duty in Vietnam presented with frank admission of fear
of flying. He had flown over one hundred missions, and loss of several crews
who were well known to the patient, precipitated his visit. He stated he
would give up flight pay, promotion, medals, etc., just to stop flying.
Psychiatric consultation to USAF Hospital, Cam Ranh Bay, resulted in thirtysix days’ hospitalization with use of psychotherapy and tranquilizers.
Diagnosis was Gross Stress Reaction, manifested by anxiety, tenseness, a fear
of death expressed in the form of rationalizations, and inability to function.
His problem was ‘worked through’ and insight to his problem was gained to
the extent that he was returned to full flying duty in less than six weeks. This
is a fine tribute to the psychiatrists at Cam Ranh Bay. (633 Combat Spt Gp
Dispensary, Pleiku AB.) 62
This case was presented in the Hastings Center Report with the following question:
In a military conflict, does the doctor serve the soldier or the state? London claims that not
only were the doctors showing technical ability but they were also acting morally in serving
the state to the possible detriment of their patients. London seems to base this conclusion on
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a type of cultural relativism claiming that a social endorsement of military action implies
that all soldiers, including medical personnel, should let military duty set their “moral
compass.”
To reach this conclusion London first distinguishes between what he calls “the old
conventional morality” and “the new conventional morality.” In the former, “A soldier’s
duty was to uniform, mission, or country via chain of authorized command.” 63 This seems
to imply that not only are soldiers expected to sacrifice themselves, if necessary, for the
good of the state, but that military physicians must also do their part in supporting the
greater good. Against this, the new conventional morality “implies that soldier-doctors
should themselves define where their duty truly lies.” 64 London disagrees with the new
conventional morality. “To argue that most people can, or should be, routine arbiters of
their own morality, I believe, slaps harshly in the face of reality.” 65 By embracing the old
conventional morality we can infer that London’s position is one in which military
physicians should perform duties that conform to the chain of command.
London’s denial of the new conventional morality is based on two ideas. First, the
reality to which he refers is that “Individual morality is built on the bedrock of social norms,
and is sustained by reinforcements in social custom. It perishes slowly but surely when
social norms change and the rewards and penalties for erstwhile good and bad behavior are
changed to meet new rules.” 66 From this we can interpret, that if social norms allow military
duties to override medical duties, that is where individual morality should lie.
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The second idea London draws upon is that “most of humankind, most of the time,
are too busy trying to manage the routines of daily living to spend much energy on moral
calculations. Most morals get borrowed from the neighbors, the organization, or the big shot
of other-directed society.” 67 London believes that physicians, especially in combat
situations, may not have the time to make moral calculations. In such circumstances, they
have to follow the rules or policies that they are given. We see that London’s position has
an interesting difference from Huntington’s in that for London, it does not matter if a war is
perceived by some as being contrary to the interests of the military and/or the U.S. For
Huntington it does matter.
Social norms and policy could mean that physician duties override military duties,
but London does not create that impression. He seems to acknowledge that military duties
should override physician duties because London claims that “a decent society makes the
individual the last arbiter of morality, not the first one….In 1975, it is unseemly, if not
immoral, to retrospectively condemn the doctors of last decade’s war for doing what then
looked like their duty in a cause which they probably supported.” 68 The implication is that
military interests are legitimate, overriding considerations, concerning a military physician’s
duties.
Now that two proponents of the general defense of the either-or solution claiming
that military duties should have priority over physician duties have been reviewed, it is
possible to extract some similar themes in their positions. First, the defenses share a belief
in the overriding importance of state security through military power. Second, the defenses
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emphasize state interests over individual interests, and are usually willing to sacrifice liberal
freedoms in favor of state security. Finally, the defenses contain implications that
physicians in the military should allow military duties to override physician duties when
they come into conflict. Some of these implications might be considered subtle, yet they
provide common reasoning as to why people accept this general position.
Now consider two examples of the either-or proponents that utilize the specific
approach to address the claim that officer duties should override physician duties when there
is a conflict underlying professional ethics or codes of conduct. First, will be a study of
Colbach’s position on combat psychiatry. From there consideration will be given to Gross’s
account of physicians in the military.

§1.3: Colbach
Edward Colbach takes no position concerning moral dilemmas of military physicians
in non-combat situations. Colbach’s specific account of combat psychiatry reiterates many
of the themes of the medical-military dilemma and serves as a reminder of the issues that are
involved. Soldiers experience many of the same medical problems that civilians experience,
although the number of incidents and intensity of problems can be significantly higher in
combat situations. In addition to physical injuries, combat duty produces higher rates of
mental problems such as stress, paranoia, delusions of grandeur, and post-traumatic stress
disorder. According to Colbach, these problems are acerbated when soldiers are treated to
benefit the military organization rather than treated to benefit the individual soldier. Yet,
Colbach claims that ultimately his duty, and the duty of all combat psychiatrists, is to the
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military as an organization and not to the soldiers as individual patients. How does Colbach
articulate the dilemma and how does he reach his conclusion that during times of combat,
broadly construed, military duties outweigh physician duties?
Colbach first notes an interesting dichotomy between civilians in peacetime
situations and soldiers in combat situations. In civilian life, it is considered abnormal for
someone to constantly experience fear and anger. When someone has these symptoms, they
are advised to seek medical attention or otherwise make changes in their life that will
reduce, and remove when appropriate, the fear and anger.
Once the decision is made to seek medical help for constant feelings of fear and
anger, or other medical problems, the patient can be reasonably assured that under most
circumstances the physician is primarily responsible to the patient. As Colbach says, “In
medical school I had been taught that my primary responsibility was to my patient. There
were always some exceptions to this . . . when I had to consider my responsibility to society
as well.” 69 Unless the patient represents a clear and present danger to himself or others, the
physician’s primary concern, qua physician, is to treat the patient in order to resolve his
individual medical issues without third party involvement. 70 Some of the more common
treatments for fear and anger include having the patient avoid stress “triggers,” giving the
patient drugs to help minimize physiological stress, and helping the patient develop stress

69
70

Edward M. Colbach, “Ethical Issues in Combat Psychiatry,” Military Medicine (150) (1985), 257.
This is the ideal and assumes (1) the physician is paid for his services (unless he is volunteering his time),
(2) the physician has the proper resources for treatment (such as time, medications, equipment), and (3) the
patient is cooperative in his treatment plan. Moreover, in countries without state-funded healthcare,
insurance considerations may play a significant role in determining the health care of a patient. Yet,
physicians often do make choices to act as physicians and “game the system” to benefit their patients.

62

management skills. In all cases, the focus is on enabling the patient to develop greater
health and autonomy.
Compare the civilian situation with that of the combat soldier. “Fear and anger were
present in most of the military personnel I met.” 71 For Colbach this comparison precipitates
a revaluation of values—whereas continuing fear and anger are considered abnormal in
civilian life, they are revalued as the norms of experience and expectation within a combat
military life.
This affects the therapeutic situation in several ways. First, military leaders are less
likely to acknowledge that a medical problem exists because nothing is out of the ordinary.
“People fighting a war were expected to be unhappy and anxious and depressed.” 72 This
means that unless a soldier is so fearful or angry that it causes problems within the military
structure or mission, the soldier is unlikely to be sent to medical help for treatment.
Second, when a soldier visits a doctor, the doctor’s treatment of the soldier is
different from treatment typical in civilian practice. As a civilian psychiatrist, Colbach had
a professional duty to treat his patients and help them cope with their normal reactions of
fear and anger. As a combat psychiatrist, Colbach had a professional duty to consider the
goals of the military. “The role of the military psychiatrist was to help soldiers cope with
these feelings for the greater good.” 73 This was reflected in the motto of the Army Medical
Corps, which Colbach felt he had to adopt, to “Conserve the Fighting Strength” and
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consequently to adopt an ideal that “A successful Army needed relatively healthy soldiers to
shoot guns and drive trucks and cook food.” 74
For Colbach, “relatively healthy” refers to non-optimal care from the individual’s
perspective when “the purpose of Army medical personnel was to keep sufficient numbers
of soldiers capable of doing their jobs. The particular needs or wishes of the individual were
to be considered secondary to the needs of the unit.” 75 According to Colbach, treating the
patient-soldier can involve misleading the patient, breaching confidentiality, and medicating
the soldier in ways that may benefit the Army but not necessarily the soldier. Proponents of
military duties overriding medical duties could extend this to say that this type of treatment
can occur at any time in which the Army will be benefited during combat or even during
peace times. Opponents to this position could point out that treating the patient in this
manner would not normally be considered acceptable professional physician care in civilian
life.
What about soldiers who willingly sacrifice themselves for the good of the military?
Are they in some sense being mistreated when they voluntarily seek medical care with the
express purpose of getting the minimal healthcare necessary to return to duty? If there is
informed choice there is probably not a problem. In civilian life, similar situations occur
with firefighters, rescue personnel, or police who are hurt or wounded and often want to
return to their job before they are completely healthy. Executives in private business, who
experience physical side-effects of stress but want to get back to the job, are in similar
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circumstances. As long as these people are making informed choices, there is a sense of
professional obligation to respect their wishes.
However, an interesting Catch-22 situation sometimes arises in the military. In some
cases, seeking help for mental stress can actually be counter-productive for the individual
seeking treatment. A psychiatrist can either (1) conclude that the soldier is experiencing
normal combat reactions, in which case he is either not treated or given minimal care to
return to duty, or (2) indicate that the soldier is unfit for duty. This is especially a problem
for personnel who wish to perform better in the field, seek medical help for psychological
problems, but are then removed from active duty. 76
Through Colbach’s writings, it becomes apparent that for Colbach there was a
conflict in roles and in duties between Colbach as physician and Colbach as combat
psychiatrist. The experience of this moral dilemma expressed itself as tension. This tension
was not only about how Colbach treated patient-soldiers, but also about how he viewed
himself. “The degree of emphasis on the group over the individual in the military, however,
was certainly hard for me to accept . . . . But I did want to survive. And I quickly realized
that, if I was to survive in the military, I would have to adapt to the mores of that society.” 77
Thus, one reason Colbach made the decision to allow his military duties to override his
medical duties was a psychological desire to survive his military experience. Yet the
decision was difficult to embrace as Colbach saw the solution as a delicate balancing act. “I
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began to see it as a real challenge to operate on that thin edge where I could somehow
accommodate both the individual and the unit.” 78
As a physician and a psychiatrist, Colbach’s moral dilemma occurred when his
training to help and care for the individual patient conflicted with his obligations as a
military officer to support military goals and objectives. By choosing military duties over
medical duties, Colbach experienced an inability to balance individual patient needs with
those of the military unit. His failure to adequately combine his dual role as a military
physician produced moral distress:
I had schooled myself to shut out individual needs and desires and
suffering…I dealt with a population of limited young men who needed all of
the help they could get. I was a physician and a psychiatrist trained to help
others. Yet, because of all the circumstances, in many ways I was a failure in
actually reaching out to those fellows and touching them and alleviating their
suffering. That simply wasn’t my job, at least the way I interpreted it….And
once having acquiesced to my role as a military psychiatrist, I then had to
accept that my obligation to my individual patient was far superseded by my
obligation to the military and, eventually, to my country. This focus is the
main ethics of military psychiatry. 79
For Colbach, it was not that military security was a priority, nor was it the case that
society should determine the ethics of combat situations. Neither was it the case that some
type of utilitarianism prevailed. Rather, the conditions of active war constrained his options
in providing medical care to an extent that Colbach perceived that military duties should
override physician duties because the ethical culture and climate of military medicine
fostered actions that supported the belief that professional military ethics and duty should
override professional medical ethics and duty.
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§1.4: Gross
One of the more recent specific approaches for defending the mandate that military
duties override physician duties comes from Michael Gross. Whereas Colbach focuses on
situations during active combat operations, Gross argues that during times of war we should
apply principles of medical ethics differently than we do during times of peace. He claims
that because modern bioethics rarely acknowledges this difference, it is inadequate to
satisfactorily deal with moral dilemmas encountered when principles of bioethics conflict
with principles of warfare. Gross’s solution is to re-evaluate the relationship between the
foundational principles shared by bioethics and warfare. Through this re-evaluation, Gross
advocates the legitimacy of military necessity. This newfound legitimacy dictates that,
when a military physician perceives conflicts of duty, he should forgo his physician duties in
favor of his officer duties.
Gross establishes the foundation of his ideas by first arguing that the ethics of war
are not in conflict with the ethics of medicine because both of these areas rest on similar
philosophical foundations. The first part of the foundation consists of values arising out of
the Enlightenment, which proposes that it is “the state’s duty to protect an individual’s right
to life, the paramount place of autonomy, self-determination, and human dignity, and the
dictates of utility that constrain the duty to protect life or dignity at any cost.” 80

80

Michael Gross, Bioethics and Armed Conflict: Moral Dilemmas of Medicine and War, (Cambridge, MA.:
The MIT Press, 2006) 28. Notice that this probably will not justify many wars – not Korea, not Vietnam,
not Iraq. Maybe this is where Martz comes in. The soldier’s duty is to fight and win even wars that are not
justified by appeal to these values.

67

The second part of the foundation consists of shared principles: the right to life,
respect for autonomy, human dignity, and utility. 81 According to Gross, it is in the shared
values where medical-military dilemmas originate – that of state duties coming into conflict
with an individual’s rights. Resolution of these dilemmas is adjudicated through an appeal
to the shared principles.
Normally there is no conflict between state interests and individual rights because
“in nearly all cases imaginable, bioethical norms should prevail in the conduct of medicine:
physicians should respect confidentiality and patient autonomy, medical personnel should
remain neutral, and patients should receive care solely subject to medical need. But during
war, military necessity may override these duties.” 82
In times of war, however, the state must sometimes “set aside many of the principles
that prohibit intentional harm to others and accept the need to take life and wreak
destruction, either to save ourselves, save others, protect cultural artifacts and traditions, or
avenge a wounded sense of pride and honor . . . the conditions necessary for human
existence and for making our lives worth living.” 83
As Gross claims, whether or not ethics shift during times of war is often
dichotomized into either a “realist” position or an “idealist” position. According to the
realist view, at the national level, morality follows only one rule – survival. In the fight for
survival, ethics may be minimized or eliminated whenever state interests are jeopardized.
Against this view, Gross continues, are idealists who think that the state is a tool to help
people attain the ethical life. A classically liberal state ensures the conditions necessary for
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liberty and happiness, but must be regulated or it risks destroying the very ideals it is trying
to protect.
During war, according to Gross, one of two things happens. Either the ethical focus
shifts to survival, in which anything necessary for survival is allowed, or certain ethical
principles are subordinated in order to ensure that the state survives in order to protect
individuals’ liberty and happiness. In the former case, the government may determine that
certain rights of privacy are counter-productive to national security and institute a secret
national phone-tapping system. The idealist position, on the other hand, might advocate a
slight loosening of privacy rights, but still mandate that privacy be respected by maintaining
the requirements of showing probable cause and respecting legal procedures to ensure that
privacy is not violated. Whether the realist or idealist position is taken, Gross maintains,
there is a shift from ethics that are appropriate in times of peace, to ethics that are
appropriate in times of war.
Medical ethics is included in this shift. Military necessity becomes an overriding
concern when state interests are significantly threatened, such as when the state is no longer
able to provide for the conditions necessary for liberty or happiness of its citizens. 84
Priorities, including appropriate forms of medical care, are shifted to maintain combat
readiness and facilitate the goals of the military. In particular, the focus of medicine is no
longer on individual patients, but on preserving force strength. This influences the right to
life, self-determination, and patient welfare because, “claim rights vary from patient to
patient as a function of medical need and identity.” 85
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Gross supports his claim that medical ethics in times of peace is different from
medical ethics in times of war by arguing first, “the hallmark principles that drive bioethical
decision-making in ordinary clinical settings are largely absent. Military personnel do not
enjoy a right to life, personal autonomy, or a right to self-determination to any degree
approaching that of ordinary patients.” 86 Second, “the principles of contemporary just war
may simply override many bioethical concerns. Military necessity grants paramount
authority to reason of state, proportionality limits but does not eliminate excessive harm, and
the doctrine of double effect permits unintentional harm to noncombatants.” 87 Gross also
challenges the presumption that physicians, especially military physicians, have a duty to
provide care and that patients have a right to receive it.
Ultimately, Gross maintains that the realities of combat limit what would normally
be thought of as absolute rights, such as peacetime respect for autonomy and its derivative
emphasis on informed consent, respect for privacy, and confidentiality. That is, the realities
of war dictate that military necessity severely curtails informed consent, privacy, and
confidentiality. Thus, Gross maintains that military officer duties ought to override
physician duties.

86
87

Ibid. 15.
Ibid. 15.

70

§2: The Patient Comes First
For most members of the medical community, the inclination to follow the ideals of
the medical profession is strong. This often follows from both personal convictions and
from training. Physicians are trained to perceive that the patient comes first and that a
physician has license to exercise their own professional judgments regarding patient care.
This is evident in the World Medical Association International Code of Medical Ethics.
According to the WMA, general duties of a physician include:
A physician shall…always exercise his/her independent professional
judgment and maintain the highest standards of professional
conduct…respect a competent patient’s right to accept or refuse
treatment…be dedicated to providing competent medical service in full
professional and moral independence, with compassion and respect for
human dignity…deal honestly with patients and colleagues…respect the local
and national codes of ethics. 88
Specific duties to patients include:
A physician shall…act in the patient’s best interest when providing medical
care…respect the patient’s right to confidentiality…in situations when he/she
is acting for a third party, ensure that the patient has full knowledge of that
situation. 89
On the basis of the spirit of this code, the belief that in most instances the patient’s
needs take priority over other duties, leads to the claim that physician duties should override
officer duties. For some, the code identifies potential areas of conflict between the
physician’s medical duties and his duties as a military officer. The WMA code states that
physicians should exercise independent professional judgment in the medical care of their
patients, they should respect the patient’s choice of accepting or refusing treatment, they
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should maintain full professional and moral independence concerning their patients, and
they should deal honestly with their patients. 90
Proponents of this view often take one of two approaches. From an extreme
position, proponents argue that physicians are unable to act morally when forced to abandon,
alter, or subvert their physician duties towards individual patients in favor of other concerns.
At a less extreme position, it is claimed that more harm than good occurs when physicians
are not allowed to exercise their physician values and duties. Harms may be to the patient,
the physician, or the society.
According to the World Medical Association, and modern medical traditions, there is
an assumption that all things being equal, the patient comes first. Exceptions to this rule
seem to apply to two specific situations. One, when the patient may cause harm to others,
the physician has permission to protect the third party, including breaking confidentiality,
medically confining his patient, or reporting a patient to the proper authorities. Two, when
the physician is acting for a third party, in which case the patient should have full knowledge
of that situation and consent to the treatment under the criteria established by the third party.
The potential for conflict of duties arises in understanding how that second situation
applies to a military physician. The previous section illustrated how some scholars claim
that military physicians should let their military duties override their medical duties. In
contrast, the scholars in this section will claim that even when working for a third party,
such as the military, there are some ethical duties that cannot be abdicated. Their claim is
that a good physician, a moral physician, first attends to the care of his patients and then
considers other obligations and duties.
90
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The claim that physician duties should override military duties is usually formed by
utilizing one of two different arguments. One argument focuses on a specific issue and uses
the issue as a justification to claim that in this area physician duties clearly override other
duties, such as military duties. This approach argues for physician duties overriding military
duties in a certain type of situation or conflict. The general argument of these scholars
would be: A physician may never purposefully use medicine or medical knowledge to cause
harm to another individual, therefore physicians may never participate in combat roles (or,
some may argue, any military role). Moreover, whenever someone has a medical need, and
the physician is in a position to help, that physician should address that person’s medical
need. The argument concludes that there are some things physicians do not do, such as
purposely or directly using their medical skills to cause harm to individuals. The “specific
duty” argument claims that if physicians do not override other duties there is a potential of
violating the dictate that patients come first which risks causing harm not only to the patient,
but also to the physician and possibly the institution of service.
The second type of argument used by scholars, seeks to establish that generally
physician duties override other duties. This is done by extending the focus of the argument
to many issues and then extrapolating to all situations. Again, an appeal is made that it is
wrong for physicians to use their medical knowledge in ways that cause harm. The scholars
then illustrate how allowing military duties to override physician duties causes harm. Harms
include not only harms to individual patients, but also harms to physicians or even to the
institutions of service. For example, certain activities may subvert a physician’s role as a
healer, or risk psychologically harming the physician. Scholars using this type of argument
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claim that ultimately, for various reasons, unless military physicians are able to practice as
physicians unbound from other duties, they are unable to act as moral agents.

§2.1: Sidel
Sidel contrasts nicely with both Huntington and Colbach. Huntington represents an
extreme where military duties override physician duties; Sidel represents an extreme
position where physician duties override military duties. Colbach represents a position
claiming that in combat situations it is necessary for personal survival to forsake or
substitute the professional ethics of a physician. Sidel claims that there is no conflict
between military and medical obligations because “It is morally unacceptable for a
physician to serve as both a physician and a soldier in the United States military forces, and
probably in other military forces as well.” 91 The overriding ethical principles of medicine
are “concern for the welfare of the patient” and “primarily do no harm;” while the overriding
ethical principles of military service are “concern for the effective function of the fighting
force” and “obedience to the command structure.” 92 Because these principles conflict,
according to Sidel:
The ethical principles of medicine make medical practice under military
control fundamentally dysfunctional and unethical. Medical practice under
these conditions of military control may be harmful to the personnel being
cared for, to the overall mission of the armed forces, and to the practice of
medicine—not only in the military service but in other settings as well. 93
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Sidel explores five ethical dilemmas where, he claims, these principles significantly conflict
with each other.
First, according to Sidel, by adopting the motto “To preserve the fighting strength,”
military physicians are guilty of subordinating the best interests of their patients. Sidel
identifies four areas in which military interests override patient wishes or fail to attend to a
patient’s best interests: triage, medical research, violations of confidentiality, and a failure
to keep adequate medical records.
According to Sidel, military triage does not follow medical standards of care in that
patients are not treated in order of severity of condition. Rather, soldier-patients are treated
in order to expedite the return of soldiers to the ranks regardless of long-term medical
consequences. Sidel identifies the practice of dividing military casualties into at least two
groups. The first group is labeled “expectant” in that they are expected to die because their
injuries require extensive treatment that exceeds the medical resources available in the field.
It is not that there are unavailable resources, either in the field or in some “safe” zone, but
medical resources are saved for casualties in the second group. The second group is the
“walking wounded.” Their wounds are dressed quickly so that they can have weapons
issued to them and continue fighting. Sidel does not identify any other classifications of the
wounded. Triage is based not on the medical needs of the individual soldier, but on the
military needs of getting troops back in the field. One of Sidel’s objections with this
practice is that extended care is neither provided nor expected for wounded soldiers. 94
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Sidel also claims that medical research, such as nuclear or biochemical testing, is
conducted on soldiers without informed consent. 95 Medical research in the military is not
bound by typical safety protocols. In 1990, the Food and Drug Administration provided the
Department of Defense with a waiver authorizing the use of investigational drugs and
vaccines. The FDA justified this ruling for a number of reasons. First, there is an appeal
that trying “something” is better than “doing nothing.” Second, there is an appeal that
“extraordinary circumstances” warrant extreme measures to attempt to save lives. Third,
there is an appeal that people who lack capacity to make decisions in life-threatening
conditions would want medical personnel to attempt to try to save their lives. 96
According to Sidel, violations of confidentiality are generally accepted in the
military; unless it pertains to military or national security, there are no secrets in the military.
According to my interviews, commanding officers can order disclosure of any medical
knowledge of a soldier under their command that may be relevant to military performance.
Officers decide what is relevant.
Finally, Sidel proposes that there is a general failure in the military to keep adequate
medical records. This failure, he claims, impacts long-term healthcare for soldiers, as it is
difficult, if not impossible, to track or treat long-term injuries or ailments.
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The second set of ethical problems confronting military physicians concern Sidel’s
claim that military physicians are guilty of overriding patient wishes in at least three areas:
medical immunizations, management of psychiatric problems, and engaging in inappropriate
triage. Sidel sees no problem with using known effective immunizations in order to protect
an individual against harm. 97 He disagrees with immunizations used for the good of the
fighting force because this undermines a soldier’s autonomy and is “destructive of good
patient care in the long run because the soldier is not an active participant in decisions
relative to his personal healthcare.” 98
There are also two methodological concerns Sidel identifies with military medical
immunizations. Experimental immunization follows more “intuitive” protocols than
“evidence based medicine” in that decisions to test vaccinations are less likely to be
determined by clinical trials and more likely to be protocols from unproven techniques. In a
recent case of anthrax vaccinations, the vaccine was untested and had unknown results.
Moreover, experimental immunizations appear to suffer from a problem of inadequate
record-keeping. “We disagree with the military’s requiring administration of a vaccine that
may have been of questionable efficacy and safety, as we allege in the case of the anthrax
vaccination, when problems with medical record-keeping may make it impossible to track
who might have received a ‘bad’ batch of vaccine.” 99
Along with imposing immunizations, military physicians do not ethically manage
psychiatric problems, according to Sidel. Reminiscent of Colbach’s account of combat
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psychiatry, Sidel questions, “Is battle fatigue or a severe stress reaction to be treated by
rest...and prompt return to the battlefield, or are these symptoms of illness that require more
treatment?” 100 Over-evacuating (sending too many patient-soldiers to hospitals or areas
away from the combat area) is considered a cardinal sin in combat psychiatry, thus
significantly affecting the treatment of soldier-patients.
Finally, Sidel claims, military physicians are forced to engage in battlefield triage
involving euthanasia. Sidel is particularly concerned with two situations that he claims
result in unethical and unprofessional action. Sidel questions the appropriateness of using
euthanasia for the dual purposes of relieving pain and hastening death for expectant patients.
Sidel also questions the practice of battlefield euthanasia, as a practice of military
physicians, when the decision is made not on medical grounds, but, for example to silence a
wounded soldier’s cries of pain and distress which may endanger other soldiers.
The third set of ethical dilemmas revolves around Sidel’s claim that military
physicians are guilty of failing to provide appropriate care to others, such as civilians and
enemy soldiers, possibly violating requirements of the Geneva Conventions. Sidel explains
that there are strong historical traditions of military physicians treating their own casualties
first, allies second, civilians third, and the enemy (if at all) last. The Hippocratic tradition
and the American Medical Associations’ inscription on the Washington Monument “Vincit
Amor Pariae,” 101 indicate that during times of war it is acceptable for military physicians to
follow these traditions. Sidel views this as unethical procedure that violates the Geneva
Conventions.
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Moreover, Sidel asserts that physicians or other medical personnel sometimes use
their medical knowledge to gain information from their patients. This tradition was also
challenged with the adoption of the Geneva Conventions. Sidel interprets the Conventions
to state:
Regarded as ‘noncombatants,’ medical personnel are forbidden to engage in
or be parties to acts of war...The wounded and sick soldier and civilian—
friend and foe—must be respected, protected, treated humanely, and cared for
by the belligerents...The wounded and sick must not be left without medical
assistance and the order of their treatment must be based on the urgency of
their medical needs...Medical aid must be dispensed solely on medical
grounds, ‘without any adverse distinction founded on sex, race, nationality,
religion, political opinions, or any other similar criteria’...Medical personnel
shall exercise no physical or moral coercion against protected persons
(civilians), in particular to obtain information from them or from third
parties. 102
Sidel provides accounts as to why or under what situations these duties are violated.
For example, as military physicians become attached to their own group, they are at risk of
failing to fully attend to the needs of patients from other groups. One result of this may be
the rise of untreated civilian casualties in modern warfare. Moreover, enemy soldiers in
need of medical care may not receive care due to reasons of patriotism or national security.
Sidel believes that military physicians are psychologically at risk of adopting an “us” versus
“them” mentality that undermines medical practice and ethics.
According to Sidel, the fourth moral dilemma is that military physicians are guilty of
blurring combatant and noncombatant roles. There is a significant tradition of doctors as
voluntary and active combatants. During the Crusades, the Knight Hospitallers were
infamous for engaging in battle one moment then rendering medical aid to the survivors of
combat the next. Sidel claims that more recently, U.S. Military surgeons have been awarded
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Medals of Honor for commanding troops during U.S. engagements. 103 Sidel claims that
Special Operations Forces’ medics primarily use medicine as a weapon “to seek and destroy
the enemy” first and “only incidentally to take care of the medical needs of others on the
patrol.” 104 Sidel believes, “physicians are always physicians and therefore should adhere to
their ethical duty to ‘do no harm.’” 105
For Sidel, the blurring of combat duties and medical duties can be seen in several
other areas. One area is that of developing weapons. When military physicians work on
weapon systems, they may be in danger of violating the medical prescript to “first, do no
harm.” Another area of possible conflict is that of participating in or failing to report
torture.
Sidel’s final accusation against military physicians is that they are prevented from
acting as moral agents within the military. There are three areas in which Sidel claims that
physicians in the military are prevented from acting as moral agents: (1) attempting to
protect military personnel, (2) taking moral actions in the military, and (3) expressing their
moral protest. Sidel states that the institutional mentality of the military, especially the
health professional’s inability to refuse to obey orders, dictates that physician duties are
overridden by military concerns; concerns which do not cohere to the principles of medical
ethics. Not only are physicians forced to forgo their physician centered duties, they are
prevented from protesting this situation. According to Sidel, when they are an active
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member of the military, soldiers must relinquish their right to pro-actively participate in the
political process, including public protests. 106
Given the five broad areas of ethical concern addressed by Sidel, he claims that the
conflicting principles of medicine and warfare are truly a moral dilemma:
The role of the ‘physician-soldier’ [is] an inherent moral impossibility
because the military physician, in an environment of military control, is faced
with difficult problems of mixed agency that include obligations to the
‘fighting strength’ and, more broadly, to ‘national security.’ Furthermore,
these physicians are assigned to specific duties and committed for a fixed
period to military service, both of which preclude options that civilian
physicians have for resolving role conflict and the dilemmas inherent in those
situations. 107

§2.2: Howe
As Colbach represents a position that survival in the military during active combat
requires adopting the military point of view and abdicating physician duties, Howe
represents a position that to retain their humanity, and for a society to remain civilized,
physician values must be upheld, especially when they go against military values.
Howe concentrates on issues faced by U.S. military physicians since the terrorists’
attacks against the U.S. on September 11, 2001. Howe’s project is concerned with
identifying the implications of taking military duties as overriding physician duties. Howe
maintains that some values, particularly those held by physicians, must remain unchanged
even if they go against optimal military interests or the interests of the society that a military
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serves. To hold otherwise, he claims, regresses society and turns society from civilized
values to more barbaric values. 108
These claims follow from Howe’s general discussion regarding the leading issues
faced by physicians tasked with being part of a team monitoring terrorist prisoners: Can
physicians participate in the torture of terrorists? How do physicians deal with suicide and
psychological care? How are prisoners of war treated? Should prisoners be given protective
or preventive treatments such as vaccines or experimental medications? What should be
done when the military medical triage principle is at stake? These issues are examples of
the moral dilemmas which military physicians may encounter prompting moral distress.
Howe first considers issues of torture. He suggests that to engage in torture, a
society must revert to pre-civilized standards, presumably standards that the society has
abandoned. Howe does not categorically claim that physicians should not participate in
torture. Instead, he claims that “If certain interrogation practices are deemed unethical or
illegal, military physicians have professional obligations as doctors and military obligations,
like all soldiers, to oppose them. If they remain silent, they, like the rest of society, will be
guilty of moral complicity.” 109
Along with issues of participating in torture, military physicians also have to
question to what degree they intervene in potential suicide attempts and to what extent they
engage in psychological care or prisoners. Howe’s concern is that terrorists are at a higher
risk of suicide than typical civilian prisoners or prisoners of war. He claims that although
physicians could use physical restraints on terrorists, this could be interpreted as a human
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rights violation. Howe believes that physical restraints increase long-term harms to
prisoners and involves treating terrorists differently from other prisoners.
Further complicating the matter, quality health care requires trust between a patient
and physician. Trust is significantly eroded when medical workers participate in
interrogation or torture procedures. This implies, according to Howe, that medical workers
should not participate in non-health related activities with prisoners.
The history of treatment of prisoners of war has significantly changed over the
centuries. Historically it was not uncommon that all “enemies,” soldier and civilian, were
killed or taken for slave labor. Sacrificing the enemy to “the gods” was also practiced. In
some wars, prisoners were given the option of offering an oath not to fight again or even
granted the chance to join their capturer’s army. As medical practice began to improve and
gain acceptance in military campaigns, it was somewhat common to use prisoners as
experimental test subjects. In modern times policies for some countries and militaries have
developed that require a more humane treatment of prisoners.
Humanely treating prisoners of war still meets difficulty. According to law, POWs
under capture by U.S. forces deserve the same medical care as U.S. soldiers. This follows
from both pragmatic and moral concerns. Pragmatically, U.S. military forces hope for
reciprocal treatment for captured U.S. soldiers. New standards of combat morality indicate
a belief that equal treatment seems to be the correct thing to do. However, what does the
requirement of “equality” really entail? According to Howe:
Some soldiers and military physicians, however, believe that it is ethical to
violate the Geneva Convention because, like terrorists, POWs can give
valuable information. Others believe that, even if POWs cannot or will not
provide information, they still should not be treated equally because they do
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not deserve to be: First, they may have killed U.S. soldiers; second, even if
they have not, since they are enemy soldiers, they are not innocent
bystanders; and, third, treating them equally would demoralize U.S. forces,
especially if U.S. soldiers were not treated or their treatment was postponed,
as a result. 110

Howe claims that since some physicians have displayed the capacity to treat enemy
soldiers equally, even when it is difficult to remain objective, all physicians ought to be
willing to treat POWs equally. Howe’s argument is not explicit. He converts the fact that
some people are able to remain objective, to the moral rule that all people ought to be able to
remain objective. Perhaps he relies on notions of professional responsibility to combine
practice with moral approbation.
If military physicians treat enemy POWs equally with respect to allied soldiers, what
does this entail when it comes to giving prisoners protective agents? “Protective agents,” in
the context of Howe’s concerns, seems to be an euphemism encompassing vaccinations,
experimental medications, and experimental procedures used on soldiers. For example,
Howe claims that against standard civilian research protocols the U.S. Government
frequently requires its soldiers to take bio-chemical “protectives,” experimental blood
clotting agents, and other “treatments” which have not been fully tested. 111 He believes
medications are tested or used “off-label” to determine possible effects in cases of chemical
or biological attacks.
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Howe holds that although the military should not require its soldiers to take
medication as part of a testing program, it can nonetheless require the medication as a
stipulation for entering battle. 112 That is, during peacetime soldiers should not be part of a
general medical test, but during wartime, or in preparation of war, soldiers can be required
to take the medication as part of their combat readiness preparation.
Would similar treatments apply to civilians or POWs who come under the care of a
military physician? Howe points out that under the popular notion of “equality of
treatment” not only would this be permissible, but also it is required. Although prisoners of
war are not being prepared to participate in a battle, the prisoners must be treated as if the
battle may come to them. In some situations, those who care for prisoners must consider or
plan for action in the case that the prisoners are unwittingly forced into combat situations.
For example, if soldiers are given medication to protect them from possible biological
agents used against the compound where prisoners are being held, prisoners must also be
protected.
Equality of care may also influence rationing of limited supplies. What should be
done when military medical triage is at stake? According to Howe, “The medical triage
principle holds that when resources are limited, military doctors may first treat soldiers who
can return to the front, as opposed to those soldiers who cannot return. They may do this so
that the war effort can succeed, even though they anticipate that as a result some of the
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soldiers whose treatment is delayed or preempted may die.” 113 Military physicians may then
experience a problem as:
The ethical question confronted by military doctors would be whether they
could apply the military medical triage principle in the usual way by treating
first U.S. soldiers who could return to the front, then more severely injured
U.S. soldiers, and finally, equally injured POWs. They could not, since this
would not treat equally injured POWs equally. 114
Howe concludes with the following observations. “The cardinal question posed by
these new issues is what priorities, if any, should stay the same. If there are any ethical
priorities that should remain unchanged, it would seem that the values that should be
retained are those relating to the treatment of captured terrorists and POWs.” 115 This
contrasts with Gross’s view. Gross argues that ethical principles and priorities must change
in time of war; Howe argues that certain principles must remain unchanged even in times of
war.
Howe is especially supportive of maintaining principles and values when it comes to
the treatment of prisoners. “To respect all persons, once captured, affirms human dignity.
Respecting human dignity may be the major underlying, if not the sole justification, for
conducting all wars. Thus if, after 9/11, no other time-honored values are continued, those
regarding the treatment of these prisoners would seem most to warrant being retained.” 116
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§2.3: Jadresic
Whereas Howe focuses on physicians retaining their humanity, and the dangers of
social regression if physicians abdicate their patient-centric health-care focus, Jadresic
focuses on professional integrity, following codes of ethics, and following international law.
Moreover, not only does he address the illegitimacy of physicians participating in certain
kinds of activities, Jadresic also addresses the immorality of not allowing physicians to treat
those in medical need. In contrast to Sidel, who claims a physician cannot act morally and
ethically as a member of the military, Jadresic represents an individual’s search for a
methodology that would allow active participation in the care of individuals while
maintaining professional ethics even within a military climate. 117
On September 11, 1973, the Chilean military staged a coup d’état. Chile’s National
Stadium was used as an internment center for those suspected of opposing the coup. One of
the detainees was Alfredo Jadresic, a prominent physician. During his detention, Dr.
Jadresic was asked to be a prisoner-doctor. Based partly on the reports from prisoners that
“they had seen doctors and nurses participating in the interrogations” 118 Jadresic became a
prisoner-physician in order to help relieve the suffering experienced by the prisoners. In this
role, Jadresic witnessed the results of torture.
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Although he found that some of the medical workers were supportive and
sympathetic towards the tortured prisoners, he also found that the majority of medical
workers either pretended to ignore the situation or rationalized it. “’What do you expect?
We are at war!’ Taking for granted, obviously, that the practice of torture should be
acceptable in case of war.” 119 This echoes the claim that ethics during times of war are
different from ethics during times of peace. How does this apply when medical workers
find themselves transformed from primarily working as healers of individuals to
interrogators for the state? Jadresic accounts for the various ways medical workers may
become directly or indirectly involved with torture, “as advisors in the use of drugs or the
effectiveness of certain procedures, by ensuring that torture may continue, by covering up
evidence of torture, by neglecting sick or injured prisoners and sometimes by participating
themselves.” 120 The involvement with torture sometimes includes experiencing moral
conflict, particularly “between loyalty to the patient-prisoner or to the institution to which
they belong.” 121 Because of his own personal experiences, Jadresic developed a strong
position against torture.
Jadresic’s basic position is “the moral rejection of all forms of torture in all
circumstances.” 122 He rejects both retributive torture as well as interrogational torture.
Implicit in this rejection is a rejection of claims that either state or military interests can
provide mitigating circumstances for either type of torture. He emphasizes that medical
personnel have absolutely no legitimate role to play in torture. “It has been considered a
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fundamental responsibility of the medical profession to judge the moral and ethical propriety
of each medical act that affects another human being. I would explicitly add that this
responsibility commits all medical societies and medical associations to condemn the
participation of any of their members in any way in the practice of torture.” 123 This claim is
followed by both general humanitarian prohibitions against torture as well as specific
professional prohibitions of torture.
In general, humanitarian ideals dictate, “From a moral point of view the intention to
break the will of the victim through degradation and destruction of the human personality is
inadmissible.” 124 Jadresic does not argue for this claim of moral inadmissibility of torture
for all; however he does give specific prohibitions against torture from a medical point of
view. Even if there does not exist a general prohibition against torture, various professional
standards in medicine, as expressed in medical codes, do take a stance against torture.
Jadresic’s reasoning that to maintain professional integrity physicians should not
participate in torture is based on recognized codes of ethics. According to the International
Code of Medical Ethics, “Under no circumstances is a doctor permitted to do anything that
could weaken the physical or mental resistance of a human being, except for strictly
therapeutic or prophylactic indications imposed in the interest of the patient.” 125 The
Declaration of Tokyo states, “The doctor shall not countenance, condone or participate in the
practice of torture or other forms of cruel, inhuman or degrading procedures, whatever the
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offence or which the victim of such procedures is suspected, accused or guilty, and whatever
the victim’s beliefs or motives, and in all situations, including armed conflict or strife.” 126
The ethics surrounding torture are not associated only with direct participation of
medical workers. According to Jadresic, medical workers should not be prevented from
treating victims of torture. Others have a responsibility to allow medical workers
professional autonomy in carrying out their duties. In a position similar to Sidel, Jadresic
claims that physicians should be able to maintain professional autonomy. “Medical codes of
conduct should also help to prevent negligence and improper treatment in the care of
prisoners and should allow doctors complete freedom to treat any person regarding medical
care.” 127
What insights does Jadresic provide? Jadresic raises the issue that it may be a
common attitude among medical workers that during times of war their loyalties are allied
with their nation or institution of service, but not with individual patients. This attitude
potentially conflicts with normal patient care. It may allow medical workers to act in ways
not in their patients’ best interests or in ways consistent with professional autonomy.
Jadresic suggests that most medical care personnel who witness or participate in torture
ignore the conflict or deceive themselves into thinking that their patriotic duty overrides
patient concern.
Yet, he maintains, there are some activities in which no moral human being should
participate, such as torture. Additionally, he claims that medical workers have a special duty
not to engage in or otherwise condone torture. Although this is not a blanket proposal that
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physician duties override military duties, it suggests that there are physician duties that
ought to override military duties.
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Chapter Four: Challenges to the “Either-Or” Solution

No sensible decision can be made any longer without taking into account not
only the world as it is, but the world as it will be.
Isaac Asimov
My basic principle is that you don’t make decisions because they are easy;
you don’t make them because they are cheap; you don’t make them because
they are popular; you make them because they’re right.
Theodore Hesburgh

To reiterate, there are two common approaches in the literature to conflict resolution
when situations arise in which physician duties conflict with officer duties: (1) officer
duties should override physician duties, and (2) physician duties should override officer
duties. Sometimes one or the other of these approaches is subtly implied as (3) a “case-bycase” approach where officer duties and physician duties are weighted depending on the
circumstances such that one set of duties seems more appropriate than the other set of duties.
Another approach claims that, (4) as a member of the moral community the military
physician has duties above and beyond professional duties, thus non-professional duties can
regulate the dilemma. 128
Interviews with physicians, military officers, and military physicians, as well as a
literature search, reveals that there is a preference for approaches (1) and (2). Moreover, it
appears that even in the case where someone advocates for approaches (3) or (4), there is
often an underlying default to (1) or (2). Clearly (1) and (2) provide a general framework
for dealing with the moral dilemmas of a military physician and they are attractive for
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precisely this reason. In many instances, approaches (1) and (2) can provide a simple,
principled manner to handle some types of conflict of duty, but these diametrically opposed
either-or solutions do not always provide for satisfactory resolution of moral and ethical
dilemmas that will prevent or lessen moral distress.
This chapter analyzes the positions expressed in the previous chapter’s reviews of
proponents of the either-or solutions. It discusses the challenges presented by following
only the military proponents’ view or of following only the medical proponents’ view.
Although there are some very key insights in approaches (1) and (2), and elements that are
important in evaluating and negotiating moral dilemmas, both positions will be shown to be
insufficiently nuanced and insufficiently sensitive to different contexts which shape the
moral dilemmas faced by military physicians. There is not one set of reasons why all eitheror solutions do not work; rather each attempt at an either-or solution can be inadequate due
to either problematic assumptions or unacceptable consequences.
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§1: Challenges to Military Proponents
§1.1: Huntington
Huntington argues that there is often an assumption that professionals should serve
the public good or they do not deserve to receive the legalized monopoly of providing
services for their clientele. Military officers serve the public good by managing and
providing security for a state. In this capacity, military officers are tasked with directly
serving the interests of the state. Military efficiency and security require that soldiers serve
as instrumental objects within a chain of command. This includes, Huntington suggests,
uncritically following orders in most cases. Moreover, the training and duties of soldiers
often result in a dissolution of an individual’s will into the group. 129
Consequently, it has been argued, soldiers may essentially be rendered into
mechanistic automatons or otherwise have their autonomy reduced. Moral responsibility
may be lessened such that, at a minimum, an excusing condition has been provided for
certain questionable behavior in the military. All of this, Huntington claims, arises from a
need to limit personal liberty in favor of state security.
Is it true, as Huntington claims, that “The tension between the demands of military
security and the values of American liberalism can, in the long run, be relieved only by the
weakening of the security threat or weakening of liberalism”? 130 This could depend upon
how we understand liberalism.
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If a classical liberalism stance is assumed which advocates both freedoms and
responsibilities for individuals while stressing such components as human rationality,
protected liberties, and constitutional limitations, then perhaps we may be dealing with a
false dichotomy. Perhaps both military security and American liberalism can be
accommodated if emphasis is placed on core values shared by physicians and military
officers – protecting individuals, helping individuals flourish, or shielding individuals from
harm. This would imply that we could somehow resolve the physician-officer conflict
without resorting to the possible false dichotomy of an either-or solution.
Consider this in light of Huntington’s statement that “Success in any activity requires
the subordination of the will of the individual to the will of the group.” 131 This seems to be
a false dichotomy in that it is not clear whether a choice needs to be made between success
with subordination of the will, or failure by maintaining individualism. It is certainly
conceivable that a group could value individuality and uniqueness and that people could
succeed in certain activities without subordinating themselves to the will of the group. We
often reward successful artists, scientists, or businessmen precisely because they were able
to maintain their individualism without succumbing to “groupthink.” This provides the
possibility that there is an option other than the either-or solution to the physician-officer
conflict that will allow us to balance the duties and will of the individual with the duties and
responsibilities of the group.
Another problem arises from Huntington’s statement that soldiers cannot be effective
in their duties unless they uncritically obey orders and act for the collective interests of the
military. Consider various implications of this idea. The rationale seems to ignore that,
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since the Nuremburg Trials, it is commonly acknowledged that soldiers are not required to
obey illegal orders. In fact, the Uniform Code of Military Justice states that a soldier must
obey only legal orders and has a responsibility to report illegal orders. Yet, it is sometimes
claimed that allowing soldiers to disobey orders results in less effective military operations
and thus reduces the efficiency of a military in working towards state interests. While this
latter assertion awaits empirical evidence, a critical choice that the modern military and any
liberal democracy may face is between being effective while having a policy where every
order must be obeyed, versus possibly being less effective while allowing for the disobeying
of illegal orders. In fact, perhaps one purpose of morality is to keep organizations from
ruthlessly pursuing effectiveness. 132
A related problem is that it has not been established how best to act for the collective
interests of the military. This is a classic problem in some consequentialists’ theories of
ethics that claim that we should maximize the good for a group. In some situations it is
possible to maximize the good for a group by maximizing the good for each individual. For
example, if “health” is considered a good, then to maximize the health of a group it would
be desirable, or most productive, to maximize the health of each individual within the group.
That is, give each person what they need, better health, then the entire group is maximally
healthier.
Situations where maximizing the good of the group is not achieved through
maximizing the good of the individual are more complicated, but they are well established.
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I owe this point to John Hardwig. As he suggests, some might argue that in a state of extreme emergency –
active combat or your country is in danger of being defeated – effectiveness could be a single-minded
pursuit. Japanese and German citizens were, and are, grateful that their military did not do everything it
could to avoid defeat at the end of WWII. See Appendix 3 for an analysis of obeying orders.
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Garret Hardin’s Tragedy of the Commons, or the infamous Prisoner’s Dilemma in game
theory, demonstrates this situation where trying to maximize benefits for each individual
results in overall disutility for the group. In these cases, it is necessary to adjust utility for
each individual to maximize utility for the group. Thus, with respect to acting for the
collective interests of the military, it needs to be established what the interests of the military
are and how these relate to individual interests and group interests.
This problem is replicated in Huntington’s claim that “the military man emphasizes
the importance of the group as against the individual.” 133 Does the importance of the group
get emphasized by focusing on the group at the expense of the individual, or does the
importance of the group get emphasized by focusing upon the needs of the individuals?
There is a need for empirical studies for these types of problems.
A final problem with Huntington’s account is that although he acknowledges that
obeying orders does have limits, he does not indicate when it is reasonable for a soldier to
disobey orders due to “dictates of private conscience.” 134 In fact, Huntington’s view that
“Moral aims and ideological ends should not be pursued at the expense of security,” 135
leaves solutions to some situations vague and unanswered.
Overall, Huntington provides an account as to where some of the conflicting roles
appear for the military physician. A tension is felt between liberal concerns (as represented
in physician duties) and national interests (as represented by officer duties). Although there
are difficulties with Huntington’s overall claim concerning the primacy of military duties, he
does provide the perspective that it is appropriate, at times, to maintain that state interests
133
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should override individual interests. Therefore, it is possible to extract the claim that officer
duties should sometimes have priority over physician duties.
However, this claim becomes conceptually confused when we consider Huntington’s
position on obeying orders and maintaining military efficiency. Huntington’s position rests
on empirical assumptions. Even if his premises are correct, it is not outside the realm of
plausibility to suggest that a modern military or liberal democracy would maintain that
liberal positions ultimately enhance security rather than threaten security. Moreover, it is
plausible that there remains a balanced solution that is better than the either-or solution
proposed by Huntington’s arguments.

§1.2: London
London initially offers excusing conditions for what might otherwise be considered
immoral behavior on the part of military physicians—that we should be cautious of casting
moral blame on people when they are acting within the conventional morality of their
society. This is especially true when people are under pressures where they are unable to
consider and critically evaluate their situation. In such cases, they must rely on conventional
morality, or in following the standards that are considered acceptable within their
organization.
Although the notion of excusing a military physician for following his officer duties
may be more acceptable than mandating that officer duties always supersede physician
duties, there are some problems with London’s thesis. London appears to advocate a type of
cultural relativism. However, his account of morality seems to rely upon both a
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questionable understanding of how individuals can generate their own morality and a
questionable belief in the morality of socially generated beliefs.
In the former case, London claims that most people are too busy living life to be
concerned with moral calculation. Even if he is correct in assuming the generally busy lives
of individuals, this does not excuse professionals from not taking sufficient time and energy
in their lives to develop an awareness and practice of morality and professional
responsibility. This is especially true when we consider professions dealing with the
possibility of causing great harm.
In the latter case, London seems to unabashedly accept that social norms imply
morality. This is not a problem if he means that social norms inform us of moral belief, and
perhaps help us to understand moral behavior. However, if he fully embraces the idea that
social norms define moral behavior, some issues need to be considered.
London’s position becomes morally problematic for anyone who believes in moral
progress. A commitment to the ideal of moral progress suggests that German or Japanese
physicians should not be excused for their participation in war crimes during World War II,
such as the horrendous experiments on prisoners, even though their society appeared to
accept their actions. Instead, those who believe in moral progress have the opinion that
German or Japanese physicians who chose to engage in moral behavior by treating prisoners
humanely, even when requested to do otherwise by the social norms of their country, should
be praised.
Moral progress is incompatible with cultural relativism. Though London provides
insight into understanding why people act as they do, he does not provide an adequate
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defense for the belief that people can and should act according to social custom. London
does provide specific reasons for excusing or justifying the actions of military physicians
who constrain their medical duties in order to conform to military duty. This is problematic
as the logic behind excusing someone is that we do not excuse people unless they have done
something wrong. If it is not wrong for military physicians to act as they do, because they
are following social sanctions, then there is no reason to have to excuse or forgive them.
The central insight London offers is that there are times when it may be appropriate
to excuse the behavior of a military physician. London does not qualify these conditions
other than to suggest that the military physician is excused whenever he is performing his
military duties in conformance to social norms. This may become problematic in situations
involving the “Nuremburg Defense” of “Following Orders.” However, this type of
reasoning allows claims to be introduced that sometimes officer duties should override
physician duties. By combining an appeal to military necessity with an appeal to social
norms, there is an attempt to justify excusing military physicians’ actions, and to justify
mandating that military physicians act in certain ways contrary to their physician norms.
Yet, the appeal to military necessity is lacking when it is unknown how to apply “necessity”
conditions beyond appealing to social norms.

§1.3: Colbach
Colbach offers several insights into medical care during combat conditions.
Furthering the emphasis on the group, military physicians are tasked with helping preserve
the fighting strength of the military. For militaries to succeed in their missions, soldiers are
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sometimes returned to active duty as quickly and efficiently as possible. This includes
situations in which patient care might not be optimal, in the long-term, for the individual
patient. As Colbach notes, this causes moral distress in military physicians, as it conflicts
with their medical training. Combat physicians must either adopt the view that officer duties
override physician duties or risk psychological harm.
What makes Colbach’s argument interesting is that rather than relying on notions of
military security or cultural relativism, Colbach maintains that the adaptive perspective of
his professional duties came about as a personal survival mechanism. As can be seen by the
moral distress Colbach experienced, the decision to subordinate his moral principles as an
adaptive survival mechanism changed his commitment to his previously held beliefs and the
values that had formed part of his moral identity as a physician. Thus we see a direct
example of the activation of conflicting moral scripts. Some aspects of Colbach’s position
remain troubling.
It might be troubling because it seems distasteful and morally wrong to find that
someone is forced to change his or her beliefs due to institutional pressure. It is also
troubling to think that someone is subordinating his moral principles in order to survive or
succeed in an organization or position. This critically depends upon the nature of the
organization. If someone were to say “In order to survive in the Mafia…” or “In order to
survive as a political assassin…” one would not be inclined to grant that subordinating
moral principles is a good thing. However, when one is working for an organization, such
as the military, that has an arguably legitimate purpose, such as protecting the interests of a
nation, one may need to re-evaluate one’s moral stance in some situations.
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It is unreasonable to hold that people must not change their beliefs. In fact, a healthy
individual may voluntarily change his beliefs over time as he grows and develops. If this
were not the case, there would be no progress in thought or moral development. What is
required to evaluate the situations where professionals change their beliefs is a reasoned and
morally acceptable account of why they changed their beliefs.
Consider, for instance, two psychiatric patients, Elijah and George, both undergoing
behavior modification therapy. The difference between the two is that Elijah was
involuntarily committed to a psychiatric care facility. He is undergoing a very aggressive
multi-therapeutic routine involving drugs, group pressure, and individual counseling which
is intended to change his behavior and, therefore, his identity. George is a willing patient
who consciously desires to change his behavior. Moreover, George is undergoing long-term
and gradual treatment. George is actively trying to change his identity, while Elijah is not.
Elijah does not want to change his behavior nor does he want to alter his identity.
Consider this concept of changing identity more closely. According to Blustein,
“Incorporating the requirement of morality into one’s life should not have disastrous
consequences for human personality. Morality may demand significant sacrifice and effort,
but the cost of being moral should not be a distorted and undesirable personality.” 136 We all
have commitments that involve a person’s centrally important values which contribute to
one’s identity. As Blustein claims, “[these commitments] make us what we are and they
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war.’”
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place constraints on our lives from which we may not be able to unbind ourselves without
self-betrayal and personal disintegration.” 137
These commitments are, not surprisingly, called “identity-conferring commitments.”
These commitments are also a key part in defining our moral personality. In light of this, we
might say that Elijah is suffering an attack on his identity-conferring beliefs. That is, he is
being forced to suffer either from self-betrayal or from personal disintegration. Because
George’s therapy is informed and consensual, he is not suffering from self-betrayal or
personal disintegration. He is simply trying to redefine his own self. How does this
compare to the case of Colbach, a combat psychiatrist, or other military physicians who seek
to reconcile their medical duties with their military duties?
It seems that a central issue is whether or not combat physicians are being forced into
a position of self-betrayal or personal disintegration. This requires us to consider whether
combat physicians lose integrity. According to Blustein, one way to lose integrity is for an
individual to “freely and intentionally act contrary to their principles or commitments when
it is difficult for these individuals to remain true to them.” 138
If combat physicians decide to emphasize their obligations to the military
organization to the detriment of the individual soldier’s health because of a personal
commitment to the military, this would seem consistent with being true to maintaining
personal integrity. Likewise, if combat physicians made the choice because they agreed
with society sanctioned views of the proper relationship between a military physician and his
relationship with individual soldiers and the military organization, they would be able to
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avoid self-betrayal and personal disintegration. Either way, combat physicians would
maintain their personal integrity. However, being true to one’s personal integrity does not
necessarily assure that one is acting in a moral and ethical manner as shown by the unethical
actions some medical and military personnel have taken and defended throughout history.
In Colbach’s account of combat psychiatrists it does not appear that the psychiatrists
made adaptations to their personal or professional integrity because of personal commitment
to the military or because society sanctioned the military view of proper medical conduct.
Instead, his combat psychiatrists adopted their perspective in order to survive the military
environment. Presumably, he does not mean physical survival, as he is not expressing fear
of being physically hurt or killed in his service. Moreover, it does not seem that he would
accept the argument “that’s what I had to do to survive in the Mafia” or “in the Gestapo.”
Presumably, what he means is that he was doing what his job required in order to maintain
his ability to function effectively within the military institution without facing reprisals for
not conforming to military doctrine.
This does not imply that combat psychiatrists or other physicians who make a
commitment to the military are automatically betraying themselves or destroying their
personal integrity. However, it is a fair claim to suggest that it is possible and likely, that
given the moral distress described by Colbach, his combat psychiatrists experienced either
self-betrayal or personal disintegration. To understand the dilemma these psychiatrists
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experienced requires a brief examination into some aspects of moral education and the
process of moral action. 139
There are various ways in which the process of developing ethical action can be
ineffective. The first breakdown may occur because of a lack of awareness of a moral
situation. In this case, the moral process never begins. The second breakdown may occur
when an individual lacks the moral wisdom to evaluate the situation by identifying the
relevant factors, considering options, and recognizing possible outcomes. In this case two
primary risks are that the moral process can become “paralyzed by analysis” or wrong
choices can be made. A third possible breakdown may occur when a person lacks intent,
empathy, or a feeling of responsibility to intervene. This may result in an absence of a
motivation for action. Finally, there may be either external or internal forces which prevent
an individual from acting.
There are a series of “gaps” which must be bridged that enable a person to perform a
moral action. The largest gap appears to be between the awareness of a moral situation and
the ability to act. How might this compare to Colbach’s, or others’, ideas of trying to
disentangle themselves from a situation that is causing moral distress?
Colbach demonstrated awareness of the situation and, as evidenced from his
accounts of experiencing moral distress, demonstrated a deep empathy for the situation.
This suggests that the breakdown occurred due to either a lack of moral wisdom or other
forces preventing him from acting. There are two key components that directly led to

139

A detailed account of moral psychology goes beyond the scope of this dissertation, so in this section I only
highlight the problem to help us understand why people may be unable to act in certain circumstances. See
Appendix 2 for a fuller account of moral psychology.

105

Colbach’s experience of moral distress and inability to treat his patients as he felt he should
as a physician.
First, because Colbach was operating within a combat zone there were both limited
resources and institutional pressures which severely impacted treatment options. That
psychological treatments were so effective during the war was a testament to the ability of
combat psychiatrists to perform their job. But there were still limits. The limits were not
only for treatment plans. The limits dictated that quitting was not an option for many
people. Whether he was drafted or enlisted, the penalties were too high – ranging from
punishment for desertion to the moral agony of abandoning people in need.
The second component which can impact moral wisdom and the ability to act is an
often ignored phenomenon – moral fatigue. Moral fatigue results from morally distressful
situations in which there exists a lack of strength and energy that causes emotional fatigue in
the mind and immobilizes thoughts. Moral fatigue limits an individual’s ability to evaluate
situations and develop cogent courses of action. Moreover, moral fatigue inhibits, at times,
the empathy or feelings which are sometimes necessary as motivation towards action.
Individuals suffering moral fatigue often lack the ability to develop independent thoughts
and make autonomous decisions. Instead, they revert to a state of compliance and often
uncritically do what others tell them to do. When this is compounded with military training
in obeying authority, morally fatigued individuals are less likely to thoughtfully evaluate the
circumstances and instead do only what they perceive that they are told to do, without
thought of more appropriate alternative action.

106

For whatever reason, Colbach did not quit performing his duties as a combat
psychiatrist even though he believed he was not being completely true to his medical ethics
and professional duty. Perhaps the penalties of quitting were too high. Perhaps he thought
it was morally wrong to quit once the tour of duty started. Perhaps he felt he was offering at
least some help to soldiers in need. Or perhaps he simply suffered from moral fatigue. We
know that he made a conscious choice to change part of his identity to “survive the
military.”
It is unknown if combat psychiatrists’ experiences more closely resemble the case of
Elijah or of George. Were their experiences more like Elijah who was being coerced into
changing his identity or of George who was an active and willing participant in his identity
change? The closer the psychiatrists’ situation was to resembling Elijah’s case, the more
likely it is that Colbach’s position, that military duties should override physician duties,
should be questioned. Likewise, the closer the situation was to George’s case, the more
likely it is, that Colbach’s position that military duties should override physician duties has
merit.

§1.4: Gross
The insight from Colbach’s account is one of reducing personal integrity, and
therefore relinquishing identity-conferring commitments, in order to survive organizational
or institutional pressures. It suggests that in some situations people are not choosing one set
of duties over another because of some sense of higher purpose or considered judgment as to
the relative values of the conflicting duties. Rather it suggests that something more
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insidious is happening to resolve personal moral conflict. Moreover, it suggests that eitheror solutions lack an awareness of the possible psychological harm the solutions can cause to
professionals.
Gross returns to the notion that during times of war, military duty overrides
peacetime bioethics, because military necessity overrides civil liberty. This suggests the
specter of the Nazi defense claim that following orders is a justifying or at least an excusing
position under limited circumstances such as submission of individual will or under
conditions of limited autonomy. For Gross, military efficiency requires that orders be
obeyed when national interests are at issue. Moreover, national security requires overriding
personal liberty and hence, physicians must allow their physician duties to be overridden by
military duties.
Gross allows for invoking a principle of military necessity whenever an action is
needed to preserve the welfare of the state, its army, and its citizens. Gross thus provides a
“continuum” along which physician duties and military duties slide, or alternate in inverse
proportion to each other, due to the intensity of warfare. In times of peace, according to
Gross, physician duties reign supreme; but during times of war, soldier duties hold preeminence. 140 The “tipping point” for Gross is determined by military necessity. Thus,
according to Gross, the realities of war dictate that military necessity severely curtails
informed consent, privacy, and confidentiality. There is clearly some validity to this claim.
Yet, it is difficult to determine what Gross defines as military necessity or to determine
when conditions reach a critical status. Another problem with Gross’s use of military
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necessity is the fear that this type of reasoning may lead to such atrocities as those seen in
Nazi Germany, Japan’s Unit 731, and the My Lai Massacre in Vietnam.

109

§2: Challenges to Medical Proponents
Just as the military has a strong tradition of service, the medical profession also has a
strong tradition of service. However, military service tends to focus on group welfare while
medical service tends to focus on the individual patient. Medicine’s focus on the individual
is often expressed in codes of medical ethics, such as the World Medical Association
International Code of Medical Ethics that states, among other things, that physicians should
always exercise their independent professional judgment by acting in the patient’s best
interest.

§2.1: Sidel
Sidel is a strong advocate of the view that physician duties should override officer
duties. In Sidel’s view, the primary ethical principles of medicine are concern for the
welfare of the patient and to do no harm; the primary ethical principles of the military are
concern for the effective function of the fighting force and obedience to the command
structure. For Sidel, medical practice under a military system might be harmful to patients,
harmful to the overall mission of the military, and harmful to the practice of medicine. Sidel
believes military physicians risk subordinating the best interests of their patients, overriding
patient interests, failing to provide care as required by international law, blurring combatant
and noncombatant roles, and being prevented from acting as moral agents. A detailed and
longer look at each of these claims reveals important differences between civilian and
military medicine which Sidel does not take into account.
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Sidel stresses that medical personnel are required to be impartial in their treatment of
patients and that physicians must be noncombatants. This implies that Sidel might be
relying on the assumption that physicians are healers only, while soldiers are only killers.
This view of the physician and the soldier might be a relatively recent concept. Historical
accounts of physicians indicate that impartiality and noncombatant status were not always
common.
Many physicians understandably saw no reason not to treat their own wounded
before dealing with either civilians or enemy combatants. During the U.S. Civil War (18611865), the American Medical Association endorsed a policy that physicians treat their own
militia with priority. In that war, several physicians were awarded medals for their combat
leadership. It was not until the advent of the Red Cross, founded in 1881, that the
perspective of impartiality of care began to gain popular support. The Geneva Conventions,
first started in 1949, led to modern perspectives of medicine in war: medical personnel were
protected in exchange for noncombatant status, care for anyone in war, no abandonment of
the sick, unbiased medical triage, and not participating in interrogation or torture.
As Sidel notes, from a psychological standpoint, medical neutrality can be difficult
to achieve when you are part of the military. During the cold war, many U.S. physicians
claimed, “the interests of the nation transcend those of the individual.” 141 Similar attitudes
exist with respect to the Gulf Wars and physicians involved with interrogation and torture.
Sidel claims that military triage forces physicians to subordinate the patient’s best
interests, violates the patient’s confidentiality, and fails to maintain adequate patient medical
records. Sidel indicates that the military physician, even one in a war zone, is not acting in
141
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an ethical manner if he follows military triage procedure. Sidel is correct in his assessment
that there are particular cases where it appears that an individual patient’s long-term health
interests are being subordinated “for the greater good.” The ethical environment of the
military places mission goals above individual interests. However, this analysis by Sidel
may be suspect when applied to all military triage situations. It is plausible that military
physicians may be acting in their patients’ best interests, even when physicians are acting
under a client-physician model of strong paternalism or service for the group.
During military triage, Sidel claims that physicians are not acting morally when they
do not triage soldier-patients solely on medical criteria such as severity of wounds. There
are at least three mitigating circumstances that would seem to argue against Sidel’s claim.
First, consider what it means to be operating under disaster situations. In civilian practice,
allowances are made for changing triage criteria during emergencies. Typically, civilian
triage follows guidelines consistent with the Geneva Conventions that require treatment of
the most severely injured patients first.
Triage protocol changes during times of disaster and mass casualty. The criteria are
changed so that resources are used so that a maximum of lives are saved. In some situations
the criteria is changed so that key personnel, such as medical workers or government
leaders, are given priority. This change in criteria acknowledges situations where the
principles of medical ethics allow for discriminatory, non-prejudicial treatment of patients.
To deny this practice for military physicians would seem a contradiction in triage decisionmaking ethics that are accepted in civilian practice. Consistency in applying such medical
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ethics standards suggests that military physicians practicing military triage are, in fact,
acting morally.
A second mitigating circumstance revolves around values held by soldiers. It can be
conceded that most of the time it may not be in a soldier’s personal interests to die.
Similarly, in civilian situations, it is most often considered not to be in the patient’s best
interests to die. However, there are values regarding life other than maximizing the quantity
of life, or in living as long as possible no matter what the circumstances or consequences.
Such values as quality of life, or meaning or purpose in life, can mitigate circumstances of
providing health care to a patient.
In this context, it is plausible that some soldiers place the welfare of the group over
individual interests or value the group’s commitment to duty and mission over personal
welfare. This attitude of care for one’s fellow soldiers and concern for accomplishing
mission goals may be reinforced in a volunteer military. Although it may not be in a
soldier’s individual medical interest for a military physician to practice military triage, it
may not go against his overall interests as a member of the moral community. If society
places value in respecting individuals and respecting the choices individuals make—
including their life goals—then society should respect individual choices regarding death or
dying. By respecting the wishes of their patient-soldiers, military physicians may be acting
morally.
In situations where a soldier may not value the survival of the group or the success of
the mission over personal survival there might still be mitigating circumstances in which a
military physician is nevertheless still acting morally with respect to military triage. In a
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volunteer military, the governments contracts with individuals to join the military and accept
certain rights and responsibilities including pay, housing, medical care, and substantial
training, education, and development. As part of this contract, the individual may be
required to sacrifice certain individual needs, rights, or comforts. This would include the
possibility of being subject to military triage in extreme circumstances where individual
medical needs might be minimized.
If military physicians respect their own contract to perform medical duties for the
benefit of the military, it seems that consistency demands that they should respect the
contract the individual soldier signed upon entering military service. Assuming that
volunteers are made explicitly aware of the military’s triage policies, as well as other
medical practices within the military, military physicians may be considered to be acting
morally by honoring contracts made between the military and its soldiers.
Next, consider the cases of informed consent and the violation of confidentiality.
Informed consent and confidentiality are important tenants in the medical profession
because they are indicative of respect for an individual patient. Within medicine, informed
consent allows patients to make choices regarding their medical care, including the right to
refuse treatment. Confidentiality allows patients to disclose fully their condition so that they
may receive appropriate medical care.
In contemporary times, the patient is often allowed to determine whether to follow a
prescribed treatment. The notable exception to this is when actions, or inactions, place
others at risk. When someone refuses vaccinations, when mental patients refuse to take their
stabilizing medicines, or when patients directly threaten or act to harm innocent third parties,
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treatments may be mandated. In these cases, there is justification to violate informed
consent or confidentiality to avoid harm.
It seems reasonable to suggest that similar reasoning can apply to military situations.
At the least, soldiers should not refuse treatments if doing so would endanger their fellow
soldiers or the strength of the military. Not only could this present a direct threat to fellow
soldiers, but also a diminished fighting force could endanger a mission. If the risks are
significant, there may be some justification for violating informed consent or confidentiality.
Additionally, it may be plausible to suggest that in an all-volunteer military, soldiers have
consented to various actions in certain circumstances including violations of confidentiality.
How does this apply to medical research of untested and experimental treatments,
vaccinations, or medical technology? The justification for requiring soldiers to be
immunized and/or receive medical care that has not been fully tested and accepted by
conventional methods is based on professional beliefs that some experimental treatments are
likely to provide protections or care not provided by traditionally approved treatments. Yet,
mandated medical treatment for research purposes presents a controversy which lies in not
adequately knowing the benefits or risks of participating in the research. Because of these
unknowns, medical research is typically closely regulated to ensure that research subjects
are informed and have consented to participate in the research. Medical research is typically
not allowed to be performed on captive or vulnerable populations. Why should the use of
soldiers in the military be any different, especially considering that soldiers may represent a
captive and vulnerable population?
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There is a critical difference for soldiers. In times of war, soldiers confront
situations which non-soldiers rarely or never experience. They may well be exposed to risks
(such as attacks with bio-chemical weapons) that civilians would rarely experience.
Battlefield conditions also change rapidly and medical care must respond to swiftly
changing situations. Of particular concern for medical workers is trying to provide proper
care for injuries caused by new or different types of weapons, including the possible use of
biological agents. During battle, there may not be time to follow conventional research
protocols.
Given that soldiers are at special risks during warfare, it follows that to protect them
there has to be adequate medical research. Therefore, during times of peace, medical
workers need to conduct research to improve medical techniques, medicines, and procedures
designed to improve patient care during warfare. In peacetime, the military should be
required to provide the information necessary to allow informed consent for all research
subjects and should be able to respect their confidentiality as it pertains to the research
activities.
What about Sidel’s claim that military physicians are guilty of violating the Geneva
Conventions? There are five separate aspects of the Conventions that Sidel claims are
violated by military physicians. First, as noncombatants, medical personnel are forbidden to
engage in or be parties to acts of war. Second, anyone wounded—be they friend, foe,
soldier, civilian—must be treated. Third, the wounded and sick cannot be abandoned and
they must be cared for based on medical need. Fourth, medical aid must be dispensed solely
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on medical grounds. Fifth, medical workers may not use medical coercion against
individuals, including using medical coercion to obtain information.
Several responses can be made to Sidel’s accusations: (1) Even assuming that
military physicians are violating some aspects of the Geneva Conventions, it is not clear that
they are contrary to principles of medical ethics; (2) specific aspects of the Geneva
Conventions may be in conflict with each other; and (3) it is not clear when physicians
(especially military physicians in the U.S. Military) are bound by the Geneva Conventions.
These responses illustrate the difficulties of utilizing either-or solutions to solve conflicts of
duties. Even though the Geneva Conventions provide suggested structure and context for
rules governing war, there is still debate over the interpretation and application of the
Geneva Conventions for both individuals and for nations. The Geneva Conventions attempt
to define ethical behavior, but they do not relieve all tension of moral dilemma and distress
caused by conflict of duties.
Assuming that military physicians are in violation of the Geneva Conventions by
being involved in war, are they necessarily violating principles of medical ethics? Strictly
followed, a “no participation” rule could imply that no medical care that contributes to war
could be given. 142 This could be interpreted to mean a physician could not give treatment to
soldiers or civilians in a war zone who might participate in war. This seems tantamount to
abandonment of soldiers and civilians in need of medical care.
The Geneva Conventions have strict guidelines on unconditionally treating patients.
In times of peace, and assuming adequate resources, there may be no problem with treating
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everyone in need of medical care. Yet in emergencies, it is allowable, under generally
accepted medical principles, to practice mass casualty triage. There is little evidence to
suggest that that principle should not also apply to military triage.
This suggests that concerns other than medical needs may exist. In the battlefield,
treatment priority may be changed to protect mission goals, maximize allied care, or deal
with a critical, dynamic situation. Much like in civilian triage of mass casualty, decisions
can be made to maximize the number of lives saved or to save key personnel.
The Geneva Conventions prohibits medical personnel from using medical coercion
against individuals. Directly participating in medical coercion violates medical principles.
Yet it is sometimes difficult to determine what constitutes direct participation. Would
caring for a patient after he is tortured constitute direct participation in the torture? What if
the military physician knew that by caring for the patient the patient would be further
tortured? If a military physician refuses to care for prisoners, is this abandonment?
There is also concern that specific aspects of the Geneva Conventions provide
conflicting or ambiguous statements in certain circumstances. How can military physicians
be forbidden from being parties to acts of war, yet at the same time require that they care for
the wounded? Providing treatment to civilians and soldiers could aid one side or the other in
hostilities. Providing indiscriminate aid may also result in prolonging hostilities and
suffering, as returning people to active duty may result in longer combat operations. Finally,
caring for prisoners can prolong torture or interrogation, resulting in medical personnel
being participants in medical coercion.

118

It is not always clear under what circumstances military physicians are bound by the
Geneva Conventions. Various interpretations of international law and international
humanitarian rights come into conflict when deciding which laws are binding on which
military physicians. Does the military physician belong to a country that has signed or
ratified the Geneva Conventions, or that has a law that necessitates the following of
international treaty? If the military physician is in the U.S. Military, has the President of the
United States ruled that certain aspects of the Conventions no longer apply to U.S.
personnel? 143 This makes it difficult to determine the legal standing of military physicians
with respect to following the Geneva Conventions. This weakens Sidel’s appeals that
physicians should follow the Geneva Conventions, as physicians may have professional
obligations to follow international law or their nation’s laws.
Are military physicians significantly prevented from acting as moral agents? Sidel
claims that military physicians are prevented from acting as moral agents because they are
not allowed to protect military personnel, are prevented from taking moral actions in the
military, and are forbidden to express their moral protests. As previously indicated, Sidel’s
accusations are not entirely warranted. It is not necessarily the case that military physicians
fail to protect military personnel, nor is it necessarily the case that they are unjustified in
their actions when they do not protect individual soldier-patients.
143
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The prevention of taking moral actions and expressing moral protest is largely a
result of having to obey orders and having to subscribe to censorship. Sidel’s claims suggest
that obeying orders or subscribing to censorship is problematic for physicians because this
might result in performing otherwise immoral acts. A military physician might be ordered
to help interrogate a prisoner, or a military physician might be prevented from releasing
information to the media about prisoner abuse.
Sidel also proposes that obeying orders or subscribing to censorship might interfere
with professional autonomy. Yet, as indicated previously, obeying orders can be not only
excusable but also justifiable. This particular concern of Sidel’s must be addressed on a
case by case basis, not in a general condemnation of military physicians.
Ultimately, what insights are gained from Sidel’s position? Conditions ranging from
the nature of one’s enlistment as a volunteer or a draftee and conditions from peace to fullscale warfare influence the military physician’s experience of moral dilemma. Sidel does
not appear to take into account that these conditions may legitimately change the military
physician’s range of duties as relevant moral factors are taken into account.

§2.2: Howe
Howe engages in an issue-by-issue tactic against physician involvement in torture.
Howe argues that this keeps central values of “civilized” society in perspective and helps
prevent its subversion. He explicitly claims that physicians hold values which may never be
compromised even though compromising may be necessary to optimize military interests or
the optimal interests of the societies the military serves and protects. If we compromise
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these values, he claims, our society will regress. We will have given up and lost what we
have come to believe constitutes what it means to be civilized and will have readopted the
once widespread rubric that “all is fair in war.”
Howe claims that physicians and military officers have a duty to not participate in
torture and to actively oppose torture that they witness only in situations when such torture is
illegal or immoral. This stipulation of Howe’s suggests that there are cases in which torture
is legal or moral. While there are differing definitions of what constitutes torture, most
ethical and moral codes view torture as wrong. Even when controversial methods of
questioning are accepted as legal, Howe fails to address how to readily identify cases of
torture and he does not provide insight into how to classify specific acts of torture as illegal
or immoral. Given Howe’s claim that some values held by physicians must remain
unchanged, it is worth noting that he does not specify how this relates to participating in
torture, beyond designating that military physicians should not participate in illegal or
immoral activities.
Drawing upon history, especially the Nazi accounts, 144 it is known that physicians
have been willing to participate in cruel and inhumane treatment of prisoners, including
torture. It is conceivable that some physicians, as well as other interrogators, are in a moral
dilemma when using torture, but feel no moral distress because they are insensitive to the
dilemma or because they have found some rationalization for their behavior. Others may
become insensitive or learn to rationalize in order to maintain a semblance of mental health.
The long-term harm to the physician and the interrogator may be that they are no longer able
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to make moral and ethical judgments of their own actions and they have lost the ability to
determine if orders are legal and moral.
Perhaps these same factors enter into Howe’s claim that torture results in harm to the
society as a whole. If society gives approval to “wrong actions,” society not only allows
individuals to act immorally, but society also becomes insensitive and learns to rationalize
questionable behaviors. Howe suggests that society as a whole then has difficulties making
moral and ethical judgments and may regress to accepting pre-civilized actions.
Howe claims that if a particular instance of torture is illegal or unethical then the
military physician has professional duties, both as a physician and as an officer, to refuse to
participate in that torture. At this point, there is no conflict between the duties of an officer
and the duties of a physician and there is no need for one to override the other. Howe’s
statement applies to “illegal” torture, but does not take into consideration that there may also
be significant conflict in what constitutes torture. For instance, an action may be deemed
lawful for U.S. soldiers because the President has declared the act does not constitute
torture. The same action may be considered torture under international law and by medical
ethics standards. The conflict between military and medical duty would then return. Howe
could take his view of torture one step farther by considering that physicians have a
professional duty to oppose all forms of torture.
Consider the following claims against torture: (1) torture is known to be unreliable
in attaining actionable information, (2) torture causes preventable harms to the victim, and
(3) torture causes harms to the people and society involved with the torture. It seems
consistent with these claims to conclude that physicians do, in fact, have a professional duty,
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as physicians, to oppose all forms of torture. The question would remain, however, as to
whether or not these duties override the military duties which may require participating in
activity which may be considered to be torture. Given claims (1) and (3) above, it appears
that physician duties ought to override military duties in cases involving torture.
What about the military physician’s duties related to preventing suicide and in
providing psychological care for detained terrorists? Howe claims that military physicians
cannot physically restrain terrorists even though they are at a higher risk of suicide. This is
based on his reasoning that restraint is barred because it means treating the terrorists
differently than other prisoners. This may be implausible given that standard medical care
related to suicide watch includes physical restraints in some cases. This indicates that the
focus should not be on an elusive notion of “equality of care,” but on giving medically
appropriate care to a patient as the situation warrants.
This reveals a problem shared with Jadresic’s position. How are the moral and
ethical boundaries identified that a military physician may establish when he becomes
engaged in treating prisoners, especially when the prisoners are being interrogated or
tortured? Howe claims that whether or not the prisoners are terrorists is immaterial to
setting moral and ethical boundaries. By treating any prisoner, physicians may find
themselves in a moral dilemma. By refusing to provide care they may be morally culpable
of negligence, but by caring for the prisoner they may be morally culpable of prolonging
torture.
Howe’s discussion also seems to place the military physician in an ambiguous
position when it comes to giving protective medical agents to civilians or POWs. Treating
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POWs equally with soldiers implies that the POWs should also receive any protective agents
that soldiers receive. The problem arises in determining when, or if, this would include
experimental medications or treatments. At what point is there a significant risk to warrant
giving prisoners experimental medications or treatments? Are physicians obligated to
provide these treatments if the experimental medications or treatments are being used as
standard care for soldiers? This is a problem because in civilian life, prisoners are
considered a vulnerable population. They are normally, at least in modern times, excluded
from many medical studies. 145
What Howe has exposed is a general problem for military physicians in interpreting
what it means to treat POWs “equally.” Howe points out that some soldiers and military
physicians see no problem with violating the Geneva Conventions when it involves dealing
with the enemy. Howe’s argument against this is that since some physicians exhibit the
ability to treat enemy patients without bias, then others should also exhibit the ability to treat
prisoners without bias. This argument is not conclusive. It does not necessarily follow that
because some physicians can act in a certain way that others should also be able to act that
way.
There is also a problem with determining what equality means. Does equality allow
for treating all U.S. soldiers first or does it require treating U.S. soldiers and POWs “more
equally” by providing treatment as Howe maintains on an alternating or random basis? The
standard interpretation is that a physician treats all of their own soldiers first, then the enemy
soldiers. According to Howe, there is an alternative. Enemy soldiers with equal injuries
should be treated on alternating or random basis. If Howe’s alternative is followed,
145
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“friendly” soldiers might die before receiving treatment. Howe’s scenario risks military
goals. Enforcing Howe’s principles of equality in treatment may risk lives and mission
objectives, becoming a self-defeating proposition.
Conflicting international and national guidelines, codes, and laws often confront
physicians. For example, should military doctors treat captured enemy soldiers or civilians
first? Adhering to the Geneva Conventions may require military physicians to treat POWs
equally with respect to civilians. However, the Geneva Conventions also indicate that
civilians may legally deserve priority care. The U.S. did not agree to this particular part of
the Conventions, so, for the U.S. military, there may be implications that enemy soldiers
should be treated before civilians.
There remains a problem with how terrorists are classified. If terrorists are classified
as neither POWs nor civilians, then presumably they can be treated last. If they are
civilians, they may legally deserve priority treatment. When it is not clear how to prioritize
treatment, military physicians may be placed in an ambiguous position that could cause
moral dilemma and moral distress.
Howe provides an intuitively appealing conclusion to the question of whether or not
physician duties should override military duties. In some situations, according to him, in
particular when it comes to the treatment of prisoners, interrogation, and torture, physician
duties should override other concerns, even when this results in non-optimal military
resolutions of military or national interests. Yet Howe’s arguments to reach this conclusion
are sometimes ambiguous because he strongly articulates both sides of the issues.
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This strong articulation sometimes overshadows Howe’s arguments that physicians’
duties should override other concerns. Howe’s claims that society regresses if its people
approve of or participate in such actions has much initial appeal. However, the initial appeal
needs further elucidation. Howe needs to provide more clarity in his claim that since some
physicians can overcome operational bias then all physicians should be able to overcome
that bias.

§2.3: Jadresic
Jadresic produces an issue-by-issue position that physician duties override military
officer duties. His specific claim is that medical personnel have absolutely no legitimate
role to play in torture. He bases this claim on international codes of medical ethics which
dictate that doctors are to engage in therapeutic or prophylactic treatments that benefit
patients. As such, doctors are prohibited from engaging in activity which weakens the
physical or mental resistance of a human being.
Clearly, torture performed for sadistic pleasure, revenge, or punishment is considered
to be improper. At issue for Jadresic is whether or not medical workers should participate in
interrogational torture; Jadresic argues that ethically they should not. Whether or not
interrogational torture produces valid results is highly debated. 146 However, Jadresic’s
position is that even if interrogational torture produces valid results, physicians have a
professional duty to not actively participate in such activities and to not act negligently or
146
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improperly in the care of prisoners. Both of these duties rely on a strong endorsement of
professional medical autonomy.
There is a subtle conflict in Jadresic’s position. It leaves unanswered the question of
what, exactly, constitutes participation in torturous activity. Jadresic does not appear to
consider that any medical treatment of a victim of torture could be construed as participation
in torture. Consider the following scenarios.
A prisoner is brought to a physician for a “routine” health evaluation. If the exam
allows interrogators to evaluate how much torture the prisoner can withstand, has the
physician participated in torture? A physician is brought to a tortured prisoner to stabilize
the prisoner. If the treatment allows the prisoner to recover so he can withstand additional
torture, has the physician participated in torture?
In each case, failure to provide comfort or care can be construed as negligent or
improper care of the prisoner-patient. However, providing care is often a crucial step in the
torture process, especially in cases where it prolongs the torture or provides for a positive
relationship of garnering trust between the victim and his interrogators. Having to choose
between neglecting to care for a prisoner or participating in torture by providing medical
care for a prisoner presents an ethical problem for any physician.
The dilemma occurs in cases where a patient is about to be or is currently being
interrogated. Assuming that such activity has ended, the physician will not have a
“participation dilemma” limiting his treatment of the patient. Physicians may participate in
treatment, but only in ways that improve the health or safety of the person being
interrogated. The issue is to make sure that such participation is not contributing to or
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prolonging torture. Professional codes, which focus on protecting the rights of patients, may
not provide the physician with adequate or sufficient guidance for action in cases where
either choice has the potential to harm, as well as to help, an individual.
Because they are facing moral dilemma, physicians are in a position to experience
moral distress over the choice they must make. It is also possible for a situation to produce
the conditions necessary for a moral dilemma to develop, but an individual might not
experience moral distress. Some individuals may not recognize the moral dilemma inherent
in the choices they must make. Other individuals may whole-heartily accept the reasons
behind the choice. If they believe their choice is acceptable, they may not experience
feelings of moral distress.
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§3: Summary of Either-Or Analysis
A common approach to resolving conflict in duty is to mandate that whenever there
is doubt concerning which set of duties to follow military officer duties should override
physician duties. This policy also mandates that a military chain of command, through
enforcement of obeying orders, determines if and when officer duties override physician
duties. Justification for this policy includes arguments for state survival, arguments for
military necessity, and arguments for professional survival.
Despite various flaws in these arguments, they present valuable perspectives and
insights into the problems that military physicians face when trying to resolve the moral
dilemmas sometimes found between medical traditions and military traditions. The
arguments suggest plausible reasons as to why some people accept that officer duties should
override physician duties. However, this position is ultimately insufficient for resolving
moral dilemma experienced by some physicians in the military.
The shortcomings of this position, as detailed in the previous sections, result from
both theoretical and practical concerns. From a theoretical standpoint, the primary
motivations for accepting this position are that national security, efficiency, and overall
utility are best served by adopting such policy. As has been illustrated, this may not always
be accurate.
The interests of the military and the state may be better served by focusing on
classically liberal ideals of protecting the liberty and rights of individuals. “Military
necessity” is often invoked to justify the overriding nature of military duties. Yet, the
professional literature does not clearly show how military necessity is established to a
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degree that warrants sacrificing individual liberty. Moreover, it is clear that military
necessity will not serve to underpin a majority of either-or solutions because, as indicated in
this dissertation, many cases of moral conflict do not really involve military necessity.
Finally, it is also not clear when following orders changes from an excusable condition to
that of a justifying condition.
From a practical standpoint the position that military duties always override
physician duties does not always result in acceptable consequences. As history has shown,
this position has the potential to be abused, e.g., military physicians engaged in harsh
interrogation or torture, Nazi physicians engaged in terminal medical experiments, or
Japanese physicians involved in Unit-731. Although adopting the position does not
necessitate abuse, it can be interpreted as a justification for unjust actions which can result in
horrible consequences, pain and suffering, and a lack of respect for humanity. There are
situations where it is appropriate to claim that military duties override non-military duties.
But just as certainly, there are negative consequences when this practice is taken to
extremes, where humanity and the very beliefs that the military claims to be trying to protect
are put into jeopardy.
The position that claims that physician duties override officer duties is compelling
especially in light of the commendable efforts and commitment most military physicians
demonstrate during their service. Although, as we have seen, there are some concerns with
the arguments presented for this position, the arguments provide insights. Much like the
alternative either-or solution, it is procedurally understandable to follow a policy that
dictates that physician duties ought to outweigh military officer duties. In a world of limited
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resources and limited timely information, especially during combat or other high stress
situations, having one policy is convenient to implement, monitor, and enforce.
Yet, accepting the position that physician duties must always outweigh military
officer duties is inadequate as a procedure for all moral action for some military physicians.
The shortcomings of this position result from both theoretical and practical concerns.
In medicine the primary motivation for accepting this position is the prevailing
tradition that the patient comes first. History and the progress of civilization seem to
confirm this to be a worthy ideal. In a majority of medical ethics cases it has clearly been
vindicated as the appropriate attitude to adopt. It indicates respect for patients and allows
them to preserve their liberty.
Yet, from a theoretical standpoint, it is not clear that this tradition is so strong that it
creates an inviolable principle. Primacy of patient care has fluctuated over the centuries.
This is especially true when it comes to provisions in medical ethics which suggest that
under certain situations an individual’s health interests may be compromised to some extent
to benefit third parties or society in general. There is no longer a sacrosanct physicianpatient relationship mandating that at all times and in all circumstances a patient’s medical
needs come first.
The position that physician duties are paramount assumes that professional
autonomy is legitimately independent of other considerations. But professional medical
autonomy is not absolute. Professional organizations may regulate behavior, and society
may regulate professional conduct, especially in times of emergency. Combat may be
analogous to emergency or catastrophic situations. Clearly combat situations are
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emergencies of a sort, not the normal conditions which commonly provide the background
for professional medical codes. Therefore, it is not conclusive that a military physician is
always free to relegate their military officer duties in favor of their physician duties.
There are medical codes of ethics that have clauses allowing physicians to act
partially or solely for third parties. This would tend to add legitimacy to claims that military
physicians may, in fact, act contrary to individual patient health interests in favor of group
interests or service to society. However, it may be claimed that patients still have rights
such as rights to be informed of third party conflict of interests and rights to refuse
treatments or participation in medical trials.
In addition to these theoretical concerns, there are several practical concerns with
suggesting that physician duties ought to always override military duties. This position, like
the converse position, may be inadequate to relieve moral dilemma. Many cases of moral
dilemma result from institutional pressures in forms of policies or orders that demand
sacrificing one set of professional duties in favor of another set of duties.
These sacrifices may impinge on professional integrity, escalating problematic and
stressful situations. While institutional pressures can be generated from HMOs, hospitals,
insurance companies, or even private partnerships, the focus of professional and public
scrutiny is often on that of a military physician enduring moral dilemma by being forced to
abandon physician duties in favor of military duties.
We cannot ignore that similar situations of moral dilemma may occur in which a
military physician may feel equally compromised in his professional integrity if he is told to
ignore his military officer duties. Military physicians, especially in an all volunteer military,
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may feel they are being asked to behave immorally when they are denied the opportunity to
professionally serve as military officers dedicated to preserving the fighting strength of their
military and, consequently, to serving their country.
A second practical concern relates to being required to always follow orders, or of
being exempt from certain orders due to non-military professional responsibility. While the
U.S. Military allows for disobeying orders in specific cases, a policy which endorses
refusing to follow orders may lead to inefficiency or even confusion and chaos within an
institution. This would be especially true during emergency situations and combat. Refusal
to follow orders could seriously undermine group cohesion and satisfactory resolution of the
situation.
Finally, as seen with the issues of torture, it seems that at most these arguments for
physician duties overriding officer duties establish an issue-by-issue prohibition against
certain behavior, not a profession-wide prohibition against prioritizing duties of a nonmedical nature. This, together with the concern of allowing physicians to maintain
professional medical integrity, suggests that a better approach to the problem is to allow
military physicians the professional autonomy to make professional decisions on a case-bycase basis. This leads to the idea of a middle ground, where issues that are relevant exist
somewhere on a continuum scale between prioritizing exclusively either military duty or
physician duty. In order to develop a continuum scale it is helpful to examine Jonsen and
Jameton’s theories that help to better establish theoretical responsibilities and relationships
among the various roles a physician assumes in his professional life and his life as a citizen
of a community.
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§4: Toward a Common Ground
Jonsen and Jameton propose the following paradigm of clinical medicine as the
“premise in which an interaction between physician and patient becomes ‘practicing
medicine’ – diagnosis and treatment of an illness or injury for an individual who presents a
complaint within the context of an established relationship.” 147 Jonsen and Jameton’s
paradigm arises from a project that was designed to explore the social and political
responsibilities of physicians.
In addition to professional responsibilities physicians have the social and political
responsibilities that any citizen has. Physicians qua citizens have responsibilities to their
community. “Physicians should be concerned about war, racism, and poverty, but so should
all citizens.” 148 This ideal is a reaction to a perspective Jonsen and Jameton identified.
“Physicians as a class have shown little interest in political activities unless political and
social situations directly affected them.” 149 During the 1970s, there was a growing call for
physicians to assume more social and political responsibility.
Suggesting that physicians, as citizens, have increased responsibilities to their
communities and should take more social and political responsibility may be an ambiguous
claim open to differing interpretations and may give rise to special problems for physicians
in relation to the military. As we have seen, physician responsibilities as citizens could
mean that physicians have a responsibility to oppose all forms of war, refuse service in a
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military, or actively campaign for social reform. 150 That responsibility can also be
interpreted as a call to join the military as a citizen-soldier defending one’s society and
enforcing its ideals; to include engaging in preferential treatment of friendly soldiers,
participating in medical experimentation and torture, and helping to manipulate or regulate
soldiers’ beliefs and attitudes. 151
Although Jonsen and Jameton do not deal with the issue of military medicine, they
try to clarify the ambiguity of social and political responsibility by identifying three areas
where physicians, as physicians, have responsibility to the community. All three areas lead
to special issues for physicians in the military.
The first area of responsibility Jonsen and Jameton claim is that “physicians are
responsible for the economic and social forms which medical care takes.” 152 But they do not
note that the definition of “medical care” will decisively shape this responsibility and may
give rise to different responsibilities for physicians in the military. For example, defining
care as “the art and science of diagnosing and treating the organic manifestations of disease”
imposes one model of medical care, i.e., reactive medical care. Defining care as
“maintenance of health” imposes a different model of care, i.e., preventative medical care. 153
Using a model of reactive medical care, a military physician might focus on
individual patient care if and only if there is a manifestation of disease. If this is the only
model utilized it may preclude such preventative measures as vaccines. Yet, military
physicians opting for a model of preventative medical care may impose a level of
150
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paternalistic care that includes the administration of vaccinations, or the intervention into
lifestyle habits such as smoking, drinking alcohol, diet, and exercise. This type of model
resembles the Army Medical Motto, “To Conserve the Fighting Strength.”
At issue here, is whether or not military physicians have chosen an appropriate
model of medical care, i.e., a socially-accepted model of medicine. Criticism of the model
of medical care implied in the Army Medical Motto may lead to the conclusion that military
physicians have chosen a model that, by appealing to military necessity or mission success,
is unacceptable.
Jonsen and Jameton’s second area of community responsibility assumed by
physicians is that “they are responsible for the environment of medical care.” 154 It is argued
that it is the physicians’ professional “dedication to human good…which imposes the
responsibility upon them.” 155 Physicians are responsible, more so than the average citizen
who may not express a dedication to human good, to engage in social and political activism
on behalf of patient care. Jonsen and Jameton extend this area of community responsibility
into situations outside of the medical care community. “The war in Vietnam was certainly a
health hazard to millions, civilian and military, but the immorality of the war itself should
have led physicians, who should encourage life rather than death, to oppose it.” 156
Unlike Jonsen and Jameton’s first area of community responsibility that indicates
that “the economic and social forms which medical care takes” is the responsibility of
physicians, this second area clearly contains pro-patient implications. Even with an
opposition to war, it does not clarify to what extent this community responsibility should
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influence physicians’ actions. Should a physician refuse military service? Should a civilian
or military physician refuse to give medical clearance to potential or active soldiers? Should
a military physician use his authority to medically evacuate soldiers even when their injuries
would not normally meet the threshold for evacuation? If opposing an unjust war means
aiding the enemy, should a military physician commit treason?
Jonsen and Jameton’s third area of community responsibility is that “they
[physicians] are responsible for the use of medical skills.” 157 It is a combination of medical
skills plus a dedication to human good that creates the obligation to work toward moral
causes. “Physicians must take social and political action against the immoral appropriation
of their skills.” 158 As we have seen in this and the previous chapter, particularly in the
discussion of Sidel, this view is clearly controversial as it dictates that a physician is
culpable for the misuse of medical training which he conducts. 159
Some physicians, according to Jonsen and Jameton, will claim that these three areas
of community responsibility are not relevant as physicians have responsibilities only to their
individual patients. This is one of the classic issues of conflict within professionalism. To
what extent does a professional have social and political obligations that may go beyond
individual client obligations or, possibly, go against the interests of their individual client?
To answer this question, Jonsen and Jameton framed a paradigm of physician responsibility.
Graber, Beasley, and Eaddy explain the paradigm as follows. The interaction
between a physician and patient becomes practicing “real” medicine when the following
elements are present: (1) diagnosis and treatment (2) of an illness or injury (3) for an
157
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individual (4) who presents a complaint (5) within the context of [an] established
relationship. 160 Elements (1) and (2) are identified as the primary tasks “all modern
physicians are trained to do.” 161 Element (3) focuses attention to the fact that the primary
client of a physician is an individual patient. Elements (4) and (5) establish the conditions of
the relationship.
According to Jonsen and Jameton the physician, qua physician, has a primary
responsibility to the individual patient. This primary responsibility may be altered, or
regulated, by two factors. First, professional conduct is regulated, in part, by the interaction
of the patient and society. Patients are not, normally, isolated from a communal network.
“Physicians who acknowledge due care and personal concern for their patients as their
primary ethical responsibility often undertake social and political activities because they feel
obligated to do so in order to honor their responsibilities for their patients.” 162 These
“responsibilities [which are] contingent upon patient responsibilities” might include
activities such as aiding in searches for resources, lobbying for legislation, or prescribing
food or rest. 163 Thus, to honor patient responsibilities, physicians may participate in
political or social activism.
In a military context for example, a soldier-patient has certain social obligations to
the country he serves, e.g., engage in activity that protects the group over individual selfconcern. A military physician may feel obligated to engage in certain activities to aid such
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patients, e.g., provide vaccinations. Yet activities may extend to such things as procuring
resources not provided by the military, lobbying for changes to harmful policy or orders, or
prescribing food and rest. A military physician, in his role as an authentic leader, may even
use his influence to change the social and ethical climate of his unit to benefit his patients.
Second, the primary responsibility to a patient may be further regulated by the
specifics of the context of that relationship. The relationship between a physician and his
patient is normally the result of actions on the part of both participants. In civilian medical
practice the typical context of relationship is established though a patient actively seeking
medical aid. Yet, there are certain overriding considerations that may establish relationships
which begin to move away from paradigm cases of physician-patient relationships.
There are deviations, normally enforced by law, from patient-centered duties.
Consider situations of involuntary or non-voluntary treatment. This could happen through
having a patient who does not present a complaint or when an established context of a
physician-patient relationship is not present.
When someone may cause harm to another due to mental illness, the mentally ill
person may be forced into treatment. In other situations, such as emergency cases, it is
assumed that a rational, competent individual would consent to treatment. In some
situations, such as abusive relationships, there is a point when it is recognized that the abuser
must be controlled by society either through restrictive, punitive, or medical intervention.
Finally, if a person has assumed certain obligations, they may be required to receive certain
treatments to help prevent harm to others or themselves. In some cases it is conceivable that
they may be required to receive treatments designed to benefit themselves or others. People
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who routinely work with the public – medical workers, social workers, teachers, caregivers,
etc. – may have to accept certain vaccinations to continue work.
A third regulating aspect of a physician-patient relationship is the idea “that
primacy be given to principles governing actions or situations which are initiated by a
distinctive act of one’s own rather than those principles which direct attention to some future
or remote situation which may be modified by present action only in some tenuous way, if at
all.” 164 Jonsen and Jameton claim that this is recognized in legal discourse where
individuals gain responsibility for actions in relation to their initiation of the action and their
ability to actively control the action. “Since medical acts are initiated by physicians,
responsibility for them has a primacy for physicians over acts or situations which exist prior
to them or may exist subsequently, such as the economic system of medical care or the
existence of polluted air.” 165
The context of a physician-patient relationship may be regulated by the manner in
which the relationship was established. For example, once a physician begins care of a
patient they cannot, normally, abandon that patient without due cause. However, a patient
who enters into a medical relationship with a physician may be constrained from or limited
to certain services or treatments due to his insurance policy establishing the limits of care he
will receive. This type of situation, one in which services are denied due to overriding nonmedical considerations, has implications for physicians in the military that will be explored
in the next chapter.
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However, one implication for military medicine that should be mentioned here is the
consideration revolving around the principle “respect for persons; self and all others are
acknowledged as ends.” 166 This is fundamental in interpersonal relationships and
interactions. In a medical context this is normally seen as an appeal to respect patient
decisions regarding medical care, especially in the case of refusing medical care. Yet, in a
military context the physician-patient relationship may also be seen as allowing and
respecting the decisions of soldier-patients who choose to emphasize group concerns over
individual patient medical needs. This also is present in civilian contexts, e.g., when a
patient prioritizes family concerns over his own health. One concern with this, for the
military physician, is a situation where the military physician must decide whether respect
for a soldier means honoring the soldier’s former decision to become a soldier or the current
desire not to be returned to combat.
This is consistent with my findings from interviews with physicians who have served
in the military. I have found a perspective that accepting the military persona of the patient
can make one a better physician to the people being served. By “better” it appears that these
interviewees meant that the military physician is better able to attend to the needs of his
patients, when a patient’s medical needs and life ideals are both taken into consideration.
Military physicians make this claim, or justify it, by stating that embracing the military
attitude shows respect for the men and women being treated. Respect is shown, in these
cases, by treating soldier-patients as rational beings who have made conscious choices to
enter into military service. 167
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Jonsen and Jameton provide a conceptual framework where a physician’s primary
duties are to his individual patients. Physicians also have responsibilities to their
communities. These include establishing the economic and social forms of medicine, the
environment of medical care, and the responsible use of their medical skills. Physicians
primarily attend to the needs of individual patients, but their professional-client relationships
may vary due to the context of their relationships, social interactions, and their commitment
to the protection of society.
Jonsen and Jameton offer this warning about their paradigm “We caution that we
speak only of responsibilities of physicians as physicians, not as spouses, parents, or wage
earners.” 168 By extension, the dual role of physician as military officer is not covered in
their paradigm. Jonsen and Jameton claim that “Determining priorities among one’s
professional and personal or familial responsibilities would require an analysis rather
different from the one we offer in these pages.” 169 A new decision-making topology for
military physicians will be presented in Chapter Five. By providing a mechanism for
analyzing the responsibilities, duties, and ethics of the two professions, my proposed
topology will offer an additional model for conflict resolution.
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Chapter Five: A Moral Topology of Military Physician Decision-Making
The soldier, be he friend or foe, is charged with the protection of the weak
and unarmed. It is the very essence for his being.
Douglas MacArthur
It doesn’t matter which side of the fence you get off on sometimes.
What matters most is getting off. You cannot make progress without
making decisions.
Jim Rohn
Reports from military physicians who experience moral dilemma often contain some
element of a perceived conflict in their professional duties. As has been shown, conflict
often emerges from combining two professions that may contain elements that appear to be
in conflict. Common themes of conflict are saving lives versus taking lives, personal
responsibility versus following orders, serving individual clients versus serving the public,
or serving an individual versus serving a group. Part of this conflict exists because of
theoretical professional concerns and internal constraints due to professional identities,
norms, and expectations. Another part of this conflict exists because of external constraints
due to the actual practice of combat medicine where the operational climate, or ethical
climate, strains the nature of the military physician’s relationship with his clients – clients
who include both his individual patients and the larger military organization he serves. The
internal and external factors influence the military physician’s moral working self in such a
way that sometimes identity confusion or scripting conflict manifests themselves in moral
dilemma.
When either-or solutions ignore or downplay the conflict of the moral working self,
they result in an inadequate moral topology of decision-making for military physicians.
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In this chapter, I propose a topology of moral decision-making, which I will refer to
as Topology-AMC, suitable for physicians in the Army Medical Corps. 170 Topology-AMC
utilizes four basic guidelines and multiple variables that help establish the parameters of a
moral interaction between a military physician, his patients, and the military he serves. This
moral topology starts with a basic understanding of a professional moral identity suitable for
a military physician. This, combined with a view of the dual nature of the military
physician, allows for consideration of the various needs of a nation state when a combat
arms profession requires the professional skills of medical workers.
An advantage of Topology-AMC is that it makes use of the moral psychology
surrounding self-identity in order to assist individuals to reach moral and ethical decisions in
performing their professional duties. Topology-AMC goes beyond merely establishing what
is involved in moral processing; it suggests how to move beyond what “is” to what “should
be.” By identifying morally relevant criteria in professional decision-making, the topology
also allows for identifying and retaining appropriate levels of moral dilemma or moral
distress.
The complete elimination of moral dilemma or moral distress is not necessarily a
desirable end-state of professional-client interactions. 171 Unlike either-or solutions,
Topology-AMC does not claim to dissolve all cases of moral dilemma or moral distress.
Nevertheless, it presents a moral topology of decision-making that allows military
170

In the U.S. Army, soldiers are assigned into a branch, or functional area. The basic branches are: Adjutant
General’s Corps, Air Defense Artillery, Armor, Aviation, Chemical Corps, Corps of Engineers, Field
Artillery, Finance Corps, Infantry, Medical Service Corps, Military Intelligence, Military Police Corps,
Ordnance Corps, Quartermaster Corps, Signal Corps, Special Forces, and Transportation Corps. Civil
Affairs and Psychological Operations are two non-basic branches. Military physicians are in the Medical
Service Corps.
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See Appendix 3: The Either-Or Solutions: Nazi Case Study.
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physicians the conceptual space to preserve professional and personal integrity while
upholding professional standards of competence and ethical behavior embraced by both
professions.
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§1: Topology-AMC
As we have seen, proponents for either-or solutions tend to be committed to the static
identity of a military physician. Yet, this static identity is not necessarily a blend of a
medical identity with that of a military identity. Rather, either-or proponents tend to view a
physician as a healer, and a soldier as a killer. When either-or proponents combine the
identities of a physician and an officer, they seem to assume that one professional identity
can and should dominate, as the other is submerged or discarded.
Topology-AMC addresses the tendency to identify a physician as only a healer and a
soldier as only a killer. Although these classifications may represent the primary tasks of
the respective professionals, the foundation that formed, and consequently comprise, the
professions’ codes of ethics are more complicated. Topology-AMC proposes that it could
be more appropriate to understand and emphasize that both professions may share a mental
model of protecting or shielding people from harm, even though the methodology for
reaching that goal is very different. Serving those in need of aid, either on an individual
level or on a national level, is the foundation of the moral authority that physicians and
soldiers receive that forms a public trust.
Topology-AMC would assist in the training of the military physician by allowing for
a methodology that would utilize appropriate codes of ethics supported by both professions
to produce a mental model that promotes a primary duty for a military physician to protect
or shield people from harm. 172 This allows for a dynamic view of professional identity that
provides the conceptual space to identify different guidelines and variables that can help
172
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moral foundation of protecting or shielding people from harm.
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regulate a sliding scale of military physician rights and duties with respect to patient care.
The conceptual space is provided through the use of four general guidelines used in
conjunction with the relevant physician and patient variables that impact the military
physician–patient relationship.
Following the lead of Gross, and Jonsen and Jameton, Topology-AMC proposes that
for a majority of cases it is possible for a military physician to default to traditional
“medical” or “physician” duties. This is justified because in many cases performing his
customary medical duties will enhance, or at least not be detrimental, to the missions of a
military. Yet, there could be cases where focusing overly on individual patient care could
result in harm to what the military perceives as the greater good. Thus, it is necessary to
provide a mechanism, or procedure, whereby military physicians can work through ethical
dilemmas and know when military necessity may be of a compelling enough nature to tip
the balance of care from an individual to the needs of the military institution.

§1.1: Preliminary Conditions and Guidelines
The First Guideline of Topology-AMC
For the first preliminary condition, or guideline of military physicians’ dual loyalties,
Topology-AMC draws upon common elements in both the medical profession and the
military profession. Common elements suggest that the professional identity of a military
physician centers on the duty to offer medical knowledge, skills, and abilities to protect and
shield the innocent. Where “innocent” is understood less as a legal or moral evaluation of
an individual, and more as an “ideal” where medical need is present and there are not
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compelling factors to contraindicate providing care, e.g., the potential patient is “vulnerable”
to preventable harms and does not himself present a significant threat. Moreover, the
“innocent” may be broadly construed to include not only an individual person, but also a
group or collection of individuals that are in some sense vulnerable or helpless in their
medical needs.
The Second Guideline of Topology-AMC
The second guideline of Topology-AMC states that military physicians should
practice due care and personal concern, and exercise due responsibility to the individual in
order to optimize the diagnosis and therapy of their patients. While the military physician’s
primary duty is to individuals, military physicians should be cognizant of situations where
the military mission may necessitate optimizing care for the group, protecting the group, and
assisting in mission goals even to the detriment of the medical needs of the individual. This
can be justified from both military codes of ethics and medical codes of ethics. 173 In
general, medical codes of ethics acknowledge situations where physicians may consider
group interest above and beyond the needs of a particular individual or patient. Conversely,
although military codes often focus on the group, there are indications that military needs
can best be achieved, in some situations, by focusing on the needs of individuals. Just as
medical ethics have slowly evolved to focus on group needs, military ethics are currently
evolving to focus on the needs of the individual.
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See Section Two of Chapter Two of this dissertation for details of professional codes. See also Appendix 6
for a primer on professionalism.
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The Third Guideline of Topology-AMC
The third guideline of Topology-AMC states that military physicians should
manifest themselves in their social role as offering dual loyalty to individual patients and the
military they serve. Professions, including the medical professions, have long recognized
that a professional may have competing interests, and hence dual loyalties, between a client
and other entities. Either-or solutions tend to overlook the fact that medical codes of ethics
often have an “escape” clause whereby physicians are relieved of their primary obligation to
patient care in order to satisfy obligations to a third party. 174 While his primary obligation
may be to the individual patient, Topology-AMC recognizes a military physician’s
legitimate obligation to the military and helps establish parameters of action.
Legitimizing social roles requires acknowledgment of the roles from the professional
organizations and the public. The medical profession, the military profession, and the public
must acknowledge the dual loyalty of the military physician. This acknowledgement should
include an understanding and acceptance that situations can dictate that military physicians
must exercise professional autonomy that does not always conform to either patient-centric
duties or mission-centric duties. The acknowledgment can be made possible by developing
and communicating professional codes that address the dual role of the military physician
and by providing full disclosure to potential patients of military physicians as to rights,
responsibilities, and prohibitions with respect to medical care provided by the military. A
constant reminder of the dual nature of military physicians could be the uniform that
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military physicians wear. It should have elements of both the medical role (e.g., white coat)
as well as the military role (e.g., insignia of rank and branch of service). 175
The Fourth Guideline of Topology-AMC
The fourth guideline of Topology-AMC confirms that to the extent that the military
has caused injury or illness, or that a military physician has control of a patient or situation
involving medical care, they are responsible for the diagnosis and therapy of the patient.
This follows from both the idea of reparation for causing harm to an individual and,
assuming that the individual is hors de combat, from the military physician’s duty to shield
and protect the innocent.
Meeting these guidelines requires understanding the rights and duties of military
physicians to treat patients, the rights and duties of patients to receive treatment, and
conditions that may affect these rights and duties. To help in this understanding, TopologyAMC proposes that there are parameters regulating the rights and duties of military
physicians and their patients with respect to access and treatment of medical services.

§1.2: A Selection of Morally Relevant Parameters
Topology-AMC does not provide an exhaustive list of all morally relevant
relationships. The topology is a start towards helping identify conditions that indicate when
military necessity may, or may not, override individual patient care. These parameters may
be used to help define physician and patient rights and duties within a military context.
They help identify aspects of military medicine that influence the nature of the professional-
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client relationship of military physicians dealing with a variety of clients. These parameters
are expressed by the following dependent variables:
Y1 = Range of patient rights and responsibilities with respect to their medical
needs. Across a range of values these would be represented as: Obligation
to receive medical treatment; permission to receive medical treatment;
permission to refuse medical treatment; and an obligation to refuse medical
treatment.
Y2 = Range of military physician rights and responsibilities. Across a range of
values these would be represented as: Obligation to provide medical
knowledge, skills, and abilities; permission to provide medical knowledge,
skills, and abilities; permission to refuse to provide medical knowledge,
skills, and abilities; and an obligation to not provide medical knowledge,
skills, and abilities.
Values on these ranges can be treated as either discrete or continuous variables.
Y1 represents a patient scale of rights that seeks to categorize a patient’s rights or
responsibilities to receive health care. This scale may be further demarcated into two parts:
Y1 – Patient Rights
a. Right to receive medical treatment;
b. Right to refuse medical treatment.
Rights to receive medical care depend on a need for care, a desire for such care, and
a right to that care. Rights to refuse treatment occur when a patient has a medical need but
has legitimate reasons to not want such care, e.g., not wanting to prolong a terminal illness.
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Y1 – Patient Obligations
a. Obligations to receive medical treatment;
b. Obligations to refuse medical treatment.
Obligations to receive treatment may be voluntary or involuntary. For example,
health care professionals may voluntarily fulfill an obligation to receive a vaccination in
order to prevent the spread of disease. In contrast, if an individual refuses to fulfill his
obligations, a court could determine that the individual has an obligation to receive
treatment in order to protect a third party or the public.
Overriding values may cause an individual to reason that there exists an obligation to
refuse medical treatment. Likewise, a soldier may be obligated to refuse medical treatment
because it would prevent him from participating in a mission.
Y2 represents a military physician’s scale of rights that seeks to categorize a
physician’s rights and responsibilities to provide medical services. As with the other Y
variables, this may be further demarcated into two parts:
Y2 – Physician Rights
a. Rights to initiate or continue medical service;
b. Rights to refuse or discontinue medical service.
Rights to treat may be granted when a physician has the knowledge, skills, and
ability to treat an individual in medical need where there exists a relationship between
parties that is not obtained through an emergency situation e.g., under non-emergency
conditions staff physicians at a high school may have permission, but no obligation, to also
treat the faculty at that school in addition to the students they are obligated to treat.
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Y2 – Physician Obligations
a. Obligations to initiate or continue medical service;
b. Obligations to refuse or discontinue medical service.
Obligations to treat may be generated in various ways. A physician may have the
knowledge, skills, and ability to render medical aid to a person in urgent need of such care,
e.g., emergency conditions may obligate a physician to render medical aid. A court order
may require medical treatment of a patient. A principle of non-abandonment may obligate a
physician to provide continuing medical care to his patients.
Finally, there may exist an obligation that prohibits treatment. An age-old medical
dictum is “First, do no harm.” 176 Normally a physician is prohibited from committing acts
that are expected to result in long-term or permanent harm or death. 177 There also exists an
ideal that in triage situations patients are sorted by medical need, so that the most severely
injured are treated first. However, this may not apply in mass casualty triage where there
are numerous injured individuals and limited resources. Therefore, a physician may be
prohibited from treating the most severely injured in order to treat a greater number of
injured individuals who are expected to have a greater chance of surviving. Other types of
prohibitions may arise due to third-party interventions. Insurance limits, not being a
member of a health group or organization, or (possibly) following orders may represent
prohibitions to treatment.
The Y dependent variables can be used to help establish a moral space in which a
military physician may function. To determine the value of these variables it is necessary to
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establish some of the independent variables that factor into the dependent variables. There
are at least seven independent variables:
X1 = the medical role of the individual;
X2 = which “side” the individual is on;
X3 = combatant status;
X4 = the current “spectrum of war;”
X5 = the context of the consent status of the individual;
X6 = the location of conflict;
X7 = the relative security of the location of conflict.
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These independent variables will be treated as discrete variables. The independent variables
can be described as follows.
X1. The medical role assumed by an individual may be classified as:
a. Medical worker – someone with the knowledge, skills, and ability related to
providing medical care;
b. Potential medical worker – an individual with the knowledge and skills for
providing medical care;
c. Patient – an individual in need of medical services who has been accepted
into a professional–client relationship;
d. Potential Patient – an individual in need of medical services;
e. Neither – not a patient or a medical worker.
X2. The “side” of an individual may be “friendly,” “allied,” “enemy,” or “neutral.”
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a. Friendly – a member of your own force or allied forces’ military who actively
supports your cause or mission;
b. Allied – a member of a foreign organization, such as a military force, who is
supposed to support a cause or mission, but may be unenthusiastic or passive
towards mission objectives;
c. Enemy – a member of an organization which actively opposes a cause or
mission;
d. Neutral – a member of an organization which does not take a position one
way or another.
X3. There is a tradition in Western warfare that categorizes the combat status of
individuals as:
a. Combatants – an individual who is a legitimate target;
b. Noncombatants – an individual who is not a legitimate target.
Historically, as seen in Chapters Three and Four, there are mixed accounts of how
medical personnel treat the combatant versus noncombatant distinction. As also seen in
those chapters, international law now indicates that all individuals hors de combat deserve
some level of consideration. This is difficult in some cases, as the combatant versus
noncombatant status may be blurred, especially in modern, counter-insurgency operations or
asymmetric warfare.
X4. According to the U.S. Army’s “Spectrum of Conflict” 179 classification system,
military operations are classified as:
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• War
a. General War – armed conflict between political units aimed at a
desired political end-state;
b. Insurgency – a rebellion against a constituted authority when those
taking part in the rebellion are not recognized as belligerents. 180
• Military Operations Other Than War (MOOTW)
c. Unstable Peace – an absence of aggression, violence, or hostility, but
without the more positive aspects of safety, welfare, equality, and
fairness associated with peace;
d. Peace – an absence of aggression, violence, or hostility, while within
an environment of healthy relationships, safety, welfare, equality, and
fairness.
X5. There are various ways the context of the consent status of an individual may be
categorized. In medical ethics classification systems, an individual who becomes a patient
may be classified as voluntary (known to be actively consenting), presumed voluntary (there
is no evidence to the contrary that the individual is actively consenting), involuntary (known
to be actively refusing), presumed involuntary (there is no evidence to the contrary that the
individual is actively refusing), or non-voluntary (there is no evidence one way or the other
as to whether the patient is consenting or refusing). Patients who are traumatized and

conflict, and to promote peace. MOOTW may operate within conditions of Stable Peace, Unstable Peace,
Insurgency, and General War. During General War, the military concentrates on offensive and defensive
capabilities. During Insurgency, the military concentrates slightly less on offense and defense, but more on
stability operations. During Peace and Unstable Peace, the military focuses most on stability operations,
with limited defensive operations, and little to no offensive operations. In both War and MOOTW, stability
operations are performed as needed.
180
Belligerents are entities either recognized as sovereign states or officially associated with sovereign states.
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disoriented, wounded and unconscious, etc. would, baring evidence to the contrary, be
classified as presumed voluntary. In a military classification system, soldiers may be
presumed volunteers, presumed willing conscripts, or presumed unwilling conscripts.
Unless there is compelling evidence to suggest to the contrary, Topology-AMC drops the
“presumed” qualification and proceeds “as if” the classification is accurate. 181 A soldier, as
a patient, may have a relationship with the medical apparatus as a:
a. Voluntary patient, voluntary soldier;
b. Voluntary patient, willing conscript;
c. Voluntary patient, unwilling conscript;
d. Involuntary patient, voluntary soldier;
e. Involuntary patient, willing conscript;
f. Involuntary patient, unwilling conscript;
g. Non-voluntary patient, voluntary soldier;
h. Non-voluntary patient, willing conscript;
i. Non-voluntary patient, unwilling conscript.
X6. The location of conflict, relative to either the physician or the patient, can be
classified as “home,” “friendly territory,” “allied territory,” “enemy territory,” or “neutral
territory.” 182
a. Home – geo-political area in which the individual is a citizen;
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Compelling evidence would switch classification. A soldier in an all-voluntary army is presumably
voluntary, yet when she tells you her story, you know that “she had no choice…she had to enlist…that’s all
she could do.” This soldier could be reclassified “unwilling conscript,” even in cases where she was not
literally conscripted.
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b. Friendly territory – geo-political area in which the individual is either a
citizen or non-citizen and the local government is providing active support to
the missions associated with that individual’s military;
c. Allied territory – geo-political area in which the individual is not a citizen
and the local government is supposed to provide active support to the
missions associated with that individual’s military;
d. Enemy territory – geo-political area in which the individual is not a citizen
and the government is actively or passively hostile to the missions associated
with that individual’s military;
e. Neutral territory – geo-political area in which the individual is not a citizen
and the government is not taking a position for or against the missions
associated with that individual’s military.

X7. There are various ways to define the relative security of the location of conflict.
In decreasing order of potential for close quarters combat:
a. On the front lines or “outside the wire” – a location away from a stable
“secure” location, away from direct access to supplies, and an enemy has
relatively easy access to the location to engage in hostilities; these are
generally areas where active combat is expected;
b. In a forward operating base or “inside the wire” – a location that is relatively
stable and “secure” (with gates, guns, and guards), and contains direct access
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to supplies and support; these are generally areas where active combat is
possible, but not as likely or intense as outside the wire;
c. At a pre-deployment stage – a location used as a temporary gathering of
resources (which may include both men and material) before they are sent to
mission areas; in contemporary warfare, pre-deployment stages are relatively
safe such that they are essentially non-combat situations;
d. At a “secure” area – a presumably location that is reasonably safe from active
combat situations or preparations; a safe location that normally would not be
threatened by combat activity but may contain patients or potential patients;
the location used as a permanent, or semi-permanent, gathering of military
personnel and supplies.
These are general guidelines as a war can be so encompassing in an area that there is
no defined forward operating base or pre-deployment stage. Moreover, long-range weapon
systems, incendiary explosive devices, and other factors may change this dynamic so that
the status of an area is uncertain.

§1.3: Guidelines, Parameters, and Relationships
The guidelines formulated by Topology-AMC provide the basic context and
framework within which the military physician should act. The X and Y variables may be
used in establishing the parameters of the rights and duties of military physicians and
patients. They provide information concerning the balance of patient medical need versus
military necessity and military obligations. They do this by helping to establish the
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relationship between a medical worker and his patient. Understanding the relationship helps
define a physician’s appropriate medical involvement with an individual. Particularly, the
context of how a patient becomes a patient, and the context of the classification of the
patient with which the military physician is dealing, can define the limits of patient
autonomy and the patient’s rights to health care.
As with other medical relationships, the military’s health care system consists of
policies, procedures, and guidelines for both rights and responsibilities. Individuals have
certain rights to health care when injured or suffering from illness, and certain
responsibilities to take reasonable, preventative measures to maintain health. This
relationship includes such policies as the individual’s access to emergency combat medicine
and the individual’s responsibility to take vaccinations to maintain not only his own health,
but also the health of his unit. Friendly soldiers score “high” on the scale of a right to
receive care from their military physicians. Yet, due to the nature of their chosen line of
work, they score “low” on the scale of patient autonomy. However, they might score
relatively higher on a right to receive care than willing conscripted allied soldiers, but lower
(if relatively healthy) relative to wounded civilians. 183
A relationship between the soldier and military, including the medical apparatus, is
introduced when an individual joins the military. To the extent that we approach the
“voluntary soldier” end of the spectrum in X5, soldiers may have justifiably limited
autonomy within military service due to their choice of joining. Inherent in their degree of
choice is an agreement to undergo diagnosis and treatment not only to prevent harm to
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themselves, but also to prevent harm to others. Rather than seeing this as inappropriate or
paternalistic, it could be viewed as showing respect for the soldiers’ choice to serve their
nation assuming proper information was provided to the individual upon joining the service.
There is a limitation to the nature of the relationship between military physicians and
civilians. Friendly civilians do not normally have access to military physicians unless the
civilians are family members of service personnel, civilian employees of the military, or
have some other relationship to the military. Civilians associated with the military are
granted a “higher” right to access of military health care compared to other civilians. Yet,
the autonomy of civilians who enter into a health-care relationship with a military physician
should be “higher” than that of a soldier, as less autonomy does not serve national interests.
They can voluntarily seek medical aid. Although they cannot be ordered to seek medical
care, there may be certain moral requirements that dictate or strongly encourage them to do
so, e.g., if their health status jeopardizes the health of soldiers.
However, in a situation in which a civilian’s illness or injury is caused by the
military, the military can, and possibly should, offer medical treatment to the civilian.
Military physicians, for example, should care for civilians located in a war zone, if the
military was the cause of the medical problem. There are other appropriate circumstances,
such as various humanitarian efforts, where the military offers medical aid to individual
civilians and civilian populations.
The treatment of enemy soldiers may be more complicated. According to the Law of
Land Warfare, the Geneva Conventions, and opinions among some military leaders, military
personnel are responsible for the care and safety of enemy soldiers that are hors de combat.
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This includes medical care. Some enemy soldiers, who might be called “traditional enemy
soldiers,” are presumed to consent to care from their enemy, and this includes care from an
enemy’s military medical personnel. This tacit consent is a result of a shared mental model
by the participants of warfare.
According to some military organizations, the shared mental model consists of two
basic beliefs. Although actively engaging in hostile combat, there is a sense of the basic
value of life and that it is best to (1) incapacitate but not necessarily kill combatants and (2)
fighting should be accomplished with the minimum force adequate to achieve mission
goals. 184 It can be considered that enemy soldiers may have tacitly given consent to
treatment due to their participation in combat. By being wounded and hors de combat,
enemy soldiers qualify for emergency care. If resources are available, it is not only assumed
that medical personnel are obligated to render aid, but that enemy soldiers have given
presumed consent to receive aid. This may include emergency treatments and vaccinations.
It also potentially applies to experimental treatments that are also legitimately used on
friendly or allied soldiers. However, historical accounts of the treatment of enemy prisoners
of war suggest that there is a risk of abuse in this area. Policy and professionalism must be
exercised prudently to ensure that the rights of enemy soldiers are respected.
Notice that this implied consent for proper medical treatment cannot be taken as
permission to allow enemy soldiers to be subject to otherwise unethical treatment. For
184
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noncombatants. Modern asymmetric warfare may change this conceptual model. Terrorists do not share a
conceptual perspective of the illegitimacy of using noncombatants as targets. Militaries may also espouse a
belief in using “overwhelming force” to overwhelm an enemy, minimize losses, and maximize force
protection.
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example, they should not be tortured, humiliated, used as slave labor, or used as
experimental subjects.
Medical personnel would likely not enter into a medical relationship with hostile
civilians unless, as stated above, the military causes the injury or illness. In that case, as the
fourth guideline of Topology-AMC states, if the military causes the injury or illness,
medical care should be available to civilians.
Recently terrorists have become increasingly difficult to classify for both civilian and
military authorities and this classification has been subject to much debate by both civilians
and military personnel. 185 Typically, terrorists do not act under “color of authority.”
Terrorists are often not legally recognized as enemy combatants. Yet, their activities
certainly seem to resemble enemy combatants more than enemy civilian populations. 186
Their tactics of fear and destruction, which critically rely on nonmilitary targets, make it
unclear to what extent they should be treated as traditional enemy soldiers, or lawful
combatants. Arguably, medical workers may still have a responsibility to render aid when
possible. Terrorists may consent to aid just as anyone may consent in an emergency. As
with all hostiles, there is also a degree of involuntariness to their relationship. As with the
treatment of all prisoners of war, policy and professionalism must be exercised to insure
their basic dignity and that their human rights are respected.
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For discussion on how terrorists are not classified as “soldiers” or due the legal rights of citizens, see Martin
L. Cook’s article “Ethical Issues in Counterterrorism Warfare.” He argues that unlike soldiers, terrorists are
not protected under war conventions. He further argues that unlike civilians, terrorists are not due legal
processing as criminals. He then argues that until terrorists formally take up “combatant” or
“noncombatant” status they are subject to elimination by military force.
http://ethics.sandiego.edu/Resources/PhilForum/Terrorism/Cook.html
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The U.S. has been trying to label some terrorists as “unlawful enemy combatants.” If the U.S. and
international courts allow this classification, terrorists so labeled will fall into a legal “grey” zone where
criminal or military law does not protect them, yet they will be subject to punishment and treatment from
either.
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From the previous examples, it becomes clear that there are two primary ways that
relationships can be created between medical personnel and patients. First, there are
relationships initiated by potential patient actions. These normally include soldiers who
enlisted in the military, civilians who actively seek treatment, and civilians who serve the
military. However, as we have seen, it may include enemy soldiers, civilians, conscripts, or
terrorists whose actions place them within a medical relationship with the military. Each
classification can initiate a different level of treatment that is determined by the parameters
of care established on the Y scales of dependent variables.
The second primary method that relationships can be created between medical
personnel and patients is through the actions of a military organization. Military physicians
have a professional obligation that expresses responsibility, to care for individuals harmed
by military action. Intuitively this might be expressed by the dictum that a person, or
organization, is responsible for the consequences of their actions. In particular, this can be
understood as something similar to Ross’s notions of a prima facie duty of reparation, or a
duty to redress wrongs committed against others. In the U.S. Army soldiers are instructed
that as professionals they have responsibility to people they harm but do not kill (assuming
the harmed individual is not a threat). 187 Soldiers should be responsible for the safety of
those who are hors de combat. From these policies, it can be extrapolated that when the
military is the cause of illness or injury, it obtains an obligation to care for those afflicted.
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Although reports from the field indicate that “double tapping” is practiced with more frequency than might
be expected. “Double tapping” is the practice of shooting a wounded person twice to ensure they are dead.
This is done to “circumvent” the law in that a soldier who “double taps” bypasses the need to check if
someone is alive and in need of medical care.
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This creates the basis of a relationship established by the military between its medical
personnel and the resulting patients.
After considering the four guidelines offered by Topology-AMC, the Y and X
variables can help regulate the criteria of care for illness, injury, and emergencies. These
variables help to indicate the level of obligation of care the military physician obtains due to
the initial conditions of the relationship and the level of patient rights and responsibilities,
again, due to the nature of the relationship.
Determining the level of the relationship and the nature of the relationship on a
sliding scale becomes problematic for medical personnel in cases of torture, interrogation, or
medical experimentation. Two differing perspectives illustrate these relationship issues.
One perspective argues that insofar as these actions are not part of a normal therapeutic
relationship it is understood that they fall outside the medical purview and are not subject to
professional medical ethics. However, another perspective states that it has long been
recognized that physicians, as are other professionals, are bound by professional standards
of ethics that shape their actions even when situations are not strictly within their
professional purview. Therefore, torture and certain practices of medical experimentation,
such as that used in Nazi Medicine, the Tuskegee Syphilis Experiments, or Willowbrook
Hepatitis Studies, are unethical for physicians.
Most modern military codes of conduct, and standards of professionalism within a
military, prohibit the use of torture and other inhumane practices by military personnel,
including officers. Therefore, since both physicians and military officers are prohibited by
their professions from committing torture, conducting certain types of medical experiments,

165

or engaging in inhumane practices towards prisoners of war, it appears that a conflict of duty
would not exist, as both professions would condemn these types of actions. 188
Conflict of duty and moral dilemma could still occur if either profession or, in the
case of the military, the U.S. Government, defined torture, certain medical experiments, or
inhumane practices in a manner not acceptable to professional medical ethics. For the
military physician the conflict would then center on whether or not to obey an order,
especially if it appeared the order was legal under government guidelines, and the obligation
not to engage in inhumane practices.
Although the paradigm presented in Topology-AMC helps one to understand the
limits of rights, responsibilities, and obligations of physicians and patients in a military
context, there needs to be more study to clarify the military physician’s professional ethics
and code of conduct as differing roles and duties are assigned to them. The next section
explores some advantages contained in Topology-AMC that may assist military physicians
resolve conflict.
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The legality of U.S. Military involvement with torture has been greatly confused and complicated since
George W. Bush signed “Executive Order: Interpretation of the Geneva Conventions Common Article 3 as
Applied to a Program of Detention and Interrogation Operated by the Central Intelligence Agency,” on July
20, 2007. Yet, even when torture is illegal, it continues. Physicians and other medical workers are ordered
to participate in various ways. See Mark Danner’s New York Times article, “Tales from Torture’s Dark
World,” 15 March 09.
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§2: Advantages of Topology-AMC
Through the training, education, and development of individuals, Topology-AMC
reveals relevant aspects of what is missing in applications of the either-or solutions thus
allowing for better resolution of conflict of duties. It seems that proponents of the either-or
solution who claim that military duties should override medical duties may draw their
conclusions by overly emphasizing the following three conditions: (1) an “us versus them”
mentality, (2) conditions are largely restricted to combat and general warfare, and (3)
military necessity can override individual liberty. Likewise, proponents of the either-or
solution who claim medical duties should override military duties may draw their
conclusions by emphasizing the following conditions: (1) in all circumstances a patient’s
individual medical needs come first, (2) downplaying situations of combat and general
warfare, and (3) there are reasons to ignore or minimize military necessity. Topology-AMC
allows for an awareness and evaluation of the deciding factors to reach a more balanced
conflict resolution.

§2.1: Military Proponents
Topology-AMC’s system can be utilized to analyze how military proponents utilize
factors that define the relationship of the physician to the patient to reach their conclusion
that military duty should override medical duty. By using the variables of Topology-AMC
to analyze the either-or solutions we can see that military proponents often focus on X2 (the
“side” the patient is on), X4a (the Spectrum of Conflict is considered to be at the level of
armed conflict, General Warfare), X6 (the location of the patient is not-home), X7 (the
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relative security of the location of conflict is “outside the wire” or at a forward operating
base), or X3 (the combatant status of the patient). Topology-AMC shows that by focusing
on these parameters and their values, and excluding or minimizing other possibilities, the
military proponents’ view generates several problematic implications, some of which are
detailed below.
First, by focusing on X2 (the “side” the patient is on) there is an understandable
psychological tendency to follow an “us versus them” mentality. Although this is more
often found in the non-medical personnel of a military, it creates an ethical culture and
climate that may influence the thoughts or performance of medical personnel. Focusing on
X4a (they are at war) also increases the “us versus them” mentality. It focuses on an
awareness of combatant status, which introduces a concept of military necessity. This
concept allows for sacrificing individual interests, including safety of civilians or
noncombatants. Focusing on X7 and X6 (they are in combat situations away from home)
creates an emergency triage situation. Emergency triage places less emphasis on medical
need, and more emphasis on resource management, group survival, or saving “key”
personnel. Finally, relying solely on outdated “combatant” status indications, X3
(individuals are combatants or noncombatants), creates confusion and a potential for lost
time as military physicians try to evaluate what to do with the patient.
When these selected factors are the default conditions used by medical personnel,
they create psychological mental models where military needs become more important than
individual patient care. 189 For example, soldiers on the military physician’s “side” may be
seen as more important than the “others” who are not on their side. This could be a bias
189

Recall the motto of the Army Medical Department, “To Conserve Fighting Strength.”
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favoring one’s own group over that of another. This could also be interpreted as a case of
military necessity where patients that are “us” are more in need of medical attention as their
survival may be “necessary” for the group. Moreover, soldiers on “our” side may be seen as
more deserving of care as they have been injured in the line of duty for “our” cause.
There may be situations where these reactions are appropriate, where military
physicians should act as indicated. However, what Topology-AMC reveals is that by
ignoring the variability of the moral factors involved in the military physician-patient
relationship, the either-or proponents begin to assume the validity of subsuming one moral
working self, or professional identity, under the other, sometimes going so far as to claim
this for all situations. In this case, the physician identity is subsumed under the soldier
identity, thus increasing the acceptance of claiming that military duties should always
override physician duties.
There is a second problematic implication associated with focusing on select moral
variables – X2 (the “side” the patient is on), X4a (the spectrum of conflict set at the condition
of general warfare), X7 (the location of patient care is “outside the wire” or at a forward
operating base), or X3 (the combatant status of the patient). Proponents that favor military
duties overriding physician duties may, regardless of the situation, implicitly use these
variables to answer the following four questions: (1) Can the patient harm individuals on
“our” side? (2) Will providing medical care have a significant, negative influence on the
care of individuals on “our” side (perhaps by making medical resources scarce). (3) Will
providing care have a negative impact on military missions? (4) What medical care is
needed and how urgently is it needed in triage situations?
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If the answer is “yes” to any of the first three questions or the patient is rated as
“expectant” with respect to the fourth question, then, it is argued, the military physician is
prohibited from providing medical care, possibly even including the relief of pain and
suffering. In the extreme case where the patient under consideration acts violently,
otherwise harms, or threatens to harm others, pro-military proponents may argue that the
military physician may have a duty to incapacitate or even to use lethal force on that
individual. In their argument, given the conditions of general warfare, the military physician
may have a duty to defer when soldiers on his side attempt to subdue or kill the individual in
question.
In a combat zone (X4, X6, X7), enemy prisoners of war who attack medical personnel
or patients should be dealt with quickly and, perhaps, lethally (third guideline, X2). Acting
in self-defense, or in the defense of their patients (first guideline), presents a reasonable
justification for a military physician to react lethally to end the threat or harm. Yet this
action seems unreasonable in less extreme conditions. For example, considering other
Topology-AMC variables such as different levels of the spectrum of conflict (X4), as well as
the location of conflict (X6), can, and should, change the obligations and permissions of the
military physician (Y2). During peacetime (X4, X7), the military physician should not be
required to defer if soldiers attempt to mistreat an individual who may cause harm (first
guideline). Instead, a military physician should insure that the patient is properly restrained
and then provided with medical care appropriate to his medical needs (second guideline).
By considering such variables Topology-AMC presents and defines additional factors
beyond those factors utilized by either-or proponents. These additional factors can be
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utilized for more informed moral decision-making and can allow the physician the
conceptual space to incorporate a different set of moral variables into his moral workingself.
There is one further problem to address concerning proponents claiming that military
duties should always override physician duties. This is their use, or misapplication, of the
concept of military necessity. In theory, this concept is uncomplicated. Military necessity,
“as understood by modern civilized nations consists of the necessity of those measures
which are indispensable for securing the ends of war, and which are lawful according to
modern law and usages of war.” 190
Following guidelines from just war theory, 191 military necessity is regulated by the
two conditions of discrimination and proportionality. Discrimination asks, “Who makes a
legitimate target?” while proportionality asks, “What is the acceptable collateral damage
when compared to military goals?” In this case, “collateral damage” generally means
anything not a legitimate military target such as noncombatants, hospitals, and holy
buildings.
Most of the examples and case studies used in this dissertation demonstrate that, for
some military physicians, the conflict of duties involves the explicit or implied claim that
military officer duties should override physician duties because of military necessity. The
claim is that when situations exist where there is a conflict between medical professional
practice and military mission requirements, the military mission must come first to preserve
the peace, stabilize conditions, or end a war. Discrimination and proportionality are applied
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General Order No. 100, Section 14. 1863.
See Appendix 4 for the conditions associated with a just war.
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to define who makes legitimate “patients” and in determining which individuals are
considered acceptable “losses” from the military’s perspective.
A problem with military necessity is that determining military necessity is largely
decided by whoever is in power or control of the military apparatus. What is viewed as
proportional, discriminatory, or even necessary appears to be largely based on intuition.
Sometimes this intuition is based on developed and thoughtful experience, but this is not
always the case. The ethical culture and the climate of the military may make it difficult to
obtain a view that is not dominated by military culture and tradition. Topology-AMC may
be useful to help develop a more informed and ethical decision-making process than is
presently available under dynamic situations. Topology-AMC may not provide an
exhaustive calculus for military necessity versus medical need, but it does provide
additional, relevant variables for consideration. The paradigm could be used to help train
military physicians, and other officers, to recognize complex ethical situations and to reach
ethical judgments.

§2.2: Medical Proponents
Recall that proponents of the either-or solution that claim medical duties should
override military duties may draw their conclusions by focusing on and emphasizing the
following three factors: (1) a belief that in all circumstances a patient’s medical needs come
first, (2) conditions are such that combat and general warfare variables are minimized, and
(3) there are reasons to ignore or downplay military necessity. The variables of TopologyAMC can again be utilized to explore the factors that cause some to claim that medical
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duties should override military duty. It appears that medical proponents tend to minimize
some of the variables presented in Topology-AMC that emphasize that in some situations
group concerns are legitimately overriding factors when compared to individual patient
concerns. Topology-AMC suggests that although the military physician’s initial duty is to
his patients (second guideline), it is possible, through the “escape clauses” in medical ethics,
to consider appropriate third party duties (first, second, and third guideline). This
consideration may be achieved, in some situations, by providing more consideration to X2
(the “side” the individual is on), X4 (the spectrum of conflict), and X5 (the consent status of
the individual).
Historically, there has been controversy as to how much consideration “side” should
receive in military medicine. On one extreme, “side” was critical in determining that only
“us” or “our side” should receive care, from the point of view of the military physician. The
other extreme suggests that “side” never matters; only medical need is important. Both
extremes are understandable, given the appropriate conditions. Limited resources, patriotic
duty, loyalty to one’s own, and a need to return troops to the field of battle make compelling
arguments that suggest a need to treat “our side” first. However, this may not always be an
ethical argument when dealing with individual patients.
The origins of equal care for soldiers on any “side” appear to arise for both
pragmatic reasons and moral reasons. Pragmatically, soldiers realized that it was in their
own best interest to foster a belief in medical neutrality when the injured were treated based
on medical need and medical personnel were “protected” in combat. Morally, people
exposed to the tragedy and horror of the battlefield decided, on humanitarian grounds, that
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anyone wounded deserved treatment. This reinforced the pragmatic concerns and further
solidified medical neutrality, but did not totally solve the practical problem of providing care
to everyone in every situation.
There are times when medical neutrality reaches a point where treating people on the
other “side” (X2) or those not involved in the missions of a military, can negatively affect
those missions. In such cases, it seems reasonable that medical care may be limited. 192 For
example, during general warfare and situations of active combat (X4, X7), it may be
reasonable for a military physician to consider the needs of his own side when evaluating the
level of medical care given to those of the other side (X2), assuming that resources are
limited or need to be preserved for future use. This follows not only from military
considerations but also from standard medical ethics surrounding triage situations.
Medical neutrality may also not apply when considering the context of consent status
of the patients or potential patients (X5). Soldiers may consent to less than optimal medical
care.
By considering Topology-AMC guidelines, such as a duty of reparation for harm
done (fourth guideline), and an awareness of the spectrum of conflict (X4), location of
conflict (X6), combatant status (X3), and possibly the context of consent status (X5),
Topology-AMC may help military physicians determine who to treat by helping to identify
the balance between medical neutrality and military necessity.
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This is reasonable because a military physician’s professional services have been retained for the express
purpose of benefiting people on his or her “side.” It is when his professional services become counterproductive to fulfilling his duty to aid and shield those in need of aid that the parameters begin to shift.
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§3: Applying Topology-AMC – Cases Revisited
Crucial to applying Topology-AMC is the understanding that training, education,
and development are necessary elements in implementing the topology. One aspect of
training, education, and development is to apply elements of the topology to cases that
appear to present a conflict of duty for the military physician. Analyzing the following
cases from the perspective of Topology-AMC can assist in providing physician-officers with
cognitive, moral decision-making skills and processes.

Should physicians participate in a war in any capacity?
An issue is a tension between the justice of engaging or seeking recourse in war (jus
ad bellum) versus acting justly or morally within the acts or conduct of war (jus in bello).
Traditional just war theory claims that these are two distinct areas. 193 Under just war theory,
it is ideal to act morally in a justified war. It is also expected that soldiers will act morally
when forced to participate in an unjust war. It is considered wrong, even tragic, when
soldiers act immorally in a just war. It is also wrong when soldiers act immorally in an
unjust war. Yet, Sidel’s account of medical duties, as well as the Gold and Sidel case of the
protest of U.S. medical students, reveals denial or lack of understanding this interpretation
of just war theory. 194
According to Gold and Sidel’s account, if a war is unjust (as they claim the Vietnam
War was), any participation in that war becomes immoral and a conflict of the physicians’
codes of ethics. To the extent that participating in an unjust war can lead to harm and
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See Appendix 4 for conditions listed in just war theory.
See Section Two of Chapter One for review of cases.
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suffering of innocent people, it is understandable how one can conclude that participating is
immoral. However, is it possible to conceive of moral actions within an immoral war?
It is possible that being able to act morally in an immoral war would be a sign of
moral courage and triumph; it may not be appropriate to condemn any or all actions within
an immoral war as immoral, ipso facto. According to the first guideline of Topology-AMC,
military physicians acting under the value of shielding or protecting innocent lives are in a
position where they may morally participate in war by providing their medical services to
those in need. They are fulfilling their medical duties while serving the military and also
fulfilling their military duty.
For example, in the Vietnam War, assuming that it was an unjust war does not mean
that soldiers in need of medical care did not have a right to receive medical care (Y1).
Unwilling conscripts may be analogous to innocent civilians who are injured by the actions
of the military (X3, X5). Topology-AMC indicates that these soldiers deserve medical care.
Willing conscripts and volunteers who are unaware that they are involved in an unjust war
would likewise deserve medical services insofar as they are “innocent” (first guideline, X5,
Y1).
According to the fourth guideline of Topology-AMC, innocent civilians in the
crossfire of combatants also deserve medical treatment due to the unjust harms caused to
them. As the fourth guideline states, medical care would be, at a minimum, a moral
requirement of reparation for the harm and disruption caused them. Studying the theoretical
foundations of Topology-AMC reveals that opposition to all war or even unjust war is not so
much a conflict between professional duties as it is an issue of a personal determination of
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the ethics of war itself, or a personal determination of which wars are just. Topology-AMC
allows the military physician the moral space to evaluate complex situations and to perform
within his dual professional obligations.

Should military physicians participate in the torture of enemy prisoners of war?
A resolution can be approached by understanding that, at least currently for a U.S.
soldier, there should not be a conflict of duty, per se; participation in torture has been
determined to be illegal and immoral for soldiers in both international and U.S. Law. Thus,
a military physician has no professional military obligation to participate in interrogational
torture. Depending on the details of the situation, a U.S. soldier would have a duty to report
the incident of torture to his chain-of-command, directly intervene in the activity, or take
other measures to deal with the situation. Understanding Topology-AMC’s account of
professional identities of physicians, military officers, and military physicians can assist the
military physician to evaluate the situation and to determine that there is not a conflict
between his duty as a physician and his duty as a military officer. As both a physician and
as an officer he has a duty to protect and shield the innocent (first guideline). 195
This is clearly the case if the proposed victim of torture is an innocent civilian or a
captured enemy soldier. But what should the physician do if the victim is a known violent
terrorist responsible for the deaths of hundreds of people? Even in this case, TopologyAMC would indicate not participating in torture. Not only would participation violate the
first guideline, but as has been shown recently in the media, conferences, and other forums,

195

For a discussion on the conflict of duty that develops when a physician is confronted with acts deemed to be
torture, but classified as legal, see Section Two of Chapter Three and Section Two of Chapter Four.
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torture is not a reliable method of gaining actionable intelligence. 196 Thus, torture is not
justified because it does not do what it purports to do, help save innocent lives (first
guideline) or further the military’s mission (second and third guidelines). Moreover, torture
has been directly linked to the rise of violence against innocent civilians. Topology-AMC
indicates that there is actually a professional duty, of both military officers and physicians,
to avoid using torture in the pursuit of interrogating detainees (first, second, and third
guidelines). 197
The difficulty may be in having the moral maturation to determine if specific
interrogation techniques are torture, as opposed to legitimate interrogation techniques. If the
military physician has reason to believe that torture is being committed, it is a matter of
having the moral potency to act against the torture. If the government changes the definition
of torture, a dilemma could develop between the physician’s duties to the individual and his
duties to the military. Training, education, and development programs that include
Topology-AMC would assist in developing moral maturation and moral potency to evaluate
a situation and to respond in an ethical manner.

To what extent should physicians participate in weapons research?
The either-or solutions argue that either (1) military duty overrides physician duty so
a military physician should participate in weapons research whenever directed to do so by
proper military or civilian authority, or (2) physician duty overrides military duty so a
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An excellent account of this is in Matthew Alexander and John Bruning’s book, How to Break a Terrorist:
The U.S. Interrogators Who Used Brains, Not Brutality, to Take Down the Deadliest Man in Iraq.
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Brains, Not Brutality, to Take Down the Deadliest Man in Iraq.
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military physician should refrain from participating in weapons research, even when
directed to do so by military or civilian authority.
By using Topology-AMC it appears inadequate to personal and professional
integrity, and the combined moral working-self of the military physician, to suggest that in
all cases of weapon development, or use, a military physician either must refuse to
participate due to medical duties or must participate due to military officer duties. Rather,
various factors should be taken into consideration to help the military physician determine to
what extent he should participate in weapons research. The type of research would be one
determining factor. For example, terminal experiments are prima facie not allowable (first
guideline), but research to discover how to treat potential victims of biological attack might
be appropriate (second guideline, X5). Topology-AMC variables such as the context of
consent status of the individual (X5), spectrum of conflict (X4), and location (X6) would also
be determining factors.
Consider a case in which the military is experimenting with the potential use of biochemical weaponry by an enemy. Eventually there will have to be some amount of human
testing for efficacy of neutralizing the bio-chemical agent and, importantly, treating
exposure to allied or friendly personnel (second guideline). Topology-AMC would allow
the physician the moral space to recognize his ethical obligations on a case-by-case
evaluation. If the test subjects were enemy prisoners of war (X2) during general warfare
(X4), the military physician would have a high obligation to refuse participation (Y2). Yet, if
the test subjects are volunteer soldiers (X2) during a stable peace (X4), the military physician
might have a high obligation to participate (Y2).
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Should military physicians participate in battlefield euthanasia?
Battlefield euthanasia has long been a controversial topic within military history. In
military medicine “battlefield euthanasia” takes on a different meaning than “euthanasia”
has meant in contemporary bioethics. Medical euthanasia on the battlefield (killing a soldier
to spare that soldier pain and suffering) is no more or less problematic in a battlefield
situation than it is in a modern hospital in peacetime. “Battlefield euthanasia” extends the
paradigm of medical euthanasia to include using non-medical criteria to decide whether or
not a patient may be allowed to die, e.g., a commanding officer or a medical officer may
consider allowing a wounded soldier to die if his cries of pain and distress may endanger
other soldiers. The cruelty of the necessity of battlefield euthanasia arises when wounded
individuals, often helpless, are “sacrificed” for the good of others. This seems to violate a
respect for life as it uses them as a “mere means” for the “ends of others” (first guideline).
Yet, there are rare and debatable factors that indicate that the military physician may have
moral permission (Y2), perhaps even an obligation (Y2), to participate in battlefield
euthanasia in extreme circumstances.
The first three guidelines of Topology-AMC allows military physicians to reach a
morally acceptable course of action when during war, as in other emergency triage
situations, medical treatment of severely wounded soldiers is limited to care and comfort,
rather than life-saving measures. Even when resources are relatively plentiful, the area is
relatively secure (X7), or the patients are not combative (X3), these might become cases of
passive euthanasia when a patient is medically terminal. Yet, some circumstances
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surrounding cases of wounded soldiers are extreme and are not, strictly speaking, only
medical cases. There are aspects of military necessity that include or introduce values
related to promoting and protecting the group and the mission of the soldiers. According to
Topology-AMC, the relevant factors would be the combatant status (X3), the current
spectrum of conflict (X4), the context of the consent status of the individual (X5), and the
relative security of the location of conflict (X7, X6).
This is analogous to a triage situation in which decisions must be made as to who
will live and who will have to die. For soldiers and medical workers, a tragedy of battlefield
euthanasia is in actively participating in causing death because medical care is unavailable
and, in extreme situations, there exists the possibility of having to “sacrifice” individuals in
order to save a larger number of individuals. Rather than take an absolutist position, such as
that of the either-or solutions, Topology-AMC suggests that there may be morally relevant
parameters that can help guide a military physician in the participation of euthanasia and
battlefield euthanasia.

Should military physicians participate in experimental medicine, especially when their
“patients” lack informed consent?
As a physician, it is normally considered unethical to administer trial medication to
patients without the patient’s informed consent (X5). However, as the first and second
guidelines suggest, military physicians not only have a responsibility to the individual
soldiers, but they have a responsibility to respond to the military necessity of having healthy
soldiers. Have soldiers given their fully informed consent to receive treatments, even
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experimental treatments, to the extent that they have freely joined the military (X5)? Does
this generalized consent relieve a military physician from the professional responsibility of
providing and obtaining individual informed consent from each patient (Y2)? Does a
military physician who is following orders need to provide individual patients with the
option to refuse treatments (Y1)? Topology-AMC helps to enlighten this issue.
To help place the usefulness of vaccinations in context, consider the experience of
the British Army during the Boer War. 198 Before the Boer War began, a vaccine for
Typhoid Fever was successfully field-tested. The British Army allowed its soldiers the
choice of whether or not to receive the vaccine. Ninety-five percent of the British soldiers
refused. Over the course of the Boar War, 6,000 soldiers died because of combat. Fourteen
thousand died of Typhoid Fever. Historically, it appears that in many military engagements,
illness and disease are more deadly and costly to a military force than enemy soldiers. 199
Given a clear medical need, perhaps made more urgent due to the spectrum of
conflict (X4), location of conflict (X6), and other emergency conditions arising due to the
nature of warfare, soldiers have an increased obligation to receive such vaccinations (Y1).
Absent standards of care, or effective treatments, soldiers may also have an increased
obligation to receive trial or experimental medications in Phase-3 testing (Y1).
As a corollary to this, under the same conditions, military physicians have an
increased obligation to treat soldier-patients (Y2) with vaccinations and trial or experimental
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For details of this account, see Gross’s Bioethics and Armed Conflict, 106-107.
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medications in Phase-3 testing. The obligation, for both soldier-patients and physicians,
may become even greater for volunteer soldiers as they have tacitly rendered consent (X5,
Y1, Y2). Nevertheless, Topology-AMC would remind military physicians, as guideline three
indicates, that as part of their social covenant, there may need to be better information
provided to individual soldiers explaining their rights and obligations in medical matters as
members of the military (Y1, Y2).
How would this apply to enemy combatants who are captured (X2)? Given a
condition of general war (X4), and a location close to combat (X6, X7), military physicians
would have an obligation to treat soldier-prisoners with vaccinations and trial or
experimental medications (Y2). This would be to provide for both the safety of the prisoner
and also the general population and the military (first and second guidelines). Enemy
combatants who are transported to a more secure location and away from combat (X2, X6,
X7, X4), may be offered the chance to decline treatment (Y1), if they agree to be segregated
or quarantined from the general population.

Should military physicians train soldiers in medicine?
This is an area where Topology-AMC may have a subtle or minimal impact as a
guide for military physician behavior. However, this may not be a problem as this type of
situation is, perhaps, a case in which a moral dilemma between professional duties may not
exist. The issue may actually be a conflict in personal ethics and professional duties. It is
not clear to what extent someone is responsible for the use, or misuse, of training he
provides to other individuals. If an educator or trainer has good reason to believe that a
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particular individual will use his training to harm innocent people, the educator or trainer
would have a legitimate reason to refuse to train that individual.
This could be derived from both medical and military ethics. The first guideline of
Topology-AMC indicates that knowingly providing someone with the means to cause harm
could violate the professional identity of a military physician to protect and shield the
innocent. On the other hand, without good reason to believe that a particular individual will
misuse his training, it could be a misplaced accusation to say the educator or trainer should
receive moral blame. The first and second guidelines of Topology-AMC would indicate an
educator or trainer would be acting ethically to increase the ability of the military to care for
individual soldiers and to meet the requirements of a healthy military. The physician would
be fulfilling his dual obligations to his medical and military roles by acting in his dual role
as a military physician (third guideline).

To what extent should a military physician care for a civilian?
As the second guideline indicates, a military physician has the individual as his
primary concern, but the degree of an individual’s rights to care (Y1) and a physician’s
responsibility to care (Y2) are influenced by the civilian status of the individual (X2, X3).
Care for a civilian will critically depend on the external factors (the X variables) to
determine what appropriate actions are available to the military physician. Nevertheless,
even those may not be enough. Consider, again, Paul J. Schenarts account of the
problematic situations developing in modern warfare as medical personnel find themselves
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in situations where they must choose how to use limited resources of personnel and
materials when caring for non-military personnel:
As a reservist with a U.S. Army Forward Surgical Team, activated as part of
the Global War on Terror, I fully considered the many ethical conflicts I
might face. There would likely be young men who died as a result of
resource limitations. The apparent conflicting duties of a physician/soldier
needed to be contemplated and justified. The Geneva Convention, which sets
forth that a physician must care for both U.S. soldiers and enemy combatants
using standard medical triage and practice, had to be adhered to….I had not,
however, considered the impact societal differences would have on my
perceptions of what constitutes the ethical practice of medicine….A 3-yearold boy presented to our forward surgical team 22 days after a forced
emersion scald burn. The wound, which covered approximately 25% of his
little body, had a pattern consistent with abuse. As anticipated, without any
medical care, he had developed advanced burn wound sepsis with
progression to systemic shock. Upon arrival, he was toxic and in the act of
dying.
Despite this, with aggressive treatment, normal physiologic
parameters were restored relatively quickly. After initial stabilization, there
would be the need for continued fluid resuscitation, metabolic stabilization,
antibiotics, excision of the wound, nutrition, and, eventually, skin grafting.
This was an overall straightforward therapeutic plan. However, although our
unit is well equipped for initial stabilization and our collective knowledge
base was more than adequate to care for this child, we did not have the
necessary facilities to continue his therapy. A combat support hospital just 2
hours away could easily provide the needed resources. 200
The boy had a good chance of medical recovery, and was medically eligible for
treatment. However, if the hospital had only limited supplies, supplies that may be needed
to perform their primary mission of combat support, what should the physicians have done
to uphold their medical duties as physicians and to uphold their military duties as officers?
The either-or solutions are inadequate for providing insight in this case. Medical and
military ethics for the military physician fail to give adequate support for reaching a
decision. Medical ethics fails in various ways. According to the military physician in this
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case, “I discovered that there might be societies where these ethical principles may in fact do
more harm than good.” 201 As he experienced in mid-East culture, belief in the worth of
children is not universal.
In Afghanistan, “children are a resource that is easily reproduced and easily replaced
should one become damaged. In this place, saving this child may be a wasted effort because
he is in fact replaceable.” 202 In addition, “…the injured [child] represents a real threat to the
resources needed by other members of the family.” Saving the child could result in harm to
other children, harm to the family unit, or harm to other more needy members of society. 203
“Child abuse,” as Schenarts describes, especially of children not “normal,” is a social
norm. Scars and other problems experienced by the burn victim would lead to others
abusing him, as well as his being ostracized from society if he survived and grew older.
Thus, according to Schenarts, it is not clear that medical treatment would have any lasting
long-term benefits for the patient. Schenarts was also fearful that medical care could lead
directly to prolonged agony and suffering as the child struggled to live in his culture.
Military guidance is equally unclear as to how to proceed. A military hospital,
located about two hours away, had adequate resources to provide medical care to the child.
Helping the burn victim was possible, and perhaps would fall under the military mission of
“winning the hearts and minds of the local population.” Yet, that assumes that the medical
care is perceived, by the involved society, as a legitimate use of medical care. It is not
inconceivable that such care could be seen as futile, and ill-conceived due to the impact on
the family or social environment.
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My inclination, in this tragic situation, is that Topology-AMC strongly supports
providing medical care for the burn victim. The first and second guidelines place the care of
innocent individuals as a military physician’s primary duty. The boy was clearly in need of
medical care. He was a non-combatant (X3), neutral in the fighting (X2), and not
participating or consenting in any military or para-military activity (X5). Resources were
not limited; however, they were located across dangerous territory (X4, X6, X7). Due to the
possible danger of transporting the patient, the physicians may not have been obligated to
continue treatment (Y2). Yet, the danger was not great enough to prohibit attempting to
move and treat the boy (Y2). The military physicians would have permission to treat (Y2).
The topology does not directly take into consideration social factors surrounding treatment
of civilians who would need long-term care, and where a strong support network would be
needed for them to survive or to thrive in society. However, it is suggested through the first
and fourth guideline that once a military physician accepts the civilian as a patient, then he
has an obligation to provide reasonable care to that patient. This would imply that the
military physician should try to place the boy into a civilian medical network where a more
supportive social situation could be provided when discharged.

§3.3: Educating to Navigate Ethical Challenges
A crucial step in negotiating moral dilemmas is by strengthening the training,
education, and development opportunities for military physicians. Formal and informal
educational opportunities, including the use of Topology-AMC, can assist military
physicians to correctly identify moral dilemma caused by a conflict of duty. Training and
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education can assist in the development of moral maturation and moral potency which will
allow military physicians to better navigate the moral process when faced with ethical
challenges. Military physicians should be trained in leadership skills that allow them to
differentiate between the extremely complex situations they may encounter and situations of
true conflict of duty. Proper development can help them obtain the knowledge, skills, and
abilities necessary to seek solutions to both situations.
When engaged with a moral situation it is possible to classify the situation in at least
one of three ways. First, the situation can be categorized as a “black and white” moral
situation. A black and white situation is characterized by there clearly being both “right”
and “wrong” actions available to the moral agent. For example, an employee with access to
a cash box “lunch fund” may be involved with a situation in which it is permissible to use
the money, e.g., taking a visiting dignitary to lunch at the faculty club. Likewise, the
employee may be involved with a situation in which it is clearly not permissible to use the
money, e.g., personally using the “lunch fund” money to pay for a matinee at the local
theatre.
A second way in which a moral situation may be categorized is as falling within a
“gray” zone. Gray situations are characterized by a general lack of clarity as to what is
“right” or “wrong.” Gray situations are more complex than black and white situations due
to lack of knowledge related to morally significant facts, or a perception of conflicting
values. Gray situations may have multiple outcomes that are morally appropriate.
For example, consider again the employee with access to the lunch box funds.
Suppose that one afternoon the office is entertaining a visiting speaker. For the final
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meeting the speaker has brought his family so that they can meet the people with whom he is
working. It may be customary after such a meeting to take the speaker to lunch. The
employee in charge of the lunch box fund has to decide whether or not to pay for the lunch
of the speaker’s family. This is a gray area. Although family members are not, strictly
speaking, visiting dignitaries working with the office, they are nonetheless part of the
visiting dignitary’s party. It would help foster good relations if their lunch was provided. It
might also be seen as an abuse of the use of funds. In this case it seems that either decision
is defendable, but each decision can also be criticized.
The third type of situation is a “right versus right” situation. In these situations
moral dilemmas exist because values, duties, or moral principles conflict. Moral dilemmas
are different from gray area situations in that there really are conflicting values so that any
“correct” action simultaneously results in an “incorrect” action.
In implementing Topology-AMC, an important factor for guiding military physician
behavior in the face of moral dilemma or moral distress is the recognition that not all
situations initially identified as moral dilemmas are in fact moral dilemmas. Assisting in
recognizing a moral dilemma can be accomplished through the promotion of moral
awareness which can be partially achieved by formal and informal education to foster moral
maturation and moral potency. Training, education, and development can help military
physicians understand that a situation may not be a “right versus right” but a “right versus
wrong.” This may entail that their choices really are not conflicts in professional duties, i.e.,
this may entail that choice then collapses into choosing the “right” course of action.
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Topology-AMC provides a mechanism to help regulate such decision-making by
providing four general guidelines that utilize Y and X variables to analyze a situation.
Using the topology might make it possible to find a middle ground and act upon it. This
approach has benefits when considering identity-conferring commitments.
We all have commitments that involve centrally important values which contribute to
one’s identity. “[These commitments] make us what we are and they place constraints on
our lives from which we may not be able to unbind ourselves without self-betrayal and
personal disintegration.” 204 I have shown that moral dilemmas that arise from conflicting
professional duties result, in some cases, in moral distress that is difficult to overcome when
identity-conferring commitments are threatened.
Identity-conferring commitments are threatened because the moral topology of
decision-making for the military physician, like other professions, has become a hybridized
combination of two differing professions. 205 This combination is unsuccessful when the
theoretical or practical aspects of the professions are not taken into consideration. By using
the new topology of moral decision-making for the physician-patient relationship, a moral
space is created between the two professions, linking them in a way that may be used to
preserve both professional and personal identity. As another example of the usefulness of
Topology-AMC, consider the conflict Colbach experienced between his medical duty and
his military duty, first introduced in Chapters Three and Four.
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Colbach was a combat psychiatrist who felt that the way to survive his military
service was to adopt the military dominated perspective that military duties should override
medical duties. Colbach was troubled by his actions and has continued to experience moral
distress. Topology-AMC allows us to understand that Colbach’s central problem was that
he lacked an adequate topology of moral decision-making to reconcile his role to the
situation. The difficulties in his situation came about because combat conditions impacted
his ability to provide the level of individual medical care to which he was accustomed, and
wanted, to provide his patients. Colbach was in a war (X4), often close to combat (X7) in
hostile territory (X6). With scarce resources triage situations and resource allocation was
necessary. As a professional physician, Colbach embraced a mental model where patient
needs came first. He was unable to reconcile the ethical possibility of military needs
holding primacy over medical needs. When he placed military duty first, he felt he had
failed to uphold the ethics and standards of the medical profession. He made his choice, not
by choosing one “right” duty over another “right” duty, but by trying to suppress his moral
and ethical beliefs. Consequently, he viewed his own actions as “going along to survive.”
The reality of combat, Topology-AMC would emphasize, creates morally relevant
conditions where medical care for the individual is constrained (by such parameters as listed
on the X scale of variables) but not abandoned (as indicated in the guidelines and Y scale of
variables.) Colbach was providing the medical care that he could, under limited and
restricted “emergency” conditions. Colbach assumed the dual role of a military physician;
therefore he had obligations not only to his individual patients, but to a third party – the
military. By utilizing the training, education, and development used in Topology-AMC,
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Colbach could have more clearly recognized the nature of his experience of moral dilemma.
Moreover, through the development of moral maturation and moral potency it is possible
that Colbach could have better understood and accepted his dual role as a military physician.
By understanding the military physician role as developed in Topology-AMC, Colbach
might have been able to use imagination to create better solutions to the demanding
situations he encountered. Learning the process of implementing Topology-AMC not only
provides a framework for moral decision-making on individual cases for the military
physician, it also provides a psychological mechanism hereby moral distress can be
lessened. Yet, implementing Topology-AMC requires more than the training, education,
and development of military physicians.
There are external factors that have to be addressed for this approach to be
implemented. The acceptance of the moral topology depends upon a public
acknowledgement, acceptance, and promulgation that the position of military physician
combines, alters, and adds to the duties of two distinct professions. Their duties are not
identical to, nor limited to, either a physician’s duties or a military officer’s duties. Rather, a
military physician’s duties are divided between patient needs and the needs of the military
mission.
Acceptance of this moral topology also requires developing more effective ethics
development education, or ethics awareness education programs that enable military
physicians to gain the moral maturity and moral potency necessary to utilize the topology of
moral decision-making. Critical features of these programs would assist individuals in
developing morally acceptable identity-conferring commitments.
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Finally, acceptance of the topology would need institutional support, possibly better
professional protection through the establishment of policies that protect the military
physician from institutional harms when they act within their professional areas of authority.
Institutional support within the military could be enhanced by ethical awareness programs
directed to other branches of the military outside of the Army Medical Corps.
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§4: Final Thoughts
Moral dilemmas surrounding professional duties may arise due to internal
“theoretically driven” factors, such as conflicts between codes of ethics, conflicts between
moral identities, and conflicts between social roles. Moral dilemmas surrounding
professional duties may also arise due to external “practically driven” factors, such as
policies, procedures, or laws that create a culture and climate that places professional
practice in jeopardy. Successfully dissolving moral dilemmas requires addressing these
various types of constraints.
The moral topology of decision-making I propose for the military physician
primarily addresses the internal aspects of conflict between professional ethics, values, and
norms. The topology does not attempt to address all aspects of even this internal dimension
of the moral dilemmas of military physicians and it does not attempt to provide the only
method of resolving issues of moral dilemmas caused by conflict of duty. The topology is
offered as one of many tools ethicists can utilize in helping individuals recognize and
address perceived conflicts in professional duty. This topology has advantages over eitheror solutions because either-or solutions attempt to provide a wholesale resolution of the
conflict in duties experienced by military physicians by prioritizing military or medical
duties in a wide range of situations.
Not all cases of moral dilemmas caused by conflict of duty may be eliminated. This
is because of a variety of reasons. It may be unclear how to minimize or dissolve a specific
case into moral non-dilemma. There may be external constraints in a case that prevent the
military physician from acting under his professional guise. A military physician may be
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embedded in a situation in which a he lacks the moral courage to act, lacks efficacy in
action, or lacks “ownership” in the case. The cause of the moral dilemma may be the result
of personal moral and ethical beliefs and not solely the result of conflicts in professional
codes. These differing sets of criteria can provide obstacles that go beyond modifying the
moral framework of professional decision-making.
There may also be “appropriate” or “legitimate” moral dilemma and stress that is
desirable as part of professional or personal development. It may have been desirable if
more Nazi physicians had experienced dilemma and distress in their actions and, hopefully,
re-evaluated their actions that supported the Nazi Party. 206 Ethicists need to engage in
discussions with military trainers concerning the appropriate experiences of moral distress.
There is a legitimate need for individuals to recognize issues that cause moral dilemma, to
experience the emerging conflict, and to develop moral and ethical resolutions.
Finally, aspects of self-identity need to be analyzed and addressed. As with the
concern with appropriate or legitimate feelings of moral distress, there needs to be
discussions of appropriate self-identities. Some identities are not morally praiseworthy.
Appeal to these types of identities should not be encouraged through attempts to solve moral
dilemmas with appeals that legitimize immoral identities. For example, Nazi physicians
with strong Nazi identity should not have been satisfied with their decisions even though
their decisions preserved their professional identity.
Overall, this dissertation provides several lessons-learned for future ethicists and
educators. A crucial step in minimizing or dissolving moral dilemmas and decreasing moral
distress is by strengthening the training, education, and developmental opportunities for
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military physicians. Formal and informal educational opportunities can assist military
physicians in correctly identifying both appropriate and inappropriate perceptions of moral
dilemma. Training and education can assist in the development of moral maturation and
moral potency that will allow military physicians to better navigate the moral process when
faced with ethical challenges. Military physicians should be trained in leadership skills that
allow them to differentiate between the extremely complex situations they may encounter
and situations of true moral dilemma. Proper development can help them obtain the
knowledge, skills, and attitudes necessary to seek solutions to both situations.
Topology-AMC presents a moral topology of decision-making that would often
allow military physicians the conceptual space to preserve professional and personal
integrity while upholding professional standards of competence and ethical behavior
embraced by both professions.
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Appendix 1: Terms and List of Abbreviations 207
ACPME – Army Center of Excellence for the Professional Military Ethic.
Agglomerative Principle – if one ought to do one thing and one ought to do another, then
one ought to do both.
Allocation – the distribution of both medical and non-medical resources without necessarily
implying scarce resources.
AMA – American Medical Association.
Arrest – the act of apprehending a person for the alleged commission of an offense or by the
action of an authority.
Battlefield Euthanasia – euthanasia when the decision is made based on other than medical
grounds, e.g., to silence a wounded soldier’s cries of pain and distress which may
endanger other soldiers.
Biscuit – used within a military intelligence context, a slang term for a behavioral science
consultation team; biscuit teams often include psychiatrists and psychologists.
Burnout – a sense of failure and of being “worn out” or exhausted through excessive
demands on one’s energy, strength or resources.
CO – Commanding Officer.
Culture – a pattern of basic assumptions invented, discovered, or developed by a given
group as it learns to cope with its problems of external adaptation and internal
integration, that has worked well enough to be considered valid and therefore is to be
taught to new members as the correct way to perceive, think, or feel in relation to these
problems.
Crisis Military Deployment – a situation in which military personnel are suddenly ordered to
duty to support an operation away from their home station and in a potentially dangerous
environment.
Defensive Operations – operations that defeat an enemy attack, buy time, economize forces,
or develop conditions favorable for offensive operations. Defensive operations alone
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A collection of terms, definitions, and acronyms found in the literature, i.e., “working” use of terms in this
document. Due to formatting concerns sources were not cited in this list, however in the main document
citations were used when necessary. As these terms often deal with controversial interpretations, major
deviations or refinements from the working use will be noted in the main document.
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normally cannot achieve a mission. Their purpose is to create conditions for a counteroffensive that allows a military to regain the initiative.
Detained Person – any person deprived of personal liberty except as a result of conviction
for an offense.
Detention – the condition of detained persons.
Development – lasting changes in one’s identity, perspectives, and meaning-making system,
e.g., creating an identity in a leader to see themselves as a mentor and leader-developer.
Discrete – from mathematics, describes objects that are individually distinct or noncontinuous, e.g., time is measured in continuous units whereas the number of people
who voted in the last presidential election is measured in discrete units.
Duty – in a broad sense, an action, or course of action, which is morally incumbent without
regard for personal likes or dislikes and is without external compulsion. Often implied is
some kind of necessity of the will or consciousness. In a narrow sense, duties result
from roles, e.g., physician, teacher, lawyer, soldier, etcetera.
Education – transferring knowledge, e.g., teaching the leader the human development
process behind mentoring techniques.
Enlisted Soldier – a soldier, either non-professional or professional, who does not hold
command responsibilities. Enlisted soldiers perform specific job functions and use their
knowledge to ensure the success of their unit’s current mission within the military.
Essentialism – when applied to professionalism, a mostly descriptive approach of
identifying professionals or professions by categorizing the necessary conditions that
must exist for an activity to qualify as a profession or that an individual must meet to be
classified as a professional. Professionalism is characterized by characteristics, e.g.,
specialized knowledge, high pay, etc.
Ethical Leadership – the demonstration of normatively appropriate conduct through personal
actions and interpersonal relationships, and the promotion of such conduct to followers
through two-way communication, reinforcement, and decision-making. This includes
the transformation of similar capabilities for sustained moral conduct in followers
through development and inspiration.
Ethics – historically, ethics was synonymous with morals. Contemporary or popular usage
understands ethics as the body of moral principles or values governing a particular
culture or group. As a philosophy discipline, ethics is the study of morality.
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Eugenics – a term coined by Francis Galton to encompass the idea of modification of natural
selection through selective breeding for the improvement of humankind; often associated
with pseudo-scientific Social Darwinism.
Functionalism – when applied to professionalism, a mostly normative approach for
identifying professionals or professions. This approach defines professional norms that
an organization or person must meet in order to gain the benefits and obligations of
public recognition as a profession or professional. Professionalism is defined by the
function, or role, played in society.
Hidden Curriculum – the unspoken curriculum of rules, regulations and routines, that
teachers and students must follow if they are to successfully navigate the social
institution and environment of school.
Hors de combat – out of action, out of combat, disabled.
ICRC – International Committee of the Red Cross; associated with International Committee
of the Red Crescent, International Committee of the Red Shield and Lion.
Identity-Conferring Commitments – commitments that involve a person’s centrally
important values which contribute to one’s identity.
Imprisoned Person – any person deprived of personal liberty as a result of conviction for an
offense.
Imprisonment – the condition of imprisoned persons.
Initial Moral Distress – moral distress where a person feels frustration, anger and anxiety
when faced with institutional obstacles and interpersonal conflict about values.
Judicial Authority – an authority under the law whose status and tenure should afford the
strongest possible guarantees of competence, impartiality and independence.
Just War Theory – theory of warfare that deals with both the historical and theoretical
justification of, and the conduct of, war. Usually divided into jus ad bellem “right of
war,” justification for engaging in war, (also seen as jus ad bellum) and jus in bello
“laws of war,” appropriate conduct for carrying out war.
Leadership – influencing people – by providing purpose, direction, and motivation while
operating to accomplish the mission and improving the organization.
MED CAP – Medical Civil Action Patrols.
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Medical Disaster – A medical disaster occurs when the destructive effects of natural or manmade forces overwhelm the ability of a given area or community to meet the demand for
health care.
Medical Euthanasia – euthanasia initiated for medical reasons by a physician.
Medical Neutrality – (1) Impartiality—medical personnel treat all patients with respect and
without discrimination based on age, disease or disability, creed, ethnic origin, gender,
nationality, political affiliation, race, sexual orientation, or social standing. (2)
Immunity—medical personnel must be granted access to patients and provided with the
protection necessary to provide patient care.
Mental Model – an explanation of someone’s thought process; a model of mental
representations of the surrounding world; a map of how someone knows, perceives,
makes decisions, or constructs behavior.
Meta-cognitive ability – the level of one’s ability to possess greater knowledge of, and the
ability to regulate, one’s own cognitive process(es), or thinking about thinking.
Meta-Moral Knowledge – a representation of a specific domain or component of general
knowledge that can be automatically or intentionally accessed during cognitive
processing. These mental representations “become” the moral lenses that one uses to
interpret moral dilemmas.
MI – Military Intelligence.
Military Necessity – as understood by modern civilized nations consists of the necessity of
those measures which are indispensable for securing the ends of war, and which are
lawful according to the modern law and usages of war. Often “regulated” by conditions
of discrimination (who makes a legitimate target?) and proportionality (what is the
acceptable collateral damage when compared to military goals?).
Modal Logic – in a narrow sense, modal logic is the study of the syntax and semantics of
alethic (truth) modalities, i.e., the study of the deductive nature of truth modifiers such as
“must,” “might,” “could,” “can,” “have to,” “possibly,” “contingently,” and
“necessarily.” In a broad sense, modal logic designates the study of other sorts of
propositional modalities, e.g., deontic (ethical) modalities, propositional attitudes
(relations between sentient beings and propositions), and tenses (e.g., the past, present,
and future tense).
MOOTW – Military Operations Other Than War.
MOOTWISUF – Military Operations Other Than What I Signed Up For.
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Moral Agency – the capacity to exercise control over the nature and quality of one’s life- the
essence of humanness.
Moral Autonomy – the freedom, right and responsibility to make choices.
Moral Capacity – the measure of a person’s ability to cognitively process a moral situation
and behave in a moral manner in regard to that situation.
Moral Comfort – an individual’s feeling of ease about a decision related to ethical problems.
Moral Competency – an aspect of moral autonomy highlighting the ability to understand the
moral issues of situations, use good moral judgment and intention, and engage in
morally appropriate behavior.
Moral Courage – the level of ability one has to act upon a moral issue, especially in the case
of adversity.
Moral Dilemma – a situation in which there is more than one right thing to do, but to act on
one necessarily precludes acting on the others; moral dilemmas result when at least two
clear moral principles apply to a case, but they support mutually inconsistent courses of
action; or when information suggests that an act x is both right and wrong, or the
evidence is inconclusive, or a person believes on moral grounds that one both should and
should not perform x.
Moral Distress – a negative feeling state experienced when a person makes moral judgments
about a situation in which he or she is involved, but something or someone restricts their
ability to pursue their course of action. Unresolved moral distress expresses itself in
harm and suffering that affects personal relationships, employment, and one’s outlook on
life. Symptoms include crying, anger, depression, nightmares, heart palpitations,
diarrhea, and headaches. Painful feelings and/or psychological disequilibrium that
occurs when people are conscious of the morally appropriate action a situation requires,
but cannot carry out that action because of institutionalized obstacles: lack of time, lack
of supervisory support, exercise of others’ power, institutional policy, or legal limits.
Moral Domain Complexity – the combination of the moral aspects of one’s self-identity and
the knowledge required to understand the moral domains one is exposed to.
Moral Efficacy – one’s belief (confidence) in his or her capabilities to organize and mobilize
the motivation, cognitive resources, means, and courses of action needed to attain moral
performance, within a given moral domain, while persisting in the face of moral
adversity.
Moral Fatigue – morally distressful situations in which there exists a lack of strength and
energy that diminishes the mind and immobilizes thoughts.
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Moral Identity – one’s self-schema that is comprised of moral traits and a person’s
awareness that arises out of interactions with his environment, of his own beliefs, values,
attitudes, the links between them, and their implications for their behavior.
Moral Imagination – the ability to understand the complexities and dimensions of moral
dilemmas; also, the ability to create novel moral solutions to ethically problematic
situations or dilemmas.
Moral Integrity – adherence to moral values affecting the sense of dignity and self-respect.
Moral Intensity – the degree of immediacy and urgency when it comes to moral matters;
determined by six key factors 1) magnitude of consequences, 2) social consensus, 3)
probability of effect, 4) temporal immediacy, 5) proximity, and 6) concentration of
effect.
Moral Judgment Processing Lenses – the ability to use multiple lenses to meta-cognitively
process a moral situation. Three different common “lenses” are Deontological (laws and
rules based processing), Teleological (consequence or goal based processing), and
Areteological (virtues or values based processing).
Moral Maturation – one’s overall capacity to attend to, store, retrieve, process, and make
meaning of morally relevant information. Moral maturation is enhanced through
developing moral identity, cognitive complexity, and meta-cognitive ability.
Moral Outrage – an intense emotional state triggered when a person sees others (not
themselves) performing immoral actions.
Moral Ownership – the level of one’s ability to be responsible for the values associated with
a moral action.
Moral Potency – a state of ownership over the moral aspects of one’s domain, reinforced by
efficacy beliefs in the capabilities to act to achieve moral purpose in that domain, and the
courage to perform in the face of adversity.
Moral Schema – a person’s mental representation of something related to morals (where
“something” is a situation, person, decision, etc.).
Moral Sensitivity – the ability to recognize a moral conflict, show a contextual and intuitive
understanding of the situation, and have insight into the ethical consequences of
decisions.
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Moral Uncertainty – a state of mind in which one is uncertain about which principles or
values apply, or if one really has a moral problem, or when individuals feel that
something is not quite right, but need assistance in determining what that something is.
Moral Working-self – the contextually activated portions of one’s cognitive, affection, and
behavioral schemas and complexities that are applied during ethical issue processing.
Noncombatants – persons taking no active part in hostilities, e.g., prisoners of war,
wounded, and civilians who do not bear arms.
Obligation – as distinct from duty, an action, or course of action, which is morally or legally
incumbent without regard to personal likes or dislikes and may include external
compulsion. Obligations are often concurrently gained with rights or powers and
involve a legal bond and enforcement between two or more people. Obligations result
only from voluntary action.
Offensive Operations – operations that aim at destroying or defeating an enemy. Their
purpose is to impose the will of the aggressor on the enemy and achieve a decisive
victory.
Officer (military) – a professional soldier who holds command responsibilities, except in the
cases of non-line officers, e.g., medical personnel, chaplains, and sometimes lawyers. In
these cases non-line officers are professionals in a non-combat respect but they are also
soldiers.
Passive Euthanasia – euthanasia in which no direct measures are taken to terminate a
patient’s life, rather the patient is “allowed to die.”
PMFs – Privatized Military Firms; corporate bodies that specialize in and contract for the
provision of military skills, including combat operations, strategic planning, intelligence,
risk assessment, operational support, training, and technical skills. Not identical to
mercenary units.
Primary Health Care – essential health care based on practical, scientifically sound, and
socially acceptable methods and technology made universally accessible to individuals
and families in the community through their full participation and at a cost that the
community and country can afford to maintain at every state of their development in the
spirit of self-reliance and self-determination.
Prisoner of War – any persons belonging to one of the following categories, who have fallen
into the power of the enemy: (1) Members of the armed forces of a Party to the conflict
as well as members of militias or volunteer corps forming part of such armed forces. (2)
Members of militias or volunteer corps belonging to a Party to the conflict and operating
in or outside their own territory provided that such militias or volunteer corps fulfill the
218

following conditions: (a) that of being commanded by a person responsible for his
subordinates, (b) that of having a fixed distinctive sign recognizable at a distance, (c)
that of carrying arms openly, (d) that of conducting their operations in accordance with
the laws and customs of war. (3) Members of regular armed forces who profess
allegiance to a government or an authority not recognized by the Detaining Power. (4)
Persons who accompany the armed forces without actually being members thereof, such
as civilian members of military aircraft crews, war correspondents, supply contractors,
members of labor units. (5) Members of crews of the merchant marine and civil aircraft
of the Parties to the conflict. (6) Inhabitants of a non-occupied territory, who on the
approach of the enemy spontaneously take up arms to resist the invading forces, without
having had time to form themselves into regular armed units, provided they carry arms
openly and respect the laws and customs of war.
Privilege – permission to perform certain acts provided specific conditions are fulfilled.
Professional – someone who provides a service in return for payment in accordance with
special training, licensure, ethics, and standards of service; sometimes associated with a
special body of knowledge and service to the community.
Professionalization – the social award of a legitimate monopoly of practice in that area to the
organized profession.
Psychological Doubling – separating off one side of the self in order to maintain oneself in
situations that conflict with one’s sense of the good.
Rationing – as opposed to allocation, resource distribution when resources are scarce.
Reactive Moral Distress – moral distress that people feel when they do not act upon their
initial moral distress.
Realism – the view that the truth-value of a statement or judgment is determined by the
world, where the world is taken to be something independent of human reason,
perception, will, desire, and the like.
Relativism – without an objective standard, “truth” is determined by the desires and beliefs
of the individual (individual relativism) or group (group relativism).
Responsibility – a state or condition in which it is justifiable to ascribe praise or blame to an
individual.
Right – a sound claim that one be permitted (or assisted) to act in some manner without
interference.
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Schema – in psychology, core identity elements; those parts of one’s identity that are central
to self-concept. Schemas lead to motivational patterns. Contrast with a-schema, or the
peripheral elements of one’s identity. A-schema lead to enhancing patterns. Disrupting
schema leads to psychological reactions.
Scripts – in psychology, a sequence of expected behaviors for a given situation. Scripts are
acquired through habit, practice, and routine.
Social Cognitive Theory — a theory that proposes an interactive and reciprocal causation
between the person, their behavior, and their environment.
Social Darwinism – pseudo-science based on misinterpretations of Darwinian evolutionary
theory; focuses on “survival-of-the-fittest” as applied to business, politics, and other
social organizations.
Soldier (military) – a person enlisted with or conscripted to serve in the armed forces of a
nation.
Stability Operations – operations that promote and protect national interests by influencing
the threat, political, and information dimensions of the operational environment through
a combination of peacetime development, cooperative activities and coercive actions in
response to crisis. Regional security is supported by a balanced approach that enhances
regional stability and economic prosperity simultaneously.
Sui generis – its own kind, being the only example of its kind, or original.
Support Operations – operations employed to assist civil authorities, foreign or domestic, as
they prepare for or respond to crisis and relieve suffering.
Tactical Euthanasia – euthanasia as a decision of the line commander incorporating factors
not directly related to the medical condition of the patient.
Terminal Experiment – experiments where the death of the subject is an expected, and often
necessary, outcome of the experimental plan. Terminal experiments were made
infamous by accounts of Nazi medical experiments.
Tiger Teams – slang term for military intelligence teams.
Training – transferring skills and abilities, e.g., training a leader on mentoring techniques.
Triage – the sorting of patients for treatment priority in emergency departments and in
multi-casualty incidents, disasters, and battlefield settings. In military triage the less
critically wounded or ill receive priority treatment, particularly if resources are scarce,
and the most seriously wounded are the lowest treatment priority; this is a reverse of
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most non-military situations in which those who are most in need of care receive priority
treatment.
UCMJ – Uniform Code of Military Justice.
U.N. – United Nations.
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Appendix 2: “Ought  Can”, or A Primer on Moral Psychology

There are at least two “ought” principles that are sometimes utilized in ethical
dialogue. The first was made famous by David Hume and is sometimes referred to as the
“is-ought” problem. In his discussions, Hume criticizes how some arguments go from
statements of “is” to claims of “ought” without providing justification for the belief that
because something “is” the case, it also “ought” to be the case. To this I would add that
consideration should also be given relating the possible to the probable. Just because
something is theoretically possible, it is not necessarily probable in practice.
The second “ought” principle is “ought implies can” (symbolized as “ought  can”).
This principle expresses the idea that to legitimately require that someone “ought” to do
something it must be possible that they “can” do that something. Alternatively, to say that
someone “ought not” do something it must be possible that they can choose not to do that
something. Possibility, in a moral sense, has to be something less than strict logical or
physical possibility – it has to be referring to what a moral agent can reasonably and
rationally be expected to do, or not do, in a given situation.
In light of this principle, ought  can, it is necessary when applying ethics to
establish the basic framework of moral processing. This helps to clarify the “can” so that
the “ought” may be reasonably assessed. This appendix summarizes current psychological
research on the “can” aspects of moral processing as it relates to leadership and ethical
development. An understanding of the psychological dynamics of moral processing can
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assist philosophers train, educate, and develop ethical behavior in individuals, particularly
those individuals who may experience moral conflict in their professional duty.
James Rest argues, “ethical behavior occurs when an individual sequentially
processes a moral dilemma through the stages of moral recognition, judgment, intention, and
behavior.” 208 Hannah and Avolio argue that developing the capacities of moral maturation
and moral potency enhances the moral-working self and helps negotiate the stages of
processing a moral dilemma. Developing moral maturation and moral potency transforms
people by “enabling and motivating them to take greater ownership of their moral
experiences, increasing the depth and breadth of their moral reasoning and decision-making,
and ultimately, enhancing their confidence and courage to carry those decisions through by
taking moral actions.” 209
Moral maturation is “one’s overall capacity to attend to, store, retrieve, process, and
make meaning of morally relevant information.” 210 Moral maturation occurs in at least three
areas: moral domain complexity, moral identity, and moral meta-cognitive ability.
“Cognitive complexity is domain specific,” such that “individuals are depicted as more or
less complex, or expert in their mental representations (schemes) of various domains of
knowledge.” 211
Domain complexity is “a product of long-term semantic memory where schemes are
developed and reinforced through a broad range of experiences across the life span, and then
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altered through the meaning-making one extracts from those experiences.” 212 Information
retrieval by human beings is limited by each individual according to the cognitive
complexity of an individual. Individuals with more complex cognitive abilities “have
developed more integrated, organized schemas that allow them to create better linkages
between different and oftentimes competing concepts.” 213 Cognitive complexity is desirable
in the moral realm because “higher levels of complexity affords individuals the opportunity
to make better sense of competing information that characterizes most moral dilemmas,
while also being able to acquire and spend more time interpreting new information that may
assist them in resolving these dilemmas.” 214
Cognitive complexity, or the development of rich and complex mental
representations related to morality, “should enhance the recognition of moral dilemmas.”
Cognitive complexity is desired as people “tend to use the highest stages of cognitive
development available to them while processing and making judgments on moral
dilemmas.” 215 Hannah and Avolio suggest that as a person achieves higher domain
complexity, “facets of their immediate and perhaps distal environment that have moral
implications will be more likely to ‘fit’ existing mental representations and thus prime the
individual’s schema to attend to and process the dilemma using a greater level of cognitive
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resources.” 216 They propose, “Greater complexity in domains of moral knowledge will
increase the efficacy of recognizing and processing moral dilemmas.” 217
Moral identity, or the self-schemas referenced in respect to an individual’s sense of a
moral self, influences “cognition and behavioral self-regulation” and supports “the more indepth processing to resolve complex moral dilemmas.” 218 Self identity is less of a unified
whole than an assemblage of selves. 219 Self identity has both content and structure such that
“Content refers to the self-hypotheses held in memory by individuals and includes both
knowledge components…and evaluative components…Structure refers to how these
contents comprising self-identity are organized and categorized.” 220 Individuals who are
more morally developed exhibit higher levels of self unity “across various roles and
situations.” 221
Self-identity is important as “people are motivated to behave in ways that are
consistent with those self-attributes they hold as important…have high levels of unity in
terms of self identity.” 222 Moral dilemmas require people to deal with both competing
values and choices. Hannah and Avolio suggest that “in areas where the self is less
‘invested’ the individual will be more likely to sway to other values and consequently away
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from taking moral action, while, conversely, their more salient values will prompt moral
engagement and a deeper level of processing of the dilemmas.” 223 “A highly-developed
moral identity will prompt one to engage themselves in processing of those moral dilemmas
and would sponsor intentions to act and take moral action consistent with core values.” 224
Hannah and Avolio argue that “Levels of development in moral identity, as indicated by the
richness of moral content structured with high unity across social roles, will be positively
associated with engagement in moral processing and self-consistent moral behaviors.” 225
The third component of moral maturation is meta-cognitive ability. According to
Hannah and Avolio, meta-cognitive ability is “thinking about thinking—the awareness of
one’s cognitive processes, cognitive strengths and weaknesses, and capability for cognitive
self-regulation.” 226 The two main functions of meta-cognitive ability are “monitoring and
controlling (regulation) cognitions and processes, and thus serves as both a self-referential
and executive-control functions critical to the processing of moral issues.” 227 This is
possible because thinking about thinking allows for the “monitoring and control” of thought
processes such that “personal biases and limitations can be identified, scrutinized and
controlled” in such a way that “moral reasoning oriented toward effective, issue-specific
outcomes can be employed.” 228 Hannah and Avolio argue that “Level of moral

223

Hannah and Avolio, “Transforming Follower Moral Capacity,” 13. See also Integrated Self-Schema Model
(ISSM), Peterson, Self-Concept and Information Processing; Stahlberg, Peterson and Dauenheimer,
“Preferences for the Evaluation of Self-Relevant Information Depending on the Elaboration of the Schema
Involved.”
224
Hannah and Avolio, “Transforming Follower Moral Capacity,” 13.
225
Ibid. 14. Italics in original.
226
Ibid. 14. See also Flavell, “Speculations about the nature and development of metacognition;” Metcalfe
and Shimamura, Metacognition: Knowing about Knowing.
227
Hannah and Avolio, “Transforming Follower Moral Capacity,” 14+.
228
Ibid. 15.

226

metacognitive ability will be positively associated with the level of utilization of moral
complexity and subsequent efficacy of moral evaluation.” 229
Moral potency is “a state of ownership over the moral aspects of one’s domain,
reinforced by efficacy beliefs in the capabilities to act to achieve moral purpose in that
domain, and the courage to perform in the face of adversity.” 230 Moral potency is required
for action as one may have moral maturation and yet fail to possess the necessary
characteristics that lead to action. For example, consider the murder of the Iraqi taxicab
driver Dilawar. One of the U.S. soldiers who helped beat him to death said “Sometimes I
feel I should have gone with my own morality. More than what was common.” 231 Another
soldier said “Some would say ‘What! Hey you should have stopped this, you should have
stopped that. Why didn’t you do something?’ …well it was us against them. I was over
there; I didn’t want to appear to be going against my fellow soldiers. Which, is that wrong?
You could sit here and say that was dead wrong. Go over there and say that.” 232 In these
and similar situations of high levels of moral intensity, “individuals require more than a
capacity to act, they must feel strongly that it is their place to act (i.e. ownership), that they
can be successful in those actions (i.e. moral efficacy), and can overcome their fears and
persevere to see those actions through to final resolution, which may invoke moral
courage.” 233
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As with moral maturation, there are three components to moral potency: moral
ownership, moral efficacy, and moral courage.
Hannah and Avolio suggest that “having a sense of moral ownership provides the
motivation required to employ a greater extent of one’s moral capacity to figure out what to
do when confronted with a moral dilemma.” 234 Ownership is “the state in which individuals
feel as though the target of ownership or a piece of that target is theirs.” 235 Ownership is
sufficient to begin a process of moral judgment that leads to a sense of responsibility to
initiate judgment and action. This is because, according to Hannah and Avolio, “an
individual’s sense of ownership will sponsor a higher propensity to utilize a greater level of
his or her moral maturation both to recognize moral issues and perform deeper metacognitive processing to and during the enactment of moral judgments.” 236 Based on this
concept of ownership, Hannah and Avolio propose that “Levels of moral ownership will be
positively associated with levels of utilization of moral maturation when processing moral
dilemmas…Levels of moral ownership will be positively associated with the formation of
intentions to act in concordance with moral judgments.” 237
One hindrance in engaging with moral dilemma is a lack of confidence. 238 A person
may be aware of a moral dilemma, take ownership of the dilemma, process relevant moral
considerations to reach an evaluation of the situation, and form the basis of intentions, yet
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not feel confident in their ability to actively engage in the situation. Moral efficacy is “one’s
belief (confidence) in his or her capabilities to organize and mobilize the motivation,
cognitive resources, means and courses of action needed to attain moral performance, within
a given moral domain, while persisting in the face of moral adversity.” 239
Efficacy has two components: self-efficacy and means-efficacy. Self-efficacy deals
with confidence in one’s own capabilities, while means-efficacy deals with confidence in the
available resources at one’s disposal. A critical aspect in action is that “one must therefore
believe they not only have the ability to perform a moral task (e.g. to disclose unethical
accounting), but that the supporting means will allow them to perform successfully (e.g.
‘whistle blower’ protection).” 240 Hannah and Avolio propose “Levels of moral efficacy will
positively moderate the relationship between moral intentions and moral behaviors.” 241
The final aspect of moral potency is moral courage. Moral courage is the “fortitude
to convert moral intentions into actions despite pressures from either inside or outside of the
organization to do otherwise.” 242 Moral courage interacts with moral identity in that
“strongly held core values (high unity) prompts courage in individuals to manifest those
values in action.” 243 Hannah and Avolio propose that “Levels of moral courage will
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positively moderate the relationship between moral intention and moral behaviors, and will
be positively associated with persistence in those behaviors when faced with adversity.” 244
Moral maturation and moral potency can be developed. Moral maturation can be
developed because “the manner in which people attend to, perceive, store, access, and make
meaning of information in their moral reasoning processes are malleable and open to
intervention.” 245 Hannah and Avolio propose three main mechanisms that can be used by
leaders to develop moral maturation of those that follow them, “1) guiding followers
through a series of experiential moral events that create states of cognitive disequilibrium
that forces a deeper inquiry to resolve, while facilitating and enhancing their interpretation
and understanding of those experiences, 2) personally modeling moral behavior, and 3)
teaching deliberate cognitive moral decision-making skills and processes.” 246
I contend that this development in moral maturation will be effective in helping
resolve conflicts in duty as experienced by military physicians. By facilitating and
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enhancing the interpretation and understanding of moral situations, military physicians will
be better able to identify whether or not they are truly in a moral dilemma. If not in a moral
dilemma, but still suffering moral distress resulting from not knowing what to do, they may
be able to model the moral behavior of others. Alternatively, if they have developed
cognitive moral decision-making skills and processes they will be able to better exercise
their own moral judgment. However, to effectively enable action, military physicians must
also be allowed to develop moral potency.
Moral potency can be developed, although it faces organizational challenges. Within
organizations, people tend to “look to and comply with what they interpret to be the moral
desires of ‘higher authority’ when making moral judgments.” 247 Consequently, people
reduce their ownership in addressing moral issues. 248 Further challenges are present as
“people tend to conform to the expectations of peers and others either to be liked or accepted
(normative influence), or to be validated and affirmed (informational influence).” 249
Hannah and Avolio propose three ways in which these challenges may be overcome.
First, leaders should foster intellectual stimulation that “encourage followers to
question and challenge their positions and decisions, as well as those of their leaders, thus
raising followers’ sense of autonomy and moral ownership.” 250 Second, leaders should add
“salience, clarity and personalization to moral issues.” 251 Third, leaders should increase “the
perceived level of moral intensity through moral issue-framing.” 252
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Moral ownership can be increased by placing moral dilemma issues “in humanistic
terms, discouraging sanitizing language (e.g. euphemisms that ‘sugar coat’ situations),
encouraging responsibility, making salient the injurious effects of potential actions, and
limiting attribution of blame to or dehumanizing of victims.” 253 Moral ownership can also
be increased by “raising the moral intensity associated with an ethical dilemma.” 254
Issue framing, “the way information about an issue or situation is presented,” is an
important factor in whether or not, and how, an individual recognizes an issue as a moral
dilemma. 255 Moral language used in framing moral situations “triggers peoples’ moral
scripts and therefore behavior repertoires.” 256 Thus, by repeated exposure to typical ethical
dilemmas (through training, modeling, etc.) individuals can better recognize and act in moral
dilemmas.
Finally, ownership and engagement can be increased by organizational reward and
control systems. 257
Self-efficacy can be developed through five elements: “1) enactive mastery
experience, 2) vicarious learning, 3) social persuasion/feedback, 4) psychological and
emotional arousal…5) providing and articulating the quality and utility of means and
support offered by the organization.” 258
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Moral courage is developed in several ways. First, individuals tend to identify with
self-sacrificing leaders. This influences a person’s identity and willingness to sacrifice
himself for moral action. 259 Second, sets of personal and social resources promote
courage. 260 Such sets include “personal resources such as efficacy, locus of control,
conscientiousness and other positive states and traits mitigate against fear and open up a
broadened set of behavior repertoires with which one can contemplate action in the face of
fear.” 261 Third, Hannah and Avolio propose “an individual’s values and beliefs such as duty
and loyalty, as well as social forces such as cohesion and group norms will promote
courageous action in the face of fear.” 262 Moral courage is an emergent property coming
from “an interaction of personal and social resources that prompt moral action.” 263
How will this help in negotiating moral dilemma and relieving moral distress? If
leaders take responsibility to help increase an agent’s moral potency, they are, in effect,
helping restructure organizational barriers which exacerbate moral dilemma and moral
distress. Given that many reports of moral dilemma and the resulting moral distress indicate
that organizational barriers are one of the chief causes of moral distress, this could be a
significant change. By increasing agents’ autonomy and moral ownership, leaders in an
organization can better trust that agents will engage with and appropriately deal with moral
dilemma. By regaining a sense of professional autonomy, agents are in a better position to
remain true to their moral working-self. They are less likely to suffer from moral distress.
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Through training in issue framing, agents are less likely to be unaware of moral
dilemmas. They will be in a better psychological state to successfully negotiate moral
dilemmas and, consequently, less likely to experience moral distress. Finally, by developing
moral courage agents are less likely to feel helpless and hopeless when confronted with
moral dilemma. Again, this increases their likelihood of successfully negotiating moral
dilemmas and decreases their likelihood of experiencing moral distress.
My proposal that developing moral maturation and moral potency to help military
physicians deal with moral dilemma and moral distress is consistent with Hannah and
Avolio’s conclusion of the relationship between moral maturation, moral potency, and the
moral working-self. Aspects of the self become prominent based on current experiential
contexts. 264 For example, when engaged in a sport, such as basketball, certain cognitive
processes and physical activities are activated while others are suppressed. While reading
the newspaper, other cognitive processes and physical activities are activated, depending
upon the work in which a person is currently engaged. The moral working-self is that part
of the self that becomes activated and engaged when contextual triggers prompt that part of
the self into action.
How does this relate to the self? Identity is “a memory structure developed over the
life span where individuals have interpreted and encoded their experiences into memory.” 265
Hannah and Avolio point out that some current theories of the self indicate that the self is
formed through narrative interpretation and both a current self-view and images of possible
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selves. 266 The self and personal identity is malleable. To understand how this will help with
resolving moral dilemma and decrease moral distress, I return to Bluestein’s understanding
of identity-conferring commitments.
Bluestein’s position is that “Incorporating the requirement of morality into one’s life
should not have disastrous consequences for human personality. Morality may demand
significant sacrifice and effort, but the cost of being moral should not be a distorted and
undesirable personality.” 267 Bluestein identified “identity-conferring commitments” that
involve a person’s centrally important values which contribute to one’s identity. These
commitments “make us what we are and they place constraints on our lives from which we
may not be able to unbind ourselves without self-betrayal and personal disintegration.” 268
These commitments are a key part of defining our moral personality.
The analysis of moral distress reveals that one underlying cause of moral distress is
from a perception of moral dilemma resulting from a perception of a conflict of professional
duties. In fact, it appears that underlying this conflict is a conflict in identity-conferring
commitments. As we have previously seen, contextual cues activate identity schemes.
When contextual cues are predominantly military related, such as a formal review or
briefing, a military physician is most likely to respond with his military identity. When
contextual cues are predominantly medical related, such as when working in an emergency
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room, a military physician is most likely to respond with his physician identity. Prolonged
engagement with mixed cues, such as in combat theaters, can provide rapidly changing
contextual cues. This can force a military physician to become cognitively aware of both his
physician and his officer identity schemes. The military physician may be faced with an
appearance of a conflict of identity-conferring commitments. This conflict forces cognitive
dissonance.
Cognitive dissonance is important because it is at this time that a person is most
likely to either develop or to be further cognitively fractured. Continued cognitive
dissonance can lead to moral distress, especially if the individual either lacks the internal
resources to effectively conceptionalyze the situation or external sources continue to lead to
pressure.
Character development, through ethical transformative leadership, can assist a
military physician (or others in similar situations) cope with cognitive dissonance. Moral
maturation and moral potency allow for both preserving and protecting or, when
appropriate, adapting and changing identity-conferring commitments. Thus, developing
these moral traits is important as they allow for successfully negotiating moral dilemma and
reducing incidences of moral distress related to action against identity-conferring
commitments. The question remains as to how a military physician determines which set of
identity-conferring commitments, or blend of sets, he ought to adopt. Topology-AMC
provides additional means of assisting ethics educators to present scenarios of the complex
situations military physicians must confront as they combine their duties as medical
personnel and military officers.
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Appendix 3: The Either-Or Solutions: Nazi Case Study

Sometimes it’s the smallest decisions that can change your life forever.
Keri Russell
What luck for the rulers that men do not think.
Adolf Hitler

Nazi Germany provides an illuminating case study in applications of the either-or
solution. It is illuminating in that within one study it is possible to apprehend the conflicting
claims that (1) military officer duties should outweigh physician duties and (2) physician
duties should outweigh military officer duties. This is possible because Nazi physicians
often used (1) in a defense of their actions, but from a historical perspective both (1) and (2)
account for a shifting in physician duties as directed from an individual patient to a society
at large.
Whereas Chapter Four’s analysis of the either-or solution provided accounts of
possible inadequacies in the various articulations of the either-or solution, this extended case
study is used to show a concrete, real-world example of the possible danger of wholeheartedly embracing an either-or solution without taking precautionary steps to prevent its
possible abuse. Section One of this appendix details how an either-or solution focusing on
military duties is used as a defense of questionable actions. Section Two details how an
either-or stance focusing on medical duties helped lead to the atrocious actions committed
by Nazi physicians.

238

§1: Karl Brandt’s Defense - Military Duty Prevails
Assume it is true that a nation’s security is of such importance that it warrants
military necessity as an overriding concern and that military necessity requires soldiers to
obey orders to maximize the efficiency of the military organization. This is one of the
arguments that officer duties should outweigh physician duties. Dr. Karl Brandt used such a
defense in the War Crimes Trials at Nuremburg. To challenge the claim that officer duties
should override physician duties I offer a counter-argument to Brandt’s defense. If it is
assumed that it is true that soldiers always have a general duty to obey orders, we reach an
unacceptable conclusion. It is not the case that military necessity is always a justification to
override physician duties.

§1.1: On the Moral Acceptability of “Befehl ist Befehl”
Often used by those committing atrocities, the defense of “I was just following
orders” has been criticized and largely considered invalid since World War II. In legal
terms, this is known as Respondeat superior (Latin for “let the master answer”). From its
appearance in the Nuremburg Trials, “just following orders” is also known as Befehl ist
Befehl, variously translated as either “instruction is instruction” or “order is order.”
This section will explore some of the complexities of the Befehl ist Befehl defense.
When taking into consideration the complexities of war, human psychology, and
suppositions of moral responsibility, it is plausible that in some cases soldiers may be
justified in following orders, uncritically, when they are involved in a moral dilemma or in
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the “heat of battle.” On the other hand, there are numerous examples in history where
uncritically following orders has led to unimaginable and unconscionable suffering.
There is little plausibility in suggesting that people who have been given orders have
no moral responsibility when they follow those orders. It is more plausible to suggest that
people who have been given orders do have individual responsibility. The responsible and
proper action for individuals is to obey legal and moral orders. In exploring the defense of
“just following orders” in the “heat of battle,” the issue in these situations is not just that
orders should not have been followed, but that illegal and immoral orders should not have
been given. Moral condemnation must rest heavily on those who initiate illegal or immoral
orders, those who enforce the ideals which lead to morally questionable practices, and those
who continually foster unethical cultures and climates which lead to a breakdown in moral
practice. However, a lack of individual responsibility, on any level, cannot be
wholeheartedly accepted, because to do so might lend justification to atrocities such as those
seen in Nazi Germany, Japan’s Unit 731, or the My Lei Massacre.
Interpretations of this defense require having some clarity regarding the
appropriateness of following orders in everyday situations: it is, in fact, necessary for the
properly functioning society. “Why did you . . . ?” is frequently justified with “Because soand-so told me to!” This is not offered as a simple excuse. It is offered as a justifiable
reason and expectation for an action.
This justification is allowable precisely because in many situations people are
expected to follow orders. Children are expected to follow the orders of adults (especially
their parents), students are expected to follow their teachers’ instructions, employees are
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expected to follow employers’ rules, soldiers are expected to follow officers’ commands,
patients are expected to obey doctors’ instructions, and parishioners are expected to obey
their church laws.
This appropriateness of following orders is not always the case. Nor is it desired, in
an ethically sensitive culture, to want this to always be the case. Yet, it must be conceded
that disobedience is the exception, not the rule. 269 Following orders is the norm and not
simply an excuse for “wrong” actions when morally questionable consequences happen. In
fact, in most situations, disobedience is discouraged, punished, or at least questioned. There
are powerful institutional, cultural, and psychological incentives to obey orders from
authority. Based on the principle “ought  can” this leads to at least three interpretations of
the defense “I was just following orders.” 270
Consider the following three interpretations of the use of Befehl ist Befehl as a
defense for a morally wrong action in the military. (1) The Mechanistic Defense – this
defense relies on a claim that although the agent is the physical cause of a moral
wrongdoing, he is not the efficient cause of the wrongdoing. The agent is nothing more, nor
less, than a “cog in a machine.” As such, he has no real autonomy, as no moral choice
realistically exists to him in his actions. The agent is morally free from blame or
condemnation. (2) The Limited Autonomy Defense – this defense relies on a claim that
although the agent is not a “cog in a machine,” he is nonetheless limited in his autonomy
269

It is important, whenever considering applied ethics, to establish the baseline or norm that is typically
accepted. For example, discussions of capital punishment, or justifiable homicide such as self-defense, start
with the norm that killing is, under most circumstances, morally wrong. The burden of proof lies in
establishing the legitimacy of killing. Likewise, when it comes to disobeying orders, whether it is from
those in authority or from the laws of the land, it is reasonable to suggest that the burden of proof lies in
establishing the legitimacy of not following orders.
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See previous appendix for discussion on “oughtcan”.
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due to the lack of autonomy enabling information. 271 This lack of information dictates that
the agent must rely upon others for information used in deciding what to do. As such,
although the results of his action may elicit morally heinous consequences, he is himself
motivationally blameless in the activity. Arguably, had the agent known otherwise he could
have acted differently. A severe limitation on autonomy can push this defense into the
mechanistic defense. (3) The Practical Defense – failure to promptly and diligently follow
orders can result in swift and sometimes harmful consequences to the agent such as verbal
criticism, or forfeiture of pay and allowances. In the Military punishment may also include
confinement, reduction in rank, bad-conduct discharge, death, or other such punishment as a
court-martial may direct. 272
Individuals might reject the Mechanistic Defense unless they have a solid
commitment to materialistic, deterministic, or otherwise mathematical-mechanical
metaphysics. Yet, the mechanization of an individual’s actions is the desired goal of some
types of training. There are good aspects of training people to act automatically without the
need for conscious thought. The goal of such training can be to establish quick and accurate
action. Mechanization is an approved way of training for certain aspects of personnel
response such as for medics, doctors, pilots, policemen, and firemen. In these cases, the
individuals are not just cogs in a machine. They are well-trained to automatically respond to
certain situations.
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I’m using Mappes and DeGrazia’s notion of autonomy as (a) liberty of action, (b) freedom of choice, and
(c) effective deliberation. In the Limited Autonomy Defense, the agent is not constrained in his actions and
is free to make choices. However, he lacks the knowledge to effectively deliberate his actions.
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Part of this training involves following orders. Without a doubt, following orders
can have advantages. Following orders instills cohesion in a military unit that allows the
unit to achieve mission objectives. Likewise, in emergency situations following orders
allows for swift and efficient mobilization, containment, and resolution of an emergency.
There is a relative degree of limited autonomy which may impact the evaluation of the
results of an individual’s following orders.
Psychologically we know that in certain situations with enough pressure almost any
individual will lose personal volition. Consider that fraternal organizations routinely engage
in behavior designed to persuade pledges to conform to the group values and structure.
Anecdotal stories suggest that public schools are sometimes perceived to operate under
“Ford factory models” which, consequently, encourage group-think and obedience to
society. Cults and gangs engage in sophisticated psychological techniques to isolate
individuals from their support networks to brainwash them into being willing servants of the
cult or gang. Corporate atmospheres are known to encourage what might be considered by
some people to be unethical climates.
In many cases, the mechanization of individuals is the desired goal of some types of
training. However, the degree of mechanization and the ethical application of
mechanization can vary from institution to institution. In some cases the mechanization may
be restricted to simple tasks, e.g., quickly moving to suppress an ambush, quickly reacting to
initiate CPR, or instinctively moving to avoid confrontation. In other cases, the degree of
mechanization seeks a deep and total control of an individual.
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As an extreme case, consider claims made by Chris White relating his experiences
with Marine Corps indoctrination. Mr. White claims that his recruiter told him that the
purpose of the 12-week boot camp was “to produce the most efficient, disciplined, and
gallant, killing machine…by removing my undesirable civilian traits, such as individuality
and the inhibition against killing other human beings, and inserting Marine Corps traits, such
as anti-individuality for the sake of a team work ethic, and, more importantly, the ability and
even desire, to kill other human beings.” 273
According to White, intense mental and physical indoctrination is used towards the
goal of producing “troops capable of following orders with minimal agency of their own,
efficiently enough to be utilized as a tool of the state, whether the Marine agrees with the
orders or not.” 274 Indoctrination is mostly about control:
They control everything you do, from the order and speed of getting dressed,
to the way you eat, sleep, and use the bathroom, to the way you walk, to the
way you talk, to the way you sit, to the way you stand, to the way you
worship, to the amount of water you drink, and so on, until you only do and
think what is ordered of you…At a certain point, you lose that nasty civilian
trait of individuality mentioned by your recruiter, and you accept, nay, enjoy,
the fact that you [are] under their control. You signed on the dotted line, you
came here of your own free will, it makes sense to go along to get along. 275
White further claims that the constant lessons are “Don’t stray from the mainstream.
You are not you anymore. You are part of a machine…This does not necessarily translate
into a submissive mind outside the realm of battle…they are controlled during battle,
regardless of their political or moral views, on the whole.” 276
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It is an empirical question as to how deeply individuals can be rendered automatons.
Yet, the degree to which an individual loses autonomy in these situations should be relevant
and taken into consideration when deciding the degree to which moral responsibility is
assigned to that individual for an action. That is, the closer someone is to being “a cog in
the machine,” the more justification there may be in pleading “Befehl ist Befehl.” Thus,
moral responsibility may not be a binary assignment, but rather something to be placed on a
sliding scale of “more-or-less” responsibility. Consequently, an individual should still be
held accountable for his actions, but those who caused, allowed, or advocated immoral
actions should also be accountable.
For individuals who are not sufficiently indoctrinated into mechanical reactions,
limited autonomy may also explain or justify their defense. In this case, consider the
situations in which autonomy is limited due to problems with justifiably limited knowledge
including, but not limited to, lack of information and false or misleading information. 277
Institutions often institute policy that individuals should follow only legal or moral
orders. This can serve several purposes. A positive purpose is to provide protection for the
individual who is confronted with an illegal or immoral act. In any organization, there is the
potential for wrongdoing by an individual who may give an illegal order. Therefore, the
organization can grant individuals the right to act on their moral judgment, as long as they
are willing to be responsible for the consequences of their actions.
There may be a more nefarious purpose for providing a policy stating that
individuals should follow only legal or moral orders. For organizations that are actively
277

A discussion on what constitutes justified limited knowledge is beyond the scope of this dissertation. These
issues are not dealing with simple cases of lack of knowledge where the individual agent is held responsible
for a lack of knowing.
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engaged in illegal or immoral goals this policy provides the institutions a shield from
criticism by offering an illusion of agent autonomy. Those policies may ignore institutional
pressures that attempt to regulate individual autonomy and overstate the belief that
individuals are capable of choosing appropriate action.
Policy that allows for obeying only legal and moral orders may actually provide
protection for the individual as it implies and the policy does reinforce a belief in personal
responsibility. Yet there are situations of moral uncertainty where individuals may be
unable to differentiate between illegal versus legal orders or moral versus immoral orders.
In such cases, it seems disingenuous to insist that it is the individual agent who has sole
responsibility for any illegal or immoral action.
Consider the following cases. A military physician is ordered to evaluate and treat a
prisoner. The military police report that the prisoner was involved with a prison riot, and
suffered his injuries from other inmates. As part of the evaluation, the physician is
requested to include a medical opinion as to whether or not the prisoner could survive
similar encounters. The military police indicate that this will determine whether the prisoner
will be returned to the general population or placed in special quarters. The military
physician is not provided with the information that in reality the prisoner is being
interrogated and possibly tortured. The intelligence officers in charge of the interrogation
have sent the prisoner to the medical facility hoping to (1) help conceal the signs of
improper interrogation and (2) ensure that the prisoner will be ready for future interrogation
sessions. Should the military physician have any legitimate reason to suspect that he was
given an illegal or immoral order?
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Alternatively, consider the case of a soldier driving a superior officer through
unfriendly territory. The officer is on a personal phone, presumably talking to command
staff. He tells his driver that there are reports of a terrorist attack at a local hospital. An
ambulance races past the jeep. The officer suddenly orders the soldier to intercept the
ambulance, force it off the road, and shoot anyone who tries to escape. The soldier has no
way to determine if the ambulance is part of the terrorist plot, or if his superior issued an
illegal order.
While professionals must be familiar with rules, laws, and ethical codes of their
profession, it is a fair question to ask whether busy professionals have the time, experience,
or knowledge to investigate every possible contingency of illegal or immoral action. 278 The
presence of legal departments and ethics committees indicates that these are specialized
services that professionals require precisely because professionals need guidance in some
situations.
People do not always have adequate time, knowledge, and resources necessary to
evaluate and to make appropriate legal and moral choices. Education, training, and
development in these matters are important so that people can react quickly and
appropriately when confronted with moral dilemma. The twin by-products of this are that
we train people to react mechanistically to situations and we train people to obey orders.
Yet we sometimes neglect the educational and developmental components of moral
deliberation, especially about how to determine whether an order is legal or moral.
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As an example of how daunting this task may be, Department of the Army Field Manual FM 27-10, “The
Law of Land Warfare” is over 190 pages long. Lawyers in the military may have over four years to study
law, but the typical soldier in the military does not have the resources to gain such a large amount of legal
expertise.
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A third defense of following orders is the Practical Defense. Some ex-soldiers
related that they only vaguely remember lectures on the Geneva Conventions, but they all
knew that if they disobeyed orders they could be court-martialed. This is understandable
given that large organizational structures have found that it is prudent to have a policy that
allows for, or even demands, that people follow orders when someone with legitimate
authority over them tells them what to do. Moreover, people may argue that such a policy
is, overall, good for individuals and society. Over the long-run, it is claimed, the good
outweighs the bad. Even in situations with limited information, an individual must
sometimes act. In some cases, this conceivably means following orders without determining
if they are legal, proper, or even moral. Precisely because information is limited, agents
may have a valid defense of “Befehl ist Befehl.” Once again, the individual retains some
level of responsibility for his actions, but those giving the illegal, improper, or immoral
orders must be held accountable to a high degree.
In conclusion, there may be times in which “following orders” is sometimes
justified; in some situations in which an individual is acting as an automaton or when his
autonomy is significantly limited. The issue is whether the need to follow orders establishes
that military duties always override medical duties. This cannot be concluded unless
following orders is always a justification, or at least always a justification in the military. It
cannot be concluded that following orders establishes that military duties should always
override medical duties unless the “following orders” defense is wholeheartedly accepted.
The case of Karl Brandt demonstrates the problems with accepting this defense.
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§1.2: Karl Brandt – Nazi Medical Doctor
Karl Brandt was one of the dominant medical figures in Nazi Germany. 279 Doctor
Brandt was Hitler’s personal physician and as a member of the Schutzstaffel (SS) was
involved in many activities which eventually led to his execution after the Nuremburg
Medical Trials. 280 Brandt was responsible for formalizing a program of the medical killing
of children, expanding this program to a focus on adult chronic patients in the T4 program,
advocating the use of carbon monoxide poisoning as a “humane” form of killing, and
working with medical experiments.
Paradoxically, Brandt was considered by many Germans as “a highly ethical person”
and was generally well regarded within Germany as a humane idealist. 281 He was angered at
some of the brutal handlings of some medical patients and allowed some groups of people to
be spared. Brandt’s extensive use of the “following orders defense” during the Nuremburg
Trials relating to medical experiments is particularly illuminating. 282
Brandt claims that “There are three aggravating factors with respect to the question
of the criminal element in experiments: their involuntary character, the lack of necessity for
them, and the dangers involved.” 283 The President of the Tribunal, Justice Beals, questioned
Brandt. “I would ask counsel if by his question he intends to ask the witness whether the
279
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experiments . . . would be objectionable or illegal if carried on by a physician upon persons
in civil life disconnected with the military service.” 284 Brandt claims that under war
conditions certain experiments may be deemed ethical and necessary.
To argue for this claim, Brandt classifies experiments as voluntary and involuntary,
each of which can be further classified as dangerous or non-dangerous. Considering the
notion of following orders Brandt says, “If there is a danger, the physician must be relieved
of all responsibility for the danger that is involved. This is possible only by way of an
official order on the part of some superior authority, or some government dispensation, the
interests of the state being capable of varying interpretation in time of war.” 285 This
underscores a direct claim that responsibility for some actions may be assumed by some
higher authority.
When asked about the ethical evaluation of physicians experimenting upon people,
Brandt continues:
May I first of all repeat, so that I am sure I have understood correctly. In the
conduct of the experiments it is assumed that they are of the highest military
importance, that the test persons have not given their consent, and that the
experiments are dangerous, with death the possible outcome. In such a case I
am of the opinion, considering the war situation, that the individual or
government institution determining their importance must also undertake to
relieve the physician of responsibility in the event of a fatal outcome of the
experiment. 286

Trying to evaluate what the implications of the “Befehl ist Befehl” defense implied,
Judge Sebring asked, “Now, does it take away the responsibility from the physician, in your
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view, or does it share the responsibility with the physician in your view?” 287 Brandt made
what may have appeared to be a mechanistic defense, quickly followed by a limited
autonomy defense:
In my opinion it removes it from the physician, for from this moment on the
physician is only an instrument, in about the same way as is an officer in the
field who is ordered to take a group of three or five soldiers without fail to a
position where they will perish, fall. When I apply the relationship of our
German conditions during war, it is basically the same. I do not believe that
the physician on his own would or could conduct such an experiment by his
medical ethics or his moral sense, unless he had immunity from the
authoritarian state, which would give him, on the one hand, security under
formal law, and on the other hand, a direct order to carry out. 288
This prompted Judge Sebring to ask Brandt about following orders. “Would you
conceive that such an order would authorize the medical officer to whom the order was
addressed to select subjects involuntarily and subject them to experiments, the execution of
which that officer absolutely knew or should have known would likely result in death of the
subject?”289 Brandt responded by appealing to limited autonomy. “It depends on the clear
chain of command that would apply in such a case.” 290 Brandt elucidated this by appealing
to an analogy of soldiers following orders in the military—soldiers follow orders even when
(or especially when) they have imperfect knowledge of the situation.
Likewise, according to Brandt, physicians must follow orders. Failure to follow
orders, for soldiers and physicians, means being held accountable for disobeying orders.
According to Brandt, “Had this physician refused to carry out the experiments [as ordered to
by the state], he would have surely been called to account for his failure. In such a case . . .
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personal response to a code of ethics peculiar to a specific profession had to give way to the
total character of this war.” 291 Brandt thus seems to base his final appeal on the practical
defense, where failure to obey orders results in personal hardship for the soldier who
disobeys.

§1.3: Lessons from Brandt’s Defense
During the Nuremburg Medical Trials, Nazi medical doctors often used the “Befehl
ist Befehl” defense coupled with two further notions. The defense claimed that military
necessity and ethics during times of war were different from ethics during times of peace
and that certain actions, such as euthanizing selected populations or engaging in medical
experiments “for the greater good,” were justified. These Nazi defense arguments have been
solidly rejected.
The basis of rejection of these defense claims is compiled in the indictments of the
Nuremberg Medical Trials. 292 The indictments state that the defense of following orders
does not apply in the following four situations: (1) Principals who took a consenting part in
planning and executing a conspiracy to commit War Crimes and Crimes Against Humanity,
(2) Principals who took a consenting part in planning and executing War Crimes, (3)
Principals who took a consenting part in planning and executing Crimes Against Humanity,
and (4) Membership in a criminal organization.
Examples of the first three indictments include performing medical experiments
upon human subjects without their consent, during which murders, brutalities, cruelties,
tortures, and other inhumane acts are performed; participating in mass murder of civilians;
291
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and performing euthanasia on human subjects, without their consent. The fourth indictment
lists Die Schutzstaffelnder National Sozialistischen Deutschen Arbeiter-Partei, the SS, as an
illegal organization. The eventual rulings in these trials add support to the implications in
these charges that there seems to be a threshold past which military necessity, changing
ethics, or following orders no longer apply as reasonable or moral.
Once an individual reaches this threshold, they must assume individual moral
responsibility for their actions. In extreme cases, such as occurred in the Holocaust, the
mechanization of an individual and the cultivation of limited knowledge reduced autonomy
and resulted in immoral actions and moral irresponsibility. What is apparent from the
indictments is that in these instances, the wrongness in these situations lies not only with the
individual following orders, but in the fact that such orders should not have been issued.
Moral condemnation must also rest upon those who initiate illegal or immoral orders, and
upon those who enforce the ideals that lead to morally questionable practices as well as upon
the individual who performed the act.
In conclusion, there are instances in which claiming “Befehl ist Befehl” is justifiable,
though it does not absolve an individual of all moral responsibility for his actions. “Just
following orders” can provide a legitimate defense and can provide relevant information that
should be taken into consideration in a defense. On a practical and moral level, “Befehl ist
Befehl” is a significant part of military training and tradition. In many cases, following
orders in the military is justified. When the complexities of war, human psychology, and
individual moral responsibility are examined, it is plausible that soldiers may be justified in
following some orders even when they have difficulty determining if the order is legal and
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moral and even when such orders may appear to conflict with personal or professional nonmilitary duties.
Because of the horrifying results of blindly following orders, as seen by the atrocities
committed by Nazi Doctors, Japanese researchers in Unit 731, and the soldiers who
participated in the My Lai Massacre, one needs to understand and evaluate the
appropriateness of “just following orders.” Since we, as a society, hold individuals
responsible for their actions, we need to provide training, education and development
necessary for individuals, especially soldiers, to explore and to determine what constitutes a
legal, valid, and proper order. We must also provide the training, education and
development necessary to foster appropriate responses to moral dilemma. Part of this
education should indicate that it is not always the case that military duties ought to override
other duties. Sometimes other moral and ethical duties, such as those of military physicians,
must take priority. As the Nuremburg Medical Trials indicate, military duties no longer
have priority beyond a threshold of reasonable or moral actions.
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§2: Nazis Revisited - Professional Subversions
There are various attempts to claim that successful conflict resolution is achieved if
physician duties are allowed to override competing military duties. Some of the claims
advocate a total separation of duties, such that physicians should never involve themselves
with military duties. Other claims are based on the idea that professional autonomy, biased
towards physician duties, would ensure ethical practices.
A common theme for the claim that physician duties ought to override military
officer duties is that physicians should be allowed to exercise professional autonomy when
deciding how to handle situations of ethical conflict and moral dilemma. It is argued that
without this provision physicians may be forced to act in ways that cause harm to
individuals, the overall mission of the military, and to the medical institution. It is suggested
that when physicians are not allowed professional autonomy in the zealous pursuit of
military objectives we risk destroying them as healers, undermine trust in physicians, and
undermine trust in the medical institution.
In this section, I explore my interpretation of why these approaches are not
satisfactory, despite the insights that they provide. In previous approaches there is an
underlying implication that suggests professionals, such as physicians, are unquestionably
moral when acting as professionals or that somehow a profession is independent from
societal influences. The claims suggest that conflict exists when physicians are forced to
mix their duties with non-physician activity and suggest that if physicians are allowed to act
with full autonomy, that moral action ensues.
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Given that many physicians are excellent role models for moral behavior, this
impression is understandable as this is a testament to the many physicians who are above
reproach in their professional and personal conduct. The danger is that the impression may
blind us to the possible insidious ways in which professionals may be led to immoral
practices. It may blind us to the possibility that sometimes “bad” people are in positions of
trust and authority, allowing them to influence and tarnish the reputation of others.
Because of the potential for abuse, several claims have been made that suggest that
physicians should not be left to their own devices when trying to adjudicate conflicts in
duties. In this section, Nazi Germany is revisited to examine one possible motivation for
this suggestion. This examination shows Nazi Germany as a historical example of what
happens when (1) physician ideals shift from concentrating on individual patients to
concentrating on societal needs, (2) physicians are allowed both unrestricted managerial and
expertise autonomy and (3) language is used to transform the values and socially accepted
ideals of medicine and ethical conduct.

§2.1: Barondess
Barondess presents an account of the rise of physician involvement with Nazi
Germany. Barondess’ account will help explain how physician duties, values, and activities
radically shifted with the rise of the Third Reich.
According to Barondess, Germany was considered one of the most sophisticated
countries in the world, leading in science and technology. Support for Nazism grew along
with various social factors such as the eugenics movements of the 19th century, restructuring
post-World War I society, social unrest and state regulations. As a consequence, “These
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forces culminated in the restructuring of German medicine, making it an arm of the state
policy.” 293 Biomedicine became largely identified with National Socialism. As
biomedicine became focused on state issues, there developed a conflict between the new
state focus and that of the tradition of medicine. “But medicine differed from these in its
explicit commitment to an ethical basis, to a humanitarian stance, and to a 2000-year-old
Hippocratic ideal that placed the sufferer first and did not stratify the responsibilities of the
physician on the basis of the social priorities of the state.” 294
In the late 19th and the early 20th centuries, there was a boom of using scientific
theories to serve political and social prejudices. In particular, by 1920 “racial hygiene” was
widely accepted as valid medical science. In Nazi Germany “medical metaphors
increasingly emerged in efforts to justify the activities of National Socialism in ‘treating’ the
country with ‘applied biology.’” 295 Medical training became increasingly influenced by this
applied biology. “By the end of 1934 the Kaiser Wilhelm Institute had trained 1100
physicians in what came to be called ‘genetic and racial care.’” 296
The medical profession was heavily involved with the Nazi movement, National
Socialism, and Socialized Biology. “Physicians joined the Nazi Party not only earlier but in
greater numbers than any other professional group. By 1937, physicians were represented in
the Schutzstaffel [the infamous SS] 7 times more frequently than the average for the
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employed male population. By 1942 more than 38,000 physicians were party members,
nearly half of all physicians in Germany.” 297
Various aspects of the Nazi movement appealed to the biomedical community. Nazi
racial hygiene was perceived as an extension of social Darwinism. Physicians felt that they
were now in a better position to help society. Professionally, physicians felt as if they were
helping to return honor and dignity to Germany, and physicians felt that they were helping
to prevent unemployment. Additionally, “there was a broad climate of dissatisfaction with
the structure of the profession, based on concerns that medicine was becoming too businesslike, overly scientific, and overly specialized.” 298
As anti-Semitism grew, these attitudes would have a profound impact on the
changing role of medicine. In particular, there was a growing sentiment that society needed
to rid itself of “burdensome” or “useless” lives. To accomplish this, Germany enacted a
series of laws and programs to promote racial hygiene. 299
The Sterilization Law in July of 1933 called for the “involuntary sterilization of
anyone suffering from disease thought to be genetically determined.” 300 Under this law,
between 350,000 to 400,000 people were sterilized. The law gained wide appeal, including
an endorsement by the American Eugenics Society, as it “established the political, legal, and
operational feasibility of a massive program of eugenic control.” 301
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The next step of the racial hygiene program was the Nuremberg Laws of 1935.
These laws were largely based on U.S. laws prohibiting marriages between whites and nonwhites. They were also defended by the American Medical Association’s practice of not
admitting blacks into their organization. The Nuremberg Laws excluded Jews from
citizenship and prevented marriage between Jews and non-Jews. 302
The racial hygiene program continued with the T-4 program in October of 1939.
Hitler ordered “mercy deaths” for patients “incurably sick by medical examination.” This
program began with children, expanded to include adults in mental institutions, and then
steadily increased its “patients” until it included Jews, homosexuals, communists, Gypsies,
Slavs, and prisoners of war. “By 1940 euthanasia had become part of normal hospital
routine” and even when not under direct orders physicians and hospitals were empowered to
act and received full support for acting on their own initiative. 303
With the growing “success” of the racial hygiene movement, biomedical research
began to organize around state and military interests reaching into such areas as brain
studies, sterilization, execution, assassination, typhus treatment, rapid decompression
techniques, freezing, seawater poisoning, transplants, burn treatments, radiation, twin
studies, and congenital defects. Physicians were widely complicit concerning Nazi activities
with physicians deciding who were subjects for experimentation, who died, and who
remained prisoners. 304
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Physicians also oversaw executions and certified deaths. They were instrumental in
administering the Nazi camps. “In short, the medical profession served not only as an
instrument of Nazi mass murder, but was involved in the ideological theorizing and in the
planning, initiation, administration, and operation of the killing programs.” 305
Part of the subversion of the medical profession in Nazi Germany was due to
overwhelming social-political pressure. “The German medical profession had been
indoctrinated for more than a decade by the Nazi Party apparatus, with relation to its special
role in healing the country and in applying a radicalized eugenics to cleansing the Volk of
inferior elements.” 306 According to Barondess, after the war many physicians returned to
practice as if nothing wrong had happened. It was relatively easy for them to reintegrate
into society and the scientific community. Against this backdrop, Barondess offers a final
thought. “For biomedicine a central lesson from the Nazi era is that the medical ethos is not
immutable, but can be severely distorted by social and political forces and by perversion in
the application of science and technology. The core values of medicine require protection,
especially by an informed, engaged, and concerned profession.” 307
To help understand why many physicians thought that their actions were
professionally sanctioned, consider Caplan’s account of Nazi doctors.

§2.2: Caplan
Caplan’s project is an inquiry into actions and the attempted defenses of biomedical
professionals’ practices under Nazi Germany. According to Caplan, “It is necessary to
305
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understand how those who committed horrific crimes on a mass scale were able to persuade
themselves that what they were doing was ethically correct. Those who carried out mass
murder, sterilization, and cruel experiments did so for reasons they believed were moral.
This fact is difficult to accept for those who take ethics seriously.” 308
According to Caplan, “Rather than see Nazi biomedicine as morally bad, the field of
bioethics has generally accepted the myths that Nazi biomedicine was either inept, mad, or
coerced.” 309 The “myth of incompetence” is the common belief “that only madmen,
charlatans, and incompetents among doctors, scientists, public health officials, and nurses
could possibly have associated with those who ran the Nazi party.” 310 However, as Caplan
observes, most medical personnel involved with the Nazi leaders were well trained in
medicine and were often highly regarded within German society.
The “myth of madness” draws upon the vision of the “mad scientist,” perhaps a
Frankenstein, who must be psychologically unhinged, or mad, to have participated in the
Nazi programs. Yet, Caplan counters, the logistics of running mass murder camps needs a
vast support system. More than just madmen would have to be involved. “The technical
and logistical problems of collecting, transporting, exploiting, murdering, scavenging, and
disposing of the bodies of millions from dozens of nations required competence and skill,
not ineptitude and madness.” 311 Possibly unique in the history of genocide, “The Holocaust
differs from other instances of genocide in that it involved the active participation of
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medicine and science.” 312 Quoting Lifton, Caplan claims that the medical involvement was
necessary to allow Nazis to carry out their goals:
Elite SS Troops, specially trained in mass killing, found it psychologically
impossible to, on a daily basis, use machine guns and pistols at point blank
range to kill tens of thousands of persons and dump their bodies in mass
graves….It would not have been possible to achieve genocide on the desired
scale and at the desired pace without the willing assistance of competent
technological and biomedical expertise. 313
The “myth of coercion” is the common belief that those who participated in the Nazi
programs were coerced and unwilling participants. Although it is true that there was
coercion and unwilling participation, the evidence suggests, according to Caplan, that most
mainstream biomedicine professionals willingly joined the Nazi party and shared with its
ideology. Many physicians, according to Caplan, willingly and enthusiastically embraced
the Nazi vision.
“The Holocaust occurred,” says Caplan, “with the intellectual support and the
involvement of the medical and scientific establishment of the most scientifically and
technologically advanced society of its time. The Holocaust, unlike many other instances of
mass killing, was scientifically inspired, supervised, and mediated genocide.” 314 Caplan
claims that biomedicine was heavily involved with Nazism through direct involvement,
providing the means, motives, and support for furthering Nazi goals. Biomedicine was
complicit in a general failure to protect or resist the immoral actions of Nazi politics.
Consider what is known about experimentation in the Nazi camps. Medical
personnel conducted approximately twenty-six types of “medical” experiments upon non-
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consenting, coerced human beings. The “medical” or “scientific” merits of the experiments
are questionable. As was explicated at the Nuremburg trials, “The evil inherent in Nazi
medical experiments was not simply that people suffered and died but that they were
exploited for science and medicine as they died.” 315 Some of the suffering was so great, and
some of the practices were so disturbing, that people recruited to help researchers with the
experiments refused to help. 316
Caplan’s central question is “How did physicians and scientists convince themselves
that murderous experimentation was morally justified?” 317 Caplan identifies six defenses
used by biomedical professionals.
First, biomedical and military personnel claimed that test subjects were volunteers
and might be freed if they survived. This is, as we know, simply false. The test subjects
were not “volunteers” in any morally relevant sense. Additionally, many of the testing
activities were “terminal experiments,” meaning that death had to occur for the experiment
to “succeed.”
Second, the biomedical and military personnel claimed that only people “doomed” to
die were used. By “doomed” they seem to have meant criminals sentenced to die or people
with terminal conditions close to death. Again, this is known to be untrue. Even in the
cases where a test subject was sentenced to die, standard ethics suggest that it was not
legitimate to use them as experimental instruments in goals they did not actively endorse.
Third, biomedical and military personnel claimed that participation in Nazi
experiments was offered as expiation to subjects, that is, participation was offered as a
315
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“cleansing” of their crimes. This was false since most people used in medical experiments
were considered “guilty” because of “crimes” related to race, political views, or genetics.
As with the previous defense, even if someone were legitimately guilty of a crime, it is
implausible to suggest that victims in the atrocities of Nazi experimentation would in some
sense be “cleansed” of their guilt.
Fourth, biomedical and military personnel claimed that since medicine and science
are value neutral, then medical and scientific experiments are also value neutral.
Additionally, they claimed that since they were acting under state authority they were not
themselves responsible for their actions. This is the familiar “I was following orders”
defense. Interestingly, Caplan does not refute this claim. However, we can readily see that
even if it is true that medicine and science are value neutral, that does not necessarily mean
that experiments done in the pursuit of medical or scientific knowledge are also value
neutral.
Fifth, biomedical and military personnel claimed that when working for the defense
and security of the state, there was a different morality during war. Again, this claim is not
really addressed by Caplan. However, the claim is closely related to the next one, which
Caplan does refute.
Sixth, biomedical and military personnel claimed that it was reasonable to sacrifice
the interests of the few for the benefit of the society. An analogy is made with this defense
with respect to common practices of the Allied armies. Nazis claimed that given the Allied
practice of drafting soldiers then using these soldiers as experimental subjects, it seemed
similarly justified to “draft” test subjects into their medical programs. Caplan counters this
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by claiming that “in the context of the Nazi regime, it is fair to point out that sacrifice was
not born equally by all as is true of a compulsory draft that allows no exceptions. It is also
true that many would argue that no degree of benefit should permit intrusion into certain
fundamental rights.” 318
Based on his analysis of these six defenses, Caplan concludes that:
Time and again physicians and public health officials at the [Nuremburg]
trials refer to the threat posed by ‘inferior races’ and ‘useless eaters’ to the
welfare of the Reich. The paradigm of the state metaphorically facing a
biological threat to its overall well-being that could only be alleviated by the
kind of medical interventions doctors would use to fight disease within the
body is reflected in the medical literature and training of health care
professionals both before and during the war. 319
The concern, when considering the relationship of physician duties to other duties, is
that “The biomedical paradigm provided the theoretical basis for allowing those sworn to the
Hippocratic principle of nonmaleficence to kill in the name of the state.” Caplan ends his
article by stating that “…those who teach bioethics in the hope that it can effect conduct or
character must come to terms with the fact that biomedicine’s role in the Holocaust was
frequently defended on moral grounds.” 320
The next section illustrates how language is used to transform the values and ideals
of medicine and ethical conduct. Lifton’s account of “socialized biology” which details a
paradigm shift in medical duties—a shift in focus from individual patients to social groups
which involves a role change from medical healer to medical killer—provides the key to
understanding the role of language.
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§2.3: Lifton
According to Lakoff and Johnson, “The people who get to impose their metaphors
on the culture get to define what we consider to be true—absolutely and objectively true.” 321
Robert Jay Lifton’s The Nazi Doctors: Medical Killing and the Psychology of Genocide
provides an insight into how Nazi Germany used biological and medical metaphors to
institute a program that most people agree is highly unethical—Genocide. This section
reviews some of the metaphors used by the Nazis to define social-political-medical “truth.”
This review will show how biological ideology and metaphor was used to undermine and
subvert the role of the physician. This will, in turn, be used to suggest why, and under what
circumstances, it is best to not suggest that physician duties should always override military
duties. As will be seen, there is a danger in uncritically suggesting that professional medical
autonomy, in the guise of pursuing professional ideals, should override military duties just
as there is a danger in uncritically suggesting that military duties should override
professional medical duties.
How can language, and in particular metaphor, influence the practice of a
profession? Consider two basic questions in medical ethics; “What is the role of the
physician?” and “What is the physician’s relationship to his patient?” As previously
indicated, physicians are typically seen as healers and caretakers of their individual patients.
James F. Childress and Mark Siegler discuss five contemporary metaphors used to
understand the physician-patient relationship. 322
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The first metaphoric relationship is “Parental” or “Paternalism.” This relationship is
one in which the physician assumes the role of a parent, while the patient is either a passive
infant or a guided adolescent. This metaphor stresses that the physician knows best, while
the patient has few rights and little or no autonomy in determining appropriate treatment
plans. The parental model assumes ignorance on the part of the patient and does not
consider that the physician and patient may have differing views, and values, when it comes
to health care.
The second metaphoric relationship is that of “Partnership.” This relationship
stresses that both physician and patient are partners in a shared value of health. This adultto-adult model highlights the equal power between patient and physician and downplays the
assumed ignorance of the parental metaphor. There is not an automatic assumption that the
physician initially knows what is best for the patient. However, it presupposes a trust that
may be unjustified. It assumes that the patient must trust the physician to act in the patient’s
best interests, and the physician must trust that the patient will participate in knowledgeable
health care decisions.
The third metaphoric relationship is that of “Rational Contracts.” This relationship
stresses a compromise between the ideal partnership and the realization that trust is not
immediately possible between a physician and a patient. It highlights two possible
misleading ideas: (a) sick people view health care as an exchange in goods and services; (b)
sick people are always able to make rational choice. The rational contract downplays the
ideas of physician benevolence, care, and compassion.
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The fourth metaphoric relationship is based on “Friendship.” This relationship is
based on the role of the “good old country doctor” or “friend.” Friendship stresses how one
person, the doctor, assumes the interest of the other, the patient. Although a common
metaphor for areas with low populations, the metaphor becomes strained in areas with high
populations, HMOs, and doctors with conflicting interests. It can also become strained as
the “friendship” is somewhat based on payment for services.
The final metaphoric relationship is that of a “Technician.” This relationship treats
the doctor as a plumber, engineer, or body mechanic – merely fixing what is broken or
contracted for. This model highlights the new advanced technology that medicine depends
upon, yet downplays the social status traditionally given to a physician.
These five metaphors capture the most common views of the relationship of the
physician to their patients. In particular, each metaphor highlights a relationship between a
doctor and his individual patient, but also downplays the relationship of a physician to the
general public or society-at-large. Although Nazi doctors practiced with certain elements of
the parental and technician models, the Nazi party incorporated new metaphors that radically
changed the physician-patient dynamic and the traditional role of the physician as healer.
The Nazi doctors worked under biological and medical metaphors that (1) changed
the physician-patient relationship to focus on society and (2) systematically made acceptable
a different metaphor for the physician—from Physician Healer and Caretaker to the
Physician Healer and Killer. This changing role of the physician was partially the result of
misguided social and biological ideology that was advanced and made acceptable partly by
medical metaphor.
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The social and biological ideology the Nazis used was a combination of
pseudoscientific genetics and eugenics. From genetics, the Nazi leaders instilled the ideas of
“racial purity” and the “inherent Aryan virtue.” These ideas prompted a rationalization to
adopt a program of eugenics in which the Nazis hoped to achieve direct control over human
progress. Lifton speaks of this Nazi state as a “biocracy” which models itself from
“theocracy, a system of rule by priests of a sacred order under the claim of divine
prerogative…of cure through purification and revitalization of the Aryan race.” 323 The Nazi
leaders made use of both a divine mission, part of a cultural obsession with anti-Semitism,
and misguided, although scientific sounding, biological ideals.
The eugenics program in Germany began much as other eugenics programs in
Western Europe and the United States. Negative eugenics was practiced by prohibiting
marriage between individuals with mental illness or retardation, and by prohibiting marriage
between members of different races. 324 Negative eugenics was also practiced by instituting
forced sterilization laws for the criminal or insane. 325
Positive eugenics was practiced by actively encouraging specific marriages, or
rewarding individuals who contributed to the state ideal of socialized medicine. In an
attempt to create a pure and perfect race, the Nazi Party carried the theories of eugenics to
the extreme, eventually leading to Nazi Germany’s involvement in genocide. In this respect,
Lifton identifies a 5-step progression to mass murder within the Nazi biocracy: (1)
Sterilization, (2) Child Euthanasia, (3) Adult Euthanasia, (4) Direct Medical Killings, and
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(5) Mass Murder. The Nazi justification and promotion of this process relied, in a large part,
on using biological metaphors.
The first step in promoting the justification of mass murder, in a biological context,
was to destroy the distinction between healing and killing. That is, the Nazis needed to
undermine the popular beliefs that healing, by a physician, is automatically morally
praiseworthy while killing, again by a physician, is automatically morally reprehensible. To
undermine these beliefs, Nazi propagandists initiated a notion of medicalized killing—killing
understood as both a surgery and a therapeutic imperative. 326 From the Nazi military point
of view, this understanding had positive effects. Nazi command was aware that the
Einsatzgruppen troops 327 were suffering from psychological problems due to the nature of
their executions. Interpreting these executions as necessary to protect the health of the state
would lessen the stress felt by the troops.
The troops suffered signs of what we now know as moral distress: anxiety,
nightmares, and tremors. In a desire to decrease moral distress and, more importantly to the
Nazi scheme, increase the effectiveness of mass killings, Nazi command needed to find a
“surgical” means of killing. A “surgical” distinction would allow soldiers in the trenches, so
to speak, to mentally distance themselves from the psychological horror of murder by
adding a patina of legitimacy to the mass killing of innocent people.
The idea of “medical killing” would justify mass murder because the killing would
then be a “therapeutic” imperative for the German (Aryan) people. This was accomplished
by first dichotomizing humans into either the “racially pure Aryan Volk” or into “the Impure
326
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Other.” By means of metaphors, the Nazis then re-conceptualized the Aryan race into a
“pure” biological organism. Simultaneously, the Nazi Party re-conceptualized non-Aryans
into “impure” biological organisms that presented a potential threat of disease to the Aryan
organism. As this was now a “medical” situation, medical workers, including physicians,
assumed new roles involved with “healing” the society by killing the “impure” elements of
it. When a physician was confronted with the apparent contradiction between healing and
killing, he could claim:
Of course I am a doctor and I want to preserve life. And out of respect for
human life, I would remove a gangrenous appendix from a diseased body.
The Jew is the gangrenous appendix in the body of mankind. 328
Physicians were transformed from serving the individual patient to serving a social
organism, a transformation which included assuming the dual role of healer and killer.
The Nazis were masters of using metaphors to manipulate the cognitive
understanding of the German people to influence how “Germans” viewed groups the Nazis
wanted to eliminate. There were many metaphors that the Nazis used to describe the Jewish
people. One group of metaphors focused on the organism metaphor and medical notions
used for treating illness and disease: the Jews are agents of racial pollution and racial
tuberculosis; the Jews are parasites and bacteria causing sickness, deterioration, and death;
the Jews are eternal bloodsuckers, vampires; the Jews are germ carriers, maggots in a rotting
corpse. This new Nazi medical reasoning promoted the idea that it was of biological or
medical importance to eliminate the Jewish people.
Another group of metaphors were employed to focus the Nazi perception that the
Jewish people were less than human: the Jews are ants – thus they must be exterminated
328

Lifton, The Nazi Doctors. 16.

271

before they overrun the country; the Jews are wild dogs – thus they are dangerous and
should be killed, and can be used in medical experiments to better society.
The underlying ideology of the mass-killings relied upon pseudoscientific ideas of
racial purity, genetics, and eugenics. 329 The justification further painted a picture of the
German Volk as a biological organism that was threatened by disease. This conception
invited the idea of a medical solution which, in turn, tried to justify mass killing as
analogous to killing the cancer of humanity. This further changed the role of the physician
from a healer to a killer.
By utilizing and imposing certain metaphors, the Nazi leadership was able to
cognitively alter belief structures which transformed physician professionalism and the
physician-patient relationship. The conceptual structures convinced people that there was a
need for a national “cure” for “the Jewish problem.” The Nazis heavily pushed the idea of
the Regime as a Healing Movement, or as Rudolf Hess declared, “National Socialism is
nothing but applied biology.” 330
Within the Nazi medical community there were many metaphors the doctors used to
justify their participation in murder. The underlying metaphor justifying sterilization and
medical killing was lebensunwertes Leben, “life unworthy of life.” This phrase permeates
the entire five-step program to genocide: Sterilization  Child Euthanasia  Adult
Euthanasia  Direct Killing  Mass Murder.
Sterilization started with cases of the criminally insane. It then included the
hereditary sick: congenital feeblemindedness, schizophrenia, epilepsy, manic-depressive
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insanity, Huntington’s chorea, hereditary blindness, hereditary deafness, grave bodily
malformation, hereditary alcoholism, and so on. The Nazis attempted to justify sterilization
by claiming that people with those medical conditions represented a threat to the organic
body of the pure German Volk. Continued reproduction, so their fears ran, represented the
threat of spreading more of “their kind” like a cancer, sucking nourishment from society
until the social organism died.
The medical metaphor of group X as a cancer was quickly assimilated by the Nazi
culture, thereby increasing the belief that group X was consuming valuable limited public
resources. For many Germans this seemed unfair. “The best young men died in war,
causing a loss to the Volk of the best available genes. The genes of those who did not fight
then proliferated freely, accelerating biological and cultural degeneration.” 331 These
hereditary sick were further made less human by being identified by metaphors such as “this
person is mentally dead,” “that person is merely human ballast,” or “that group represents
empty shells.” 332
The Nazi party, including the medical profession and military profession, made use
of metaphors at three levels. First, there was the ever-present biological assumption of an
organism, the German Volk, protecting itself from a biological harm, such as the spread of
cancer. This gave rise to the idea that the cancer must be stopped from spreading. Second,
there was an idea that the organism, the German Volk, was being crowded in its natural
environment and unable to continue its genetic heritage because there was a direct threat to
its genetic future. Third and most important for people who must work directly with the
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hereditary sick, were the dehumanizing metaphors. The metaphorical beliefs contributed to
feelings of resentment and the changing attitude towards non-Aryans. The metaphors
further represented the cognitive transition to the next level of the Nazi eugenics program –
medical killings disguised as euthanasia.
The Nazis instituted two distinct programs of euthanasia, one for children and one
for adults. Once more playing to the influence of the organic metaphors and the biological
threat to the body, to the Nazi mindset, people with hereditary sickness where using valuable
resources. Sterilization was not doing enough to combat the problem of dwindling
resources. This became seen as a large scale triage problem at a society level. Not only did
the Nazis feel that they had to stop the cancer from spreading, they felt the need to remove
the cancer from the body.
The next step of the eugenics program involved killing children (newborns to
approximately five-year olds) with hereditary conditions. Doctors used pseudo-biological
reasoning to justify their actions. “These creatures [the children] naturally represent for me
as a National Socialist only a burden for the healthy body of our Volk.” 333 Although a
person would think that the systematic killing of children would be a difficult and horrifying
task for a doctor, many Nazis used the organic and health metaphors to lessen the difficulty.
The psychological burden was further lessened as doctors used metaphors as euphemisms
for killing, for example “putting-to-sleep,” or “slow withdrawal of rations.”
The adult euthanasia program followed similar reasoning and justification—protect
the race while putting sick people out of their misery. The adult program, named T4,
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extended the medical oversight of killing to include (1) patients suffering from specific
disease, (2) patients institutionalized for more than five years, (3) the criminally insane, and
(4) non-German citizens. 334 The doctors’ involvement with this program of killing included:
(1) identify people to be given “Special Treatment,” (2) perform the actual killing by
injecting lethal medication, by ordering “special diets,” or by experimenting with gasses to
come up with a more “humane” way of killing, (3) calm the patients who were to be killed,
(4) disguise the killing process, (5) falsify the death-certificate, and (6) develop new
technology to increase the killing process. By participating in the “euthanasia” programs,
the doctors had redefined their roles from “medical healer” to “medical killer.” 335
The T4 program officially ended around August 24, 1941. The Nazi regime,
however, made it clear to physicians that medical killing should continue. With no official
policy of medical killing, individual doctors were left to their own discretion to select and
administer killings. Physicians continued to use metaphors, such as calling mental patients
“useless eaters,” to justify their actions. Moreover, physicians had more freedom to
experiment with killing techniques. For example, the “useless eaters” were given special,
totally fat free diets to ensure that they died. 336
As new technology was developed to kill patients, concepts of the T4 program were
extended to the concentration camps under code 14f13. In the camps, people were selected
to die with emphasis based on crimes, political views, and race. Yet, the selection process
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still continued to use medical myth and metaphors of health. The 14f13 program “provided
two crucial bridges between existing concepts and policies and unrestrained genocide.” 337
The first bridge was “the ideological bridge from the killing of those considered
physiologically unworthy of life to the elimination, under the direction of doctors, of
virtually anyone the regime considered undesirable or useless: that is, from direct medical
to medicalized killing.” 338 The second bridge was “the institutional bridge from the T4
project to the concentration camps.” 339 The camps themselves provided insight into medical
action that was influenced by metaphor.
The Nazi camps represented the “final solution to the Jewish question.” The Nazis
employed very powerful metaphors to try to justify their actions. From the Nazi point of
view, the “Jewish question” was: Given that the German Volk is a body and the Jews are a
disease that threatens the Volk, how do we protect the body? Using medical metaphors, the
solution was to rid the body of the disease. Genocide became legitimized as a medical
procedure as “A[n] image of curing a deadly disease, so that genocide may become an
absolute form of killing in the name of healing.” 340
Within the Nazi camps, selections for death were perceived as similar to medical
triage in war. 341 Inhumane medical experiments were viewed either as necessary duties to
the military state or as “hobbies.” 342 Gas chambers were sometimes referred to as “The
Central Hospital.” 343 Prisoners were often called “The Living Dead.” 344
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Lifton’s book provides insight into how extensive medical metaphors were utilized
by the Nazis, including both medical and military professionals. One pattern that emerges is
that the Nazis used organic metaphors to attempt to justify what they did, yet used
mechanical metaphors to carry out the medicalized killings. Both types of metaphors were
also used as part of the Nazi defense in attempts to justify why they did not try to stop the
killings.
During the Nuremburg Trials, the defense attempted to justify the actions of the
physicians by claiming that the procedure at the camps was very mechanical. The selections
and killings were constantly pushed to be faster. The camps were ran like manufacturing
plants, with an assembly line precision which made the Nazi killing machine cold and
lifeless. Even if a participant thought that something was immoral about the process, they
felt helpless to change the process. Many participants described feeling as mere cogs in the
machine, or like simple tools in the apparatus, with no idea what the rest of the machine was
doing. The final defense argument was that the defendants were “just following orders.”
The Nazis used organic and mechanical metaphors to shape and define the
perception of the nature of reality. From what we have seen, some of the atrocities
committed by doctors can be partially attributed to the physicians’ belief in the metaphorical
reality of the society to which they belonged. They believed that the metaphors accurately
described the state of affairs of the world. Physicians embraced activities which we now
perceive as highly unethical and contrary to all moral belief.
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Appendix 4: Nuremburg Charges 345

COUNT ONE -- THE COMMON DESIGN OR CONSPIRACY
1. Between September 1939 and April 1945 all of the defendants herein, acting pursuant to a
common design, unlawfully, willfully, and knowingly did conspire and agree together and
with each other and with divers other persons, to commit War Crimes and Crimes against
Humanity, as defined in Control Council Law No. 10, Article II.
2. Throughout the period covered by this Indictment all of the defendants herein, acting in
concert with each other and with others, unlawfully, willfully, and knowingly were
principals in, accessories to, ordered, abetted, took a consenting part in, and were connected
with plans and enterprises involving the commission of War Crimes and Crimes against
Humanity.
3. All of the defendants herein, acting in concert with others for whose acts the defendants
are responsible unlawfully, willfully, and knowingly participated as leaders, organizers,
instigators, and accomplices in the formulation and execution of the said common design,
conspiracy, plans and enterprises to commit, and which involved the commission of, War
Crimes and Crimes against Humanity.
4. It was a part of the said common design, conspiracy, plans and enterprises to perform
medical experiments upon concentration camp inmates and other living human subjects,
without their consent, in the course of which experiments the defendants committed the
murders, brutalities, cruelties, tortures, and other inhumane acts, here fully described in
Counts Two and Three of the Indictment.
5. The said common design, conspiracy, plans and enterprises embraced the commission of
War Crimes and Crimes against Humanity, as set forth in Counts Two and Three of this
Indictment, in that the defendants unlawfully, willfully, and knowingly encouraged, aided,
abetted, and participated in the subject[ing] of thousands of persons, including civilians, and
members of the armed forces of nations then at war with the German Reich, to murders,
brutalities, cruelties, tortures, atrocities, and other inhumane acts.
COUNT TWO -- WAR CRIMES
6. Between September 1939 and April 1945 all of the defendants herein unlawfully,
willfully, and knowingly committed War Crimes, as defined by Article II of Control Council
Law No. 10, in that they were principals in, accessories to, ordered, abetted, took a
consenting part in, and were connected with plans and enterprises involving medical
345
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experiments without the subject's consent, upon civilians and members of the armed forces
of nations then at war with the German Reich and who were in the custody of the German
Reich in exercise of belligerent control, in the course of which experiments the defendants
committed murders, brutalities, cruelties, tortures, atrocities, and other inhumane acts. Such
experiments included, but were not limited to, the following:
(A) HIGH ALTITUDE EXPERIMENTS. From about March 1942 to about August 1942
experiments were conducted at the Dachau Concentration Camp for the benefit of the
German Air Force to investigate the limits of human endurance and existence at extremely
high altitudes. The experiments were carried out in a low-pressure chamber in which the
atmospheric conditions and pressures prevailing at high altitude (up to 68,000 feet) could be
duplicated. The experimental subjects were placed in the low-pressure chamber and
thereafter the simulated altitude therein was raised. Many victims died as a result of these
experiments and other suffered grave injury, torture, and ill treatment. The defendants Karl
Brandt, Handloser, Schroeder, Gebhardt, Rudolf Brandt, Mrugowsky, Poppendick, Sievers,
Ruff, Romberg, Becker-Freyseng, and Weltz are charged with special responsibility for and
participation in these crimes.
(B) FREEZING EXPERIMENTS. From about August 1942 to about May 1943
experiments were conducted at the Dachau Concentration Camp primarily for the benefit of
the German Air Force to investigate the most effective means of treating persons who had
been severely chilled or frozen. In one series of experiments the subjects were forced to
remain in a tank of ice water for periods up to three hours. Extreme rigor developed in a
short time. Numerous victims died in the course of these experiments. After the survivors
were severely chilled, rewarming was attempted by various means. In another series of
experiments, the subject[s] were kept nake[d] outdoors for many hours at temperatures
below freezing. The victims screamed with pain as parts of their bodies froze. The
defendants Karl Brandt, Handloser, Schroeder, Gebhardt, Rudolf Brandt, Mrugowsky,
Poppendick, Sievers, Becker-Freyseng, and Weltz are charged with special responsibility for
and participation in these crimes.
(C) MALARIA EXPERIMENTS From about February 1942 to about April 1945
experiments were conducted at the Dachau Concentration Camp in order to investigate
immunization for and treatment of malaria. Healthy concentration camp inmates were
infected by mosquitoes or by injections of extracts of the mucous glands of mosquitoes.
After having contracted malaria the subjects were treated with various drugs to test their
relative efficacy. Over 1,000 involuntary subjects were used in experiments. Many of the
victims died and others suffered severe pain and permanent disability. The defendants Karl
Brandt, Handloser, Rostock, Gebhardt, Blome, Rudolf Brandt, Mrugowsky, Poppendick,
and Sievers are charged with special responsibility for and participation in these crimes.
(D) LOST (MUSTARD) GAS EXPERIMENTS. At various times between September 1939
and April 1945 experiments were conducted at Sachsenhausen, Natzweiler, and other
concentration camps for the benefit of the German Armed Forces to investigate the most
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effective treatment of wounds caused by Lost gas. Lost is a poison gas which is commonly
known as Mustard gas. Wounds deliberately inflicted on the subjects were infected with
Lost. Some of the subjects died as a result of these experiments and others suffered intense
pain and injury. The defendants Karl Brandt, Handloser, Blome, Rostock, Gebhardt, Rudolf
Brandt, and Sievers are charged with special responsibility for and participation in these
crimes.
(E) SULFANILAMIDE EXPERIMENTS. From about July 1942 to about September 1943
experiments to investigate the effectiveness of sulfanilamide were conducted at the
Ravensbruck Concentration Camp for the benefit of the German Armed Forces. Wounds
deliberately inflicted on the experimental subjects were infected with bacteria such as
streptococcus, gas gangrene, and tetanus. Circulation of blood was interrupted by tying off
blood vessels at both ends of the wound to create a condition similar to that of a battlefield
wound. Infection was aggravated by forcing wood shavings and ground glass into the
wounds. The infection was treated with sulfanilamide and other drugs to determine their
effectiveness. Some subjects died as a result of these experiments and others suffered
serious injury and intense agony. The defendants Karl Brandt, Handloser, Rostock,
Schroeder, Gen[z]ken, Gebhardt, Blome, Rudolf Brandt, Mrugowsky, Poppendick, BeckerFreyseng, Oberheuser, and Fischer are charged with special responsibility for and
participation in these crimes.
(F) BONE, MUSCLE, AND NERVE REGENERATION AND BONE
TRANSPLANTATION EXPERIMENTS. From about September 1942 to about December
1943 experiments were conducted at the Ravensbruck Concentration Camp for the benefit of
the German Armed Forces to study bone, muscle, and nerve regeneration, and bone
transplantation from one person to another. Sections of bones, muscles, and nerves were
removed from the subjects. As a result of these operations, many victims suffered intense
agony, mutilation, and permanent disability. The defendants Karl Brandt, Handloser,
Rostock, Gebhardt, Rudolf Brandt, Oberheuser, and Fischer are charged with special
responsibility for and participation in these crimes.
(G) SEAWATER EXPERIMENTS. From about July 1944 to about September 1944
experiments were conducted at the Dachau Concentration Camp for the benefit of the
German Air Force and Navy to study various methods of making seawater drinkable. The
subjects were deprived of all food and given only chemically processed seawater. Such
experiments caused great pain and suffering and resulted in serious bodily injury to the
victims. The defendants Karl Brandt, Handloser, Rostock, Schroeder, Gebhardt, Rudolf
Brandt, Mrugowsky, Poppendick, Sievers, Becker-Freyseng, Schaefer, and Beiglebock are
charged with special responsibility for and participation in these crimes.
(H) EPIDEMIC JAUNDICE EXPERIMENTS. From about June 1943 to about January
1945 experiments were conducted at the Sachsenhausen and Natzweiler Concentration
Camps for the benefit of the German Armed Forces to investigate the causes of, and
inoculations against, epidemic jaundice. Experimental subjects were deliberately infected
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with epidemic jaundice, some of whom died as a result, and others were caused great pain
and suffering. The defendant[s] Karl Brandt, Handloser, Rostock, Schroeder, Gebhardt,
Rudolf Brandt, Mrugowsky, Poppendick, Sievers, Rose, and Becker-Freyseng are charged
with special responsibility for and participation in these crimes.
(I) STERILIZATION EXPERIMENTS. From about March 1941 to about January 1945
sterilization experiments were conducted at the Auschwitz and Ravensbruck Concentration
Camps, and other places. The purpose of these experiments was to develop a method of
sterilization which woul[d] be suitable for sterilizing millions of people with a minimum of
time and effort. These experiments were conducted by means of X-Ray, surgery, and
various drugs. Thousands of victims were sterilized and thereby suffered great mental and
physical anguish. The defendants Karl Brandt, Gebhardt, Rudolf Brandt, Mrugowsky,
Poppendick, Brack, Pokorny, and Oberh[e]user are charged with special responsibility for
and participation in these crimes.
(J) SPOTTED FEVER EXPERIMENTS. From about December 1941 to about February
1945 experiments were conducted at the Buchenwald and Natzweiler Concentration Camps
for the benefit of the German Armed Forces to investigate the effectiveness of spotted fever
[i.e., typhus] and other vaccines. At Buchenwald numerous healthy inmates were
deliberately infected with spotted fever virus in order to keep the virus alive; over 90% of
the victims died as a result. Other healthy inmates were used to determine the effectiveness
of different spotted fever vaccines and of various chemical substances. In the course of
these experiments 75% of the selected number of inmates were vaccinated with one of the
vaccines or nourished with one of the chemical substances and, after a period of three to four
weeks, were infected with spotted fever germs. The remaining 25% were infected without
previous protection in order to compare the effectiveness of the vaccines and the chemical
substances. As a result, hundreds of the persons experimented upon died. Experiments with
yellow fever, smallpox, typhus, paratyphus A and B, cholera, and diphtheria were also
conducted. Similar experiments with like results were conducted at Natzweiler
Concentration Camp. The defendants Karl Brandt, Handloser, Rostock, Schroeder,
Genzken, Gebhardt, Rudolf Brandt, Mrugowsky, Poppendick, Sievers, Rose, BeckerFreyseng, and Hoven are charged with special responsibility for and participation in these
crimes.
(K) EXPERIMENTS WITH POISON. In or about December 1943 and in or about October
1944 experiments were conducted at the Buchenwald Concentration Camp to investigate the
effect of various poisons upon human beings. The poisons were secretly administered to
experimental subjects in their food. The victims died as a result of the poison or were killed
immediately in order to permit autopsies. In or about September 1944 experimental subjects
were shot with poison bullets and suffered torture and death. The defendants Genzken,
Gebhardt, Mrugowsky, and Poppendick are charged with special responsibility for and
participation in these crimes.
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(L) INCENDIARY BOMB EXPERIMENTS. From about November 1943 to about January
1944 experiments were conducted at the Buchenwald Concentration Camp to test the effect
of various pharmaceutical preparations on phosphorus burns. These burns were inflicted on
experimental subjects with phosphorus matter taken from incendiary bombs, and caused
severe pain, suffering, and serious bodily injury. The defendants Genzken, Gebhardt,
Mrugowsky, and Poppendick are charged with special responsibility for and participation in
these crimes.
7. Between June 1943 and September 1944 the defendants Rudolf Brandt and Sievers
unlawfully, willfully, and knowingly committed War Crimes, as defined by Article II of
Control Council Law No. 10, in that they were principals in, accessories to, ordered, abetted,
took a consenting part in, and were connected with plans and enterprises involving the
murder of civilians and members of the armed forces of nations then at war with the German
Reich and who were in the custody of the German Reich in exercise of belligerent control.
One [h]under twelve Jews were selected for the purpose of completing a skeleton collection
for the Reich University of Strasbourg. Their photographs and anthropological
measurements were taken. Then they were killed. Thereafter, comparison tests, anatomical
research, studies regarding race, pathological features of the body, form and size of the
brain, and other tests, were made. The bodies were sent to Strassbourg and defleshed.
8. Between May 1942 and January 1943 the defendants Blome and Rudolf Brandt
unlawfully, willfully, and knowingly committed War Crimes, as defined by Article II of
Control Council Law No. 10, in that they were principals in, accessories to, ordered, abetted,
took a consenting part in, and were connected with plans and enterprises involving the
murder and mistreatment of tens of thousands of Polish nationals who were civilian and
members of the armed forces of a nation then at war with the German Reich and who were
in the custody of the German Reich in exercise of belligerent control. These people were
alleged to be infected with incurable tuberculosis. On the group [sic; pretense] of insuring
the health and welfare of Germans in Poland, many tubercular Poles were ruthlessly
exterminated while others were isolated in death camps with inadequate medical facilities.
9. Between September 1939 and April 1945 the defendants Karl Brandt Blome, Brack, and
Hoven unlawfully, willfully, and knowingly committed War Crimes, as defined by Article II
of Control Council Law No. 10, in that they were principals in, accessories to, ordered,
abetted, took a consenting part in, and were connected with plans and enterprises involving
the execution of the so-called "euthanasia" program of the German Reich in the course of
which the defendants herein murdered hundreds of thousands of human beings, including
nationals of German-occupied countries. This program involved the systematic and secret
execution of the aged, insane, incurably ill, of deformed children, and other persons, by gas,
lethal injections, and divers other means in nursing homes, hospitals, and asylums. Such
persons were regarded as "useless eaters" and a burden to the German war machine. The
relatives of these victims were informed that they died from [n]atural causes, such as heart
failure. German doctors involved in the "euthanasia" program were also sent to the Eastern
occupied countries to assist in the mass extermination of Jews.
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10. The said War Crimes constitute violations of international conventions, particularly of
Articles 4, 5, 6, 7, and 46 of the Hague Regulations, 1907, and of Articles 2, 3, and 4 of the
Prisoner-of-war Convention (Geneva, 1929), the laws and customs of war, the general
principles of criminal law as derived from the criminal laws of all civilized nations, the
internal penal laws of the countries in which such crimes were committed, and of Article II
of Control Council Law No. 10.
COUNT THREE -- CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY.
11. Between September 1939 and April 1945 all of the defendants herein unlawfully,
willfully, and knowingly committed Crimes against Humanity, as defined by Article II of
Control Council Law No. 10, in that they were principals in, accessories to, ordered, abetted,
took a consenting part in, and were connected with plans and enterprises involving medical
experiments, without the subjects' consent, upon German civilians and nationals of other
countries, in the course of which experiments the defendants committed murders, brutalities,
cruelties, tortures, atrocities, and other inhumane acts. The particulars concerning such
experiments are set forth in Paragraph 6 of Count Two of this Indictment and are
incorporated herein by reference.
12. Between June 1943 and September 1944 the defendants Rudolf Brandt and Si[e]vers
unlawfully, willfully, and knowingly committed Crimes against Humanity, as defined by
Article II of Control Council Law No. 10, in that they were principals in, accessories to,
ordered, abetted, took a consenting part in, and were connected with plans and enterprises
involving the murders of German civilians and nationals of other countries. The particulars
concerning such murders are set forth in Paragraph 7 of Count Two of this Indictment and
are incorporated herein by reference.
13. Between May 1942 and January 1943 the defendants Blome and Rudolf Brandt
unlawfully, willfully, and knowingly committed Crimes against Humanity, as defined by
Article II of Control Council Law No. 10, in that they were principals in, accessories to,
ordered, abetted took a consenting part in, and were connected with plans and enterprises
involving the murder and mistreatment of tens of thousands of Polish nationals. The
particulars concerning such murder and inhumane treatment are set forth in Paragraph 8 of
the Count two of this Indictment and are incorporated herein by reference.
14. Between September 1939 and April 1945 the defendants Karl Brandt, Blome, Brack,
[and] Hoven unlawfully, willfully, and knowingly committed Crimes against Humanity, as
defined by Article II of Control [sic] Council Law No. 10, in that they were principals in,
accessories to, ordered, abetted, took a consenting part in, and were connected with plans
and enterprises involving the execution of the so-called "euthanasia" program of the German
Reich, in the course of which the defendants herein murdered hundreds of thousands of
human beings, including German civilians, as well as civilians of other nations. The
particulars concerning such murders are set forth in Paragraph 9 of Count Two of this
Indictment and are incorporated herein by reference.
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15. The said Crimes against Humanity constitu[t]e violations of international conventions,
including Article 46 of the Hague Regulations, 1907 the laws and customs of war, the
general principles of criminal law as derived from the criminal laws of all civilized nations,
the internal penal laws of the countries in which such crimes were committed, and of Article
II of Control Council Law No. 10.
COUNT FOUR -- MEMBERSHIP IN CRIMINAL ORGANIZATION
16. The defendants Karl Brandt, Genzken, Gebhardt, Rudolf Brandt, Mrugowsky,
Poppendick, Sievers, Brack, Hoven, and Fischer are guilty of membership in an
organization declared to be criminal by the International Military Tribunal in Case
No. 1 in that each of the said defendants was a member of DIE SCHUTZSTAFFELN
DER NATIONAL SOZIALISTISCHEN DEUTSCHEN ARBEITER-PARTEI
commonly known as the "SS" after 1 September 1939. Such membership is in
violation of Paragraph I (d) Article II of Control Council Law No. 10.
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Appendix 5: Just War Theory—Conditions
A full account of Just War Theory is beyond the scope of this paper. However, the
basics are captured from a statement made by the National Conference of Catholic Bishops,
The Challenge of Peace: God’s Promise and Our Response. Jus ad bellum requires
meeting the following conditions:
1. Just Cause: “War is permissible only to confront ‘a real and certain
danger,’ i.e., to protect innocent life, to preserve conditions necessary for
decent human existence, and to secure basic human rights.”
2. Competent Authority: “[W]ar must be declared by those with
responsibility for public order, not by private groups or individuals.”
3. Comparative Justice: “In recognition of the fact that there may be some
justice on each side, “[e]very party to a conflict should acknowledge the
limits of its ‘just cause’ and the consequent requirement to use only
limited means in pursuit of its objectives.”
4. Right Intention: “[W]ar can be legitimately intended only for the reasons
set forth above as a just cause.”
5. Last Resort: “For resort to war to be justified, all peaceful alternatives
must have been exhausted.”
6. Probability of Success: This criterion is not precisely stated, but the
bishops affirm that “its purpose is to prevent irrational resort to force or
hopeless resistance when the outcome of either will clearly be
disproportionate or futile.”
7. Proportionality: “[T]he damage to be inflicted and the costs incurred by
war must be proportionate to the good expected by taking up arms….This
principle of proportionality applies throughout the conduct of the war as
well as to the decision to begin warfare.” 346
Jus in bello requires the following conditions:
8. Proportionality: as above.
9. Discrimination: “[T]he lives of innocent persons may never be taken
directly, regardless of the purpose alleged for doing so….Just response to
aggression must be…directed against unjust aggressors, not against
innocent people caught up in a war not of their making.” 347
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Appendix 6: A Primer on Professionalism

§1: Understanding “Professionalism”
To grasp the theoretical and practical conflicting professional duties of the militaryphysician, we must understand the features of professionalism. In particular we can look at
such features as how to identify a professional or how to identify an activity as a profession.
Additional features of professionalism include identifying what qualities or characteristics
are present when dealing with professionals or a profession, as well as what qualities or
characteristics should be present when dealing with professionals or a profession. Typically,
this is accomplished by first identifying professionals and professions, then extracting the
characteristics that they share.
Initially it might seem to be an easy task to identify professionals and professions.
Consensus within the literature of professionalism suggests that “white-collar” workers are
professionals: physicians, lawyers, veterinaries, teachers, and so forth. Likewise, consensus
suggests that “blue-collar” workers are not professionals: janitors, lifeguards, factory
workers, and so forth.
Yet, this consensus is not without controversy. Some activities, although not
normally associated with professional activity, nonetheless contain people characterized as
professionals: professional musicians, professional athletes, professional poker players, or
even people who compete in eating competitions “professionally.” Furthermore, the
literature of professionalism contains debate regarding whether or not some jobs should
properly be characterized as professional: paralegals, paramedics, nurses, or soldiers.
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This essay addresses two of the more useful approaches to identifying professions
and professionals – a mostly descriptive approach and a somewhat normative approach. The
descriptive approach I will call “essentialism.” Essentialism relies on identifying the
necessary conditions that must be obtained for an activity to qualify as a profession or that
an individual must meet to be properly identified as a professional.
The normative approach I will call “functionalism.” Functionalism relies on
identifying the appropriate function or role of an activity as it relates to society’s needs.
Professional norms are then defined as related to insuring these needs are met in morally
appropriate ways. In either case, both essentialism and functionalism seek to answer two
related questions for identifying professionalism: What characteristics are necessary for an
activity to be considered a profession, or what characteristics are necessary for a person to
be considered a professional?
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§2: Essentialism
As the name suggests, essentialism seeks to answer the previous questions by
identifying the essential features of professionalism. To this end, Michael Bayles, Bernard
Barber, and Lisa Newton offer overlapping accounts of essentialism. I outline each account
in turn.
According to Bayles almost every author in professionalism literature identifies three
necessary features that characterize professionals: (1) a professional has acquired extensive
training of a particular activity, (2) the activity of a professional emphasizes intellectual
powers over physical ability, and (3) the professional performs an activity that is an
important service to society. 348 Along with these essential characteristics, Bayles offers the
following characteristics as common, but not necessary, to most professionals: (a)
professionals are certified or licensed to practice, (b) professionals organize special
memberships to promote the interests of their profession, and (c) professionals are
autonomous in their work. 349 Finally, Bayles distinguishes between consulting and
scholarly professions.
Consulting professions traditionally provided a fee-for-service practice in a clientpractitioner relationship in which the professional acts as an agent for a specific client.
Scholarly professions tend to operate on a salary with either many clients or no personal
clients. These distinctions further demarcate the essential features, as well as generate
various ethical issues. Consulting professionals, according to Bayles, possess several salient
features, features which present possible conflicts of interests between the professional and a
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liberal democratic society: (i) consulting professionals provide services related to basic
human needs, (ii) consulting professionals have a virtual monopoly on the services they
provide and (iii) consulting professionals are not subject to much public control. Thus we
can see that Bayles has a robust understanding of professionals. Barber and Newton have
slightly different approaches to essentialism.
Whereas Bayles offers a discrete view of professionalism, Barber favors a
continuous view of rating the relative degree of professionalism. 350 According to Barber,
there are no absolute differences between professionals and non-professionals. Rather, there
is a continuum between fully professional (doctors and lawyers), partly professional
(paramedics and paralegals), and barely or not at all professional (garbage men and
lifeguards). 351 The degree of professionalism depends upon the degree of involvement with
four features of professionalism: (1) a professional has a high degree of generalized and
systemic knowledge, (2) a professional is oriented towards public interest as opposed to selfinterest, (3) a professional maintains self-control through codes of ethics, membership in
professional organizations, and through training, and (4) a professional maintains a system
of monetary and honorary rewards of achievement that reflect the above.
These criteria, according to Barber, are used to classify professional activity in one
of three ways. First, they may be used to compare two or more different professions.
Second, they may be used to compare professionals within the same occupation. And third,
350

Discrete, from the language of mathematics, describes objects that are individually distinct or noncontinuous. For example, when measuring time continuous units are used because they can always
measure smaller units of time, but when counting the number of people who arrive to a party, discrete
numbers are used because one should not say “Five and a half people came to the party.” In the context of
professionalism, then, if you suggest that either someone is professional or not, you are making a discrete
claim. If you suggest that someone can be more or less professional, you are making a continuous claim.
351
Bernard Barber, "Some Problems in the Sociology of the Professions," Daedalus 92 (1963): 669. Examples
listed here are my own.

289

they can be used to evaluate with respect to differing criteria. For example, under Barber’s
system, a physician is more professional than a race-car driver; a teacher is more
professional than a secretary; a physician at a teaching university is more professional than a
“country doctor;” a Supreme Court justice is more professional than a newly graduated
lawyer.
Newton presents the most complex account of professionalism. First, Newton
suggests that professionals themselves claim that there are two criteria (which according to
Newton are individually necessary and jointly sufficient conditions) that justify
professionalism: (1) professionals are maximally competent in a specific area of knowledge,
and (2) professionals are committed to public good in that area. 352 Newton identifies
additional features that some professionals claim as justification for their professional status:
(a) professionals attend to the welfare and interests of their clients, sometimes at the expense
of the public good, and (b) professionals command large fees. Together with the first two
criteria, I characterize these four criteria as Newton’s “internal” characteristics of a
profession, i.e., these are criteria which professionals often indicate as being qualifications
that identify professionals.
In addition, Newton identifies what I refer to as “external” criteria, i.e., criteria that
involve the historical development of a profession or a description of those criteria which
actually appear to exist in a modern profession. There are three external characteristics, any
one of which is a necessary component of professionalism: (1) professionals practice an
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activity to achieve excellence within that activity, (2) professionals practice an activity for
profit, and (3) professionals practice an activity which is directed to benefit others. 353
Although it is difficult to conclude exactly how the external characteristics relate to
the internal characteristics, it appears that Newton is claiming that an activity is considered
professional when it arises from one of the external criteria and conforms with, at a
minimum, the first two internal criteria. This account seems to combine aspects of both
Bayles and Barber’s view. There are conditions which must be met to qualify as
professionalism. This is consistent with Bayles discrete view. Once professionalism has
been identified, professionalism may be evaluated as a continuum over a range of activity.
This aspect is consistent with Barber’s continuum view.
Taken together, the three accounts offered by Bayles, Barber, and Newton give a
descriptive account of how to identify professionals and professions. One looks for
combinations of the following features: providing an important service to either the public
or individuals, containing a significant intellectual component, requiring extensive training,
having a high degree of specific knowledge, orientation towards community interests (not
strictly self-serving), having a code of conduct or some instrument of self-regulation,
containing rewards and prestige, being very competent, providing a public good, or caring
for people in their charge.
As useful as this list is, however, it is mostly a descriptive account of
professionalism. A crucial part of granting “professional” status is in the profession being
identified with serving the interests of the public good or the interests of one’s client.
However, essentialism seems to lack a certain normative element of identifying specifically
353
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what professionals ought to do. How do they serve the public good? How do they work
towards client interests? To capture this normative dimension, I now turn to functionalism.
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§3: Functionalism
Functionalism relies on defining professional norms that an activity, organization, or
person must meet in order to earn the benefits and obligations of public recognition as being
a professional. As the name suggests, functionalism strives to explain professionalism in
terms of function within society.
Ozar demarcates nine categories of professional obligation. 354 Like Bayles, Barber,
and Newton, Ozar understands that there are features commonly associated with
professionalism: a public oath, an ethical code, service to others, specialized knowledge and
special moral commitments. These features are, however, based upon the collective
profession’s answers to nine categorical questions:
1.
2.
3.
4.

5.
6.
7.
8.
9.

What is (are) this profession’s chief client(s)?
What are the central values of this profession?
What is the ideal relationship between a member of this profession
and a client?
What sacrifices are required of members of this profession and in
what respects do the obligations of this profession take priority over
other morally relevant considerations affecting its members?
What are the norms of competence for this profession?
What is the ideal relationship between the members of this profession
and co-professionals?
What is the ideal relationship between the members of this profession
and the larger community?
What ought the members of this profession do to make access to the
profession’s services available to everyone who needs them?
What are the members of this profession obligated to do to preserve
the integrity of their commitment to its values and to educate others
about them? 355
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Not every profession needs to answer these questions the same way; however each
profession must identify an acceptable range of answers. The professional norms are
established by (1) a profession establishing an agreed upon range of answers to the questions
and (2) society’s sanctioning of these answers. Thus, for example, defense lawyers may
serve very different clients than public works engineers; priests may value sacrifice while
advertising agents may value maximizing profit; politicians may serve their constituents
while minimizing the needs of voters outside of their own districts.
Common usage of the concepts surrounding essentialism and functionalism often
seems to follow the convention that the essentialism approach identifies whether or not we
are dealing with professionalism while the functionalism approach provides details about a
particular profession or professional’s ideals. In the former case we are often dealing with
more descriptive notions of professionalism, while in the latter case we are often dealing
with more normative elements. Yet this is not an established rule. Both essentialism and
functionalism can be used to identify descriptive and normative features of professionalism.
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